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ABSTRACT
Redefining the Object of Semiotic Studies
by
JIN Yiqiang
Doctor of Philosophy

Semiotics has long suffered a severe identity crisis, displaying confusions on four
relationships. The crisis stems partly from our failure to distinguish three pairs of relata and
partly from our poor understanding of the nature of an academic discipline. Semiotics is,
first of all, a discipline. Like other academic fields, it should have a sound object of study
and aim at an adequate theory. An excursion into psychology and the philosophy of science
can reveal to us the necessary constituents of a proper object of study and of a good theory.
Looking back, the history of semiotics has brought up a wide range of instances and types of
signs. Descriptive and comparative studies of these sign phenomena offer us clues to the
potential boundaries and possible unifying features of the sign. To meet the demands of a
proper object of study, the sign as a phenomenon needs to be construed both in the broader
sense and in the narrower sense. Signs in the broader sense, inclusive of recollective signs,
indicative signs, and instituted signs, are characterized by three features: an act of
recollecting or inferring, a relation between something perceptible and something not
perceptible at the moment, and a revealing function. The sign thus understood qualifies as a
category, but not as a good object of study, as it hardly reveals any deep-lying regularity,
rule, or law worthy of special scientific efforts. By comparison, the sign in the narrower
sense, focused on natural signs or instituted signs, is more reasonable. Of the two kinds of
phenomena, instituted signs are characterized by a connection instituted voluntarily by some
subject when it comes into being for the first time. They originate from recollective signs
and indicative signs, and undergo several stages before the advent of highly arbitrary signs.
They are made up of essential phenomena, supplementary phenomena, and epiphenomena.
With their multiple features, instituted signs are sufficiently unique, broad, complex, and
important to be a good object of study, on the basis of which a more adequate theory of
instituted signs becomes possible. Semiotics based on such an object of study and theory
obeys the spirit of the minimalist approach to academic researches. Semiotics thus
overhauled would, hopefully, not only serve to describe and explain sign phenomena
adequately, but also coordinate with adjacent disciplines in adding to overall human
knowledge.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Semiotics makes a difference. So claim semioticians, at least. Charles Morris believes,
“[…] the concept of sign may prove as fundamental to the sciences of man as the concept of
atom has been for the physical sciences or the concept of cell for the biological sciences”
(1938: 42). Jesper Hoffmeyer goes further than Morris, claiming that biosemiotics, a branch
of semiotics, attempts to research the origins of semiotic phenomena and to pave the way for
conjoining humanities with natural sciences, culture with nature (1993: 155; italics added).
In 1997, the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS-AIS) entitled its 6th World
Congress “Semiotics Bridging Nature and Culture.” On such accounts, semiotics is not only
fundamental to the sciences of man, but serves to bridge natural sciences and humanities.
On the other hand, semiotics proves to be disappointing to many people attracted to it.
There has been no consensus on almost everything around the sign. Morris notes that there is
“wide disagreement as to when something is a sign” (1946: 3). Achim Eschbach observes,
[…] current views on the definition of the subject-matter of semiotic study range
from the narrowly linguistic and logical to the broadly pansemiotic, bound only by
the universe. The working methods of those who claim to be engaged in semiotic
research are just as varied, the only common denominator being the claim itself.
There is not even agreement on the definition of the scientific status of semiotics,
whether it is a science among other sciences, the organon of the sciences, a
discipline, doctrine, mental attitude or theory. (1983: 27; italics added)
Dascal and Dutz point out,
Except for a universal allegiance to the scientific study of ‘signs’ (cf. Martinet 1973,
7), present-day semioticians diverge about practically all the rest: should semiotics
investigate sign-systems or sign processes?; should it restrict itself to the study of
the communicative function of signs or should it consider any signs, regardless of
their function?; should it employ methods of analysis similar to those of structural
linguistics, of logic, of textual analysis, of psychology, of mathematics, etc.?
Relations with neighboring fields---especially with linguistics---are also far from
clear. …Relations with philosophy, psychology, poetics, sociology, anthropology,
and logic are not easy to define either. (1997: 758; italics added).
Winfried Nöth’s Handbook of Semiotics illustrates the wild divergence of the field on the
name of the sign (1990: 79-80), on its ontology (1990: 80-81), on its theoretic model (1990:
83-90), and on its typology (1990: 107-114). Morris (1938, 1946) and Eco (1976, 1984) both
recognize the lack of an adequate general theory of semiotics, and set about establishing,
respectively, the behaviorist theory of sign and the general semiotics. More crucially,
semioticians approach the field with strikingly differing, vested interest. One good example
is a survey on the goals of semiotics conducted by Thomas A. Sebeok (1986b), in which
widely varied responses are given by thirty-four scholars, coming from apparently different
backgrounds, with different research interests, backed by different research beliefs. As a
result, semiotics does not measure up to its expected role among academic disciplines, either
as an interdisciplinary methodology (Eco 1978: 83) or as a metadiscipline or meta-science
1

(Posner 2003: 2360-2361). Instead, we see a field bustling with serous scholars using the
term sign in their preferred way and choosing their favorite theory of sign to study the object
they are interested in out of their own research agenda. Consequently, we see a field filled
with intra-disciplinary contentment and rejoicing yet with extra-disciplinary bafflement and
indifference. Viewed from non-semioticians, semiotics is internally incoherent, with no
unified object of study, methodology, or theory, unable to explain sign phenomena
systematically; externally, it displays an urge to expand its territory, acting like “a colonizer
of well-established academic disciplines” (Sebeok 1986a: 19), without offering genuine
intellectual nourishment for them, not to mention adding to overall human knowledge.
Naturally, this state already came to many a semiotician’ notice; a couple of them braved the
strong, strange semiotic wind to claim to be unique, and committed themselves to restoring
semiotics to a state similar to other branches of knowledge, by re-establishing semiotics as a
discipline. Such efforts, unfortunately, prove to be unsatisfactory so far. Morris’ (1938, 1946,
1964) attempts at a science of signs fail, due to its heavy dependence on behaviorism and
pragmatism. Eco’s general semiotics predicates the sign on social convention (1976: 16)
without explaining how social convention could possibly emerge without signs, thus
committing the fallacy of wrong direction, i.e., the fallacy of putting the horse before the cart.
Alternatively, Eco rests content to attribute semiotics to a philosophy that aims to satisfy “a
need to provide a coherent form to the world” (1984: 11). He subsumes “intended meaning,
inferences from evidences, and pictorial representation” under “inferential processes” (1984:
8) and boils down the concept of sign to “the semiosic process of interpretation” (1984: 1),
thus managing to offer a (scientifically) unified object (1984: 7, 36). Nevertheless, he does
not evaluate the pros and cons of the unified object, not realizing that a unified object does
not necessarily make a proper object of study, and that a discipline requires more than
providing a coherent form to its object of study as a philosophy does. Apart from Morris and
Eco, one of the latest scholars overtly devoted to general semiotics is Abraham Solomonick
(2015, 2017). His “theory of general semiotics” sparkles with insights, but still leaves some
room for development. Three deficiencies with his theory are as follows: It relies on Peirce’s
definition of sign as its cornerstone; it does not give sufficient attention to the history of
semiotics and other relevant disciplines; it does not develop its theory from description and
analysis of sign phenomena. All in all, the few brave attempts to reshuffle semiotics fail to
salvage semiotics from its odd state to require to be different from other branches of
knowledge. Semiotics needs overhauling.
This dissertation represents an initial attempt at revamping semiotics by recasting
semiotics as a discipline that coordinates with other disciplines in increasing overall human
knowledge. More specifically, it aims to establish a proper object of study for semiotics, so
2

as to prepare the ground for a “good” general theory of semiotics. To attain such a goal, this
dissertation first discusses the demands proper object of study for an ideal discipline. It then
makes a descriptive study of sign phenomena mentioned in the history of semiotics, a feature
analysis of the phenomena, and a comparative analysis of the features discerned, culminating
in a set of potential boundaries of the sign. Afterwards, it compares and evaluates the
potential boundaries, in accordance with the unifying feature of sign stipulated by semiotic
theories and with the demands from a proper object of study, resulting in a proposal for two
alternatives for the object of study of semiotics. It then goes on to make a feature analysis
and an evaluation of the two alternatives, with the finding that semiotics should focus itself
on instituted signs, and that it is possible to envision a theory of instituted sign that qualifies
as a “good” theory. By way of conclusion, the dissertation advocates a minimalist approach
to semiotics.
Structurally, this dissertation comprises six chapters. It begins, in Chapter 2, with an
examination of the identity crisis facing semiotics, i.e., those ever-present conflicting
opinions on four relationships regarding the status of semiotics. The crisis turns out to stem
from confusions on three relationships, and from poor understanding of the nature of a
discipline. There are no grounds for semiotics to have the privilege to be different from other
branches of knowledge. Semiotics is by nature a discipline, and aspires to an ideal discipline.
Section 2.2 thus probes into the two core constituents of an ideal discipline, namely, a proper
object of study and a “good” theory, by turning to cognitive psychology and the philosophy
of science.
Chapter 3 starts with a near-exhaustive listing of instances of sign phenomena
mentioned by scholars in the history of semiotics, grouped under nine types and more
subtypes in accordance with their apparent characteristics. These sign phenomena are then
analyzed in detail, to show the unique features of various types of signs; afterwards, these
sign types are compared, to lay bare the characteristics of sign phenomena as mentioned in
the past. Based on the conclusions reached therein, Section 3.2.1 analyzes the potential
boundaries of the sign. Section 3.2.2 reviews what the past semiotic theories have to offer
regarding the unifying feature of the sign. Section 3.2.3 combines the foregoing analyses
with the demands from a proper object of study, leading to a proposal, made in Section 3.2.4,
for two best candidates for the boundary of the sign: one in its broader sense and the other in
its narrower sense.
Chapter 4 devotes its first two sections to the constituents, essence, essential feature,
and variable features of the sign in the broader sense, i.e., recollective signs plus indicative
signs plus instituted signs. It is found that the sign in the broader sense consists of at least
three kernel constituents and six main elements. It is found that the sign in the broader sense
3

essentially consists in its revealing function, that its prototypical members tend to be those
with a strikingly high revealing function, and that other features allow of variation to a
degree. It is also found that the sign in the broader sense does not make a good object of
study, with the conclusion that it would be more fruitful to confine the sign to instituted
signs.
Chapter 5 first investigates the name and nature of instituted signs. Section 5.2 gives a
genetic account of the instituted sign, delineating the shift from recollective signs to
indicative signs, the transition from natural signs to instituted signs, and the evolution
between various types of instituted signs. Section 5.3 lays bare the makeup of the instituted
sign, revealing the mechanism by which non-sign phenomena give rise to an instituted sign.
In so doing, the section also lays out the origin of the functions of instituted signs. Section
5.4 summarizes the characteristics of instituted signs and evaluates its reasonability as an
object of study. Section 5.5 gives a sketch of the fully blown theory of instituted signs. The
whole chapter ends with the proposal for a minimalist approach to semiotics. Chapter 6
concludes this dissertation.
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Chapter 2 Identity of Semiotics
2.1 Identity Crisis of Semiotics
Current semiotics studies leak in many ways. Of its various problems, the most vital
one concerns its identity: the nature and mission of semiotic studies.
2.1.1 Identity Crisis
Semiotics has long suffered a severe identity crisis. Not only have there been confusions,
also found in other branches of knowledge, between descriptive semiotics and theoretical
semiotics, between theoretical semiotics and applied semiotics, and between specific/special
semiotics and general semiotics, there has also been much dispute regarding semiotics
between object-science and meta-science, between discipline, interdiscipline, multidiscipline
and transdiscipline, and between science, discipline, doctrine, project, enterprise, program,
movement, and field. While noting that “confusion reigns both among and beyond the
cognoscenti as to whether semiotics is an approach, a field, a discipline, a method, a theory, a
science, or a disease,” Sebeok himself claims that semiotics is a perspective (1986a: 19).
Another example of the chaos could be found in a compilation on semiotics entitled The
Semiotic Sphere (Sebeok and Umiker-Sebeok 1986), whose contributors differ wildly over
the identity of semiotics as a “‘science,’ ‘discipline,’ ‘method,’ ‘field,’ ‘theory,’ ‘doctrine,’
‘metadiscipline,’ ‘(interdisciplinary) approach,’ even ‘scientific attitude’” (Withalm 1988:
159), or as a semiotic movement, semiotic project, semiotic enterprise, or semiotic activity
(Withalm 1988: 161).
A brief critique of semiotics exposes this crisis well enough. John Locke divides
sciences into three sorts, and puts σημϵιωτική, the “doctrine” of signs, on par with the other
two sorts, namely, Φυοική and Πρακτικέ (2004, bk. IV, ch. XXI). Charles Sanders Peirce
follows Locke in equaling logic with semiotic, “the quasi-necessary, formal doctrine of signs”
(CP 2.227; italics added), and labels semiotic a “cenoscopic science of signs” (CP 8.343;
italics added). For both philosophers, doctrine and science are interchangeable synonyms,
loosely designating something akin to discipline. Ferdinand de Saussure calls the field
differently, namely, semiology, but still views it as a “science that studies the life of signs
within society” (1959: 16; italics added). Louis Hjelmslev follows Saussure, but makes a
distinction between “semiology” and “metasemiology” (1969:120).
Morris, in contrast, commits himself to the mission to establish a genuine “science” of
signs, which is able to offer “a theoretical structure simple in outline and yet comprehensive
enough to embrace the results obtained from different points of view and to unite them into a
unified and consistent whole” (38: 1). For him, semiotics---or semiotic as he prefers---studies
5

“ordinary objects in so far (and only in so far) as they participate in semiosis” (1938: 4), and
needs to adopt a behavioristic approach to be scientific (1946: 2-5). Morris also distinguishes
between “pure semiotic” and “descriptive semiotic” (1938: 8-9; 1946: 219), between
“scientific semiotic” and “applied semiotic” (1946: 239). In comparison, Sebeok prefers to
label semiotics a “doctrine” rather than a “theory” or “science,” because he wants to keep
distance from those “that prefer to dignify the field---often with premature strategic
intent---as a ‘theory’ or even a ‘science’” (1976: ix; foreword). He takes this attitude,
because he is committed to expanding the province of semiotics to zoosemiotics. The attitude
facilitates the expansion to zoosemiotics, but does not negate, by itself, the necessity for
semiotics to become a theory or science when it is mature.
Umberto Eco recognizes disagreement on the status of semiotics as a field or discipline,
but is more concerned to unify the field, with its rich yet scattered interests, into “a specific
discipline with its own method and precise object” (1976: 7; italics original). He echoes
many semioticians in the belief that “semiotics, more than a science, is an interdisciplinary
approach”---something like “a sort of unified metatheoretical point of view governing a new
encyclopedia of unified science” (1978: 83; italics added). Nevertheless, he does not go on to
explain how a discipline also works as an interdisciplinary approach. Eco also differentiates
between “specific semiotics” and “general semiotics.” A specific semiotics aims at being the
grammar of a particular system, whereas a general theory offers common, systematic laws to
explain various sign systems from a unified point of view (1984: 4-6). Eco commits himself
to establishing a real discipline or science of semiotics, by developing a general theory of
semiotics. He sets three objectives for semiotics as a “discipline”: a uniform object, a united
methodology, and a scientific theory (1978: 76; 1984:7). As for the first objective, he maps
out the political, natural, and epistemological thresholds (1976: 5-29); he pins the core of
sign phenomena down to “everything which can be used in order to lie” (1976: 7) or “the
process of referring back (aliquid stat pro aliquo)” (1978: 76). As for the scientific theory, he
proposes a general theory of semiotics made up of a theory of codes and a theory of sign
production (1976: 3), and later suggests a theory of interpretation by subsuming sign
phenomena under inferential processes (1984: 8).
Jerzy Pelc distinguishes five meanings of “semiotics”: as properties of the sign (termed
semioticsP), as a theory or science studying semiotic properties (termed semioticsS), as
semiotic methods (termed semioticsM), as a theory or science studying semioticsS (termed
semioticsMS), or as applied semiotics (termed semioticsA) (1981: 15-17; see also Pelc et al.
1984: vii.). Pelc’s terminology sounds queer. His semioticsS and semioticsMS are tantamount
to the nowadays more common contrast between descriptive semiotics and theoretical
semiotics; since semioticsS is a theory or science describing “semiotic properties of signs, but
6

semiotic properties for the sake of those properties alone” (1981: 20), whereas semioticsMS
analyzes semioticsS and provide tools for the latter (1981: 22). The problem lies with the
identity of semioticsS. Since semioticsS is intended for description of properties only, why
call it a theory or science? Once semioticsS is restored to its original role as descriptive
semiotics, semioticsMS, the metatheory of semioticsS, naturally gives way to theoretical
semiotics. Pelc urges us to be aware of divergence in the field of semiotics and encourages
us to be tolerant, but he is obviously not content with the situation, as evidenced by his three
articles to promote among semioticians the awareness of scientificity. In the above
mentioned article, Pelc goes on to discuss such topics as theoretical foundations,
substantiation, explanation, and ultimate premises, and analyzes the theoretical foundations
of semiotics in the above five senses. In another article, Pelc (1997a: 617-643) examines the
make-up of a theory and the meanings of semiotics, with a view to revealing how semiotic
theories are constructed. In the third article, Pelc (1997b: 644-667) discusses and contrasts
the concepts of understanding and explanation in humanities with those in social sciences,
with the aim of indicating how both groups of sciences address the topic of the human sign
use in actions in society.
Pelc seems to oscillate between respecting the status quo of semiotics and aspiring after
a real science of semiotics, though he is more descriptive on the whole. The same
ambivalence is present among many other semioticians. Some of them tend to be more
critical, speaking or striving for a real discipline or science of semiotics, such as Morris, Eco,
Marcelo Dascal, and Roland Posner. Morris and Eco, as surveyed above, both call for and
work out a general theory, or science, of semiotics. Dascal and Posner, as shown below, do
not provide a general theory of signs; yet Dascal urges explicitly for a discipline of semiotics
with a uniform self-identity, and Posner outlines in detail the guidelines for a discipline of
semiotics.
Dascal and Dutz observe that semiotics is problematic as to its self-identity and
relations with adjacent fields: Semioticians diverge about almost everything except the
alleged commitment to the scientific study of signs (1997: 758). To become a “discipline,”
semiotics must form a “separate identity,” through “a process of differentiation and
specification of the field, paralleled by efforts to unify and homogenize what was previously
dispersed among other fields” (Dascal and Dutz 1997: 748).
Posner (1997: 2-3) classifies semiotics along several dimensions: between descriptive
(and comparative) semiotics, theoretical semiotics, and applied semiotics; between semiotics
as an object-science, as a metascience, and as interdisciplinary approach. Discussing the
relationship between individual disciplines and interdisciplinary approaches, Posner (2003:
2341-2374) clearly defines “discipline,” examines the make-up of a discipline, establishes
7

the criterion as to what constitutes a discipline and science, and analyses the relationship
between discipline, subdiscipline, metadiscipline and interdisciplinary approach. Applying
these conclusions to semiotics, Posner takes semiotics to be a scientific discipline; an
interdisciplinary approach; a metadiscipline as well as an auxiliary discipline of all academic
disciplines; a subdiscipline of metascience which is, in turn, a metadiscipline of semiotics;
and a metadiscipline of metasemiotics which, in turn, is also a subdiscipline of semiotics.
In a nutshell, four confusing relationships arise with regard to semiotics: (a) the
relationship between a field, doctrine, project, program, enterprise, or movement on the one
hand, and a discipline or science on the other; (b) the relationship between descriptive
semiotics, theoretical semiotics, applied semiotics, specific/special semiotics, and general
semiotics; (c) the relationship between semiotics as an object-science and as a meta-science;
(d) the relationship between semiotics as a discipline on the one hand, and semiotics as an
interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline on the other.
2.1.2 Root of the Crisis
The above chaos seems to stem from two causes. One lies in the failure of semioticians
to distinguish now from future, expediency from principle, and practice from theory. This
cause applies especially to the first relationship mentioned at the end of the last section. Any
branch of knowledge begins with a provisional sketch of a field, and develops by way of
partakers’ efforts that come to be recognized by insiders and outsiders as a project, program,
enterprise, or movement. At these times, the branch deserves such labels, but this does not
mean it needs not grow into a real discipline or science. Morris and Eco already clarify the
need when the former remarks that “semiotic will become more a science and less a program”
(1946: 248; italics added), and when the latter tries to unify the bewildering field into a
discipline (1976: 7). It is one thing to respect the status quo of a field, but quite another to
determine its future scenario. The above labels suit semiotics well for the moment, but do not
serve the future, nor do they reveal its nature---a field to be developed into a real discipline.
Besides, terms are sometimes loosely used for expediency; terms with broader
extension, or hypernyms, are often used for the sake of convenience. Locke, Peirce, and
many others sometimes use terms---science, discipline, doctrine, field, etc.---synonymously
and loosely, because these terms are expedient when no suitable term is available. Likewise,
terms with broad extension, such as field, recur frequently, because they cater to more
situations---whether a branch of knowledge is still in an inchoate stage or has established a
mature discipline, whether it is fairly unified or remains wildly divergent. Yet expediency
and convenience do not tell the principle and nature of semiotics. Semiotics cannot stay a
field forever; it should aim at a genuine discipline or science.
8

Moreover, disciplinary practices demand tolerance, whereas theoretical pursuits require
accuracy. Strict terminologies may hamper disciplinary explorations at an early stage of a
discipline, shield our view of its possible links with adjacent disciplines, or even obstruct its
way to a genuine science when, say, an improper requirement is made of its object of study.
This is especially the case when a discipline is premature, when earlier false attempts may
turn around to nourish its future achievements. In this sense, dubbing semiotics a field,
project, program, enterprise, or movement removes some obstacles to its disciplinary
explorations. This is exactly why Eco encourages a tolerant attitude in calling for a history
and historiography of semiotics (1997: 730-745), and why editors of handbooks,
compilations, and encyclopedias of semiotics, like Sebeok, Nöth, and Posner, permit of
varied positions on semiotics. However, a discipline longs for its consummation. Theoretical
pursuits, basing themselves on disciplinary practices, always seek to correct errors, reduce
ambiguities, and attain rigor. In the long run, tolerance must be replaced by accuracy.
Put briefly, it stands reason to see semiotics as a field, doctrine, project, program,
enterprise, or movement temporarily, expediently, for convenience, or for practice; but it is
not true, as some tend to believe, that semiotics is merely, always, or by nature such a thing.
In other words, semiotics is currently a field that waits to go through a phase as a doctrine,
project, program, enterprise, or movement, to fulfill its identity as a discipline and attain its
objective to be a science.
The other cause for the confusing relationships, mentioned at the end of the last section,
consists in the lack of understanding of the nature of discipline. First, every discipline, when
fully developed, comprises three interlocked branches, namely, descriptive studies,
theoretical studies, and applied studies; among the three branches, theoretical studies include
special theories and general theories. This point concerns the second relationship mentioned
at the end of the last section. Morris and Eco already throw some light on this point. Morris
recognizes the need for, as well as the interrelation between, the three branches (1946:
246-248). On the relation between descriptive semiotics and theoretical semiotics, Morris
emphasizes the need for cooperation between fact-finders and systematizers. Fact-finders
collect facts, on the basis of which systematizers work out systematized theoretical structure,
which, in turn, help future fact-finding (Morris 1938: 54). Descriptive semiotics, through
careful description and deliberate experimentation, offers a descriptive base for logicians
who work on terminology and laws. “As the descriptive and logical aspect of semiotic
expand, with mutual influence of each on the other,” Morris believes, “semiotic will become
more a science and less a program” (1946: 248). A flaw with Morris is the name he adopts
for theoretic semiotics: pure semiotic or logic semiotic. In employing the term, Morris
unnecessarily accentuates the formal requirements of a theory, which he seeks to avoid in his
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own theory (1938: 9), and which, in Posner’s (2003: 2346-2347) parlance, is more a matter
of “means of presentation” that is not essential for a theory. Eco distinguishes between
specific semiotics and general semiotics (1984: 4-6). A specific semiotics seeks after the
grammar of a particular sign system. Like every other science, it is concerned with general
epistemological problems, possesses a predictive power, and can be used to guide practice. A
general semiotics, in contrast, is a science aspiring to explain various sign systems from a
unified point of view, a science solving three basic questions, namely, a uniform object, a
united methodology, and a sound theory. Eco’s distinction between specific semiotics and
general semiotics resembles that between specific theory and general theory, but his specific
semiotics also rings like including descriptive semiotics. It would be reasonable to use
specific semiotics to designate studies meant to describe and explain a particular kind of
signs. However, it is not proper to juxtapose specific semiotics, used in this sense, with
general semiotics which explains but do not describe. It is even less appropriate to call both
specific semiotics and general semiotics a science, since they are merely constituent parts of
a science of semiotics. Hence, for a neater scheme, specific semiotics had better be replaced
by special theoretical semiotics or special theory of semiotics, though in practice it is hard to
ideally separate description from theorization. This neater scheme goes as follows.
Descriptive semiotics aims at description; theoretical semiotics aims at explanation; applied
semiotics aims at application. Special theoretical semiotics aims at explanation of a
particular kind of signs; general theoretical semiotics, at explanation of all kinds of signs.
Descriptive semiotics offer hard data for theorizing for theoretical semiotics; theoretical
semiotics provides the motivation, perspective, and route for data-collecting for descriptive
semiotics; theoretical semiotics furnishes the terminology, method, and theory for applied
semiotics; applied semiotics supplies the stimulus for further efforts in theoretical semiotics
which encourages still further efforts in descriptive semiotics. Descriptive semiotics and
theoretical semiotics represent the backbone of semiotics, among which theoretical semiotics
constitutes its pivot; applied semiotics only plays a secondary role.
Second, a discipline is essentially determined by its object of study, which defines the
field and separates it from neighboring fields. This point clarifies the third and the fourth
relationship mentioned at the end of the last section. A discipline, as Posner proposes (2003:
2350), is characterized at least by (a) a homogeneous domain, (b) a unified perspective, (c) a
central method, (d) a core body of knowledge, and (e) dominant means of presentation. And
a discipline is a science if it has (a) a fixed domain of objects that is studied in its totality, (b)
a specific set of value-free perspectives, (c) a specific set of methods that are repeatedly
applicable, (d) a theory intended to be falsifiable, and (e) means of representation that are
intersubjectively comprehensible (Posner 2003: 2351). In so doing, Posner, among other
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semioticians, outlines the so far best guideline for semiotics to be a discipline or science.
This move is adequate to help salvage semiotics from its inchoate stage when partakers rest
content with a divergent domain with differing perspectives; when they rest content to call
semiotics a field, doctrine, project, program, enterprise, or movement; and when they rest
content to deem its failure to meet the same requirements made of the other disciplines as a
manifestation of its uniqueness. What is a shame is that Posner relaxes the requirements he
himself proposes when applying them to semiotics. Consequently, he is more descriptive
than critical in delineating semiotics as a discipline, slipping into the same bog as others in
viewing semiotics as at once a discipline, an interdisciplinary approach, a metadiscipline, a
subdiscipline, and an auxiliary discipline. Hence, the following elusive identity of semiotics:
a metadiscipline as well as an auxiliary discipline of all academic disciplines; a subdiscipline
of metascience which is, in turn, a metadiscipline of semiotics; a metadiscipline of
metasemiotics which, in turn, is also a subdiscipline of semiotics. Posner’s incongruity could
be attributed to the clash mentioned above, between the needs of disciplinary practice and
those of theoretical pursuits. Yet his ambivalence might also result from his desire to respect
the status quo of the currently divergent field, or from the influence of the weird tendency of
the field to insist on its privilege to be different. More importantly, Posner’s account leaves
some lacunae: Why are the five conditions necessary? How are they logically connected? On
Posner’s account, the five conditions appear to be disconnected from one another, but
parallel in import. This is simply not right. Following some method, a discipline studies its
domain from some perspective, to attain an adequate theory, which may be presented in
some way. The domain and the perspective combine to act as the starting point of a
discipline; the theory, its target; the method, its path; and the means of representation, the
look of its result. The theory, the domain, and the perspective are indispensable and the most
important; the method is necessary but counts less; the means of representation is neither
necessary nor crucial. The domain defines the object for scrutiny; the perspective determines
the element of the object to focus on. Supposing that the main mission of a theory is to
describe and explain certain phenomena as they are, the domain together with the
perspective would largely determine the contour of the theory pursued by a discipline, the
methods to achieve the theory, and the means of representation for the resultant theory.
Consequently, it is the domain and the perspective---which Posner calls the “subject matter”
(2003: 2344)---that defines a discipline and separates it from other disciplines.
If so, the identity of a branch of knowledge as a metadiscipline, interdiscipline,
transdiscipline, and multidiscipline would be dubious. These names invariably build on
existing established disciplines. A metadiscipline is a discipline about a certain established
discipline; an interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline is a discipline that studies
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something between, across, or shared by some existing disciplines. In Morris’ parlance, these
names belong not to the “thing-language” but to “semiotical terms” (1938: 44-45, 57). They
are convenient labels allowing us to talk about a new field of studies in relation to already
established disciplines, but do not describe its object of study phenomenally. A
metadiscipline, interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline is and ought to be, first and
by nature, a discipline. Lying behind them is not so much a discipline in relation to some
established disciplines, but an object of study related to objects of study already investigated
by certain established disciplines. At the heart of the issue are new objects of study that
emerge, one after another, from increasingly finer segmentation and sophisticated perception
of the phenomenon world. As human knowledge accrues with experience, phenomena
originally lying outside our purview come within our view. Some of them come to be the
object of study of new scientific researches, hence new disciplines. When scientific research
activities themselves become an object of study, we have what Posner call metastudy,
metafield, or metadiscipline. In fact, a methodology does not, as Posner claims, investigate
“the methods followed by studies within a given discipline” (2003: 2359); rather, it studies
the way a certain group of people acts to attain some aim scientifically. In the same vein, the
logic of science and the didactics are essentially disciplines targeted at the structuring of
theories and the means of presentation---two aspects of research activities special yet
common in the phenomenon world. What happens here is only this: People set out to study
the methods, structuring of science, and means of representation employed in academic
researches, in the same way as those academic researches study the phenomenon world, i.e.,
scientifically. There is nothing extraordinary here. After all, everything can be taken to be an
object of study, whatever its original status. The same happens with the so-called
interdiscipline, transdiscipline, and multidiscipline. Statistics, information theory, systems
theory, synergetics, gestalt theory, catastrophe theory are not so much a multidiscipline, as
Posner (2003: 2362) contends, as a discipline targeted at statistics, information, system,
synergy, gestalt, and sudden shifts that appear in relation to many phenomena. Nor are the
branches of knowledge Posner (2003: 2363-2366) cited as examples really interdisciplines or
transdisciplines, any more than a discipline targeted at some special phenomena. In a word,
terms like metadiscipline, interdiscipline, transdiscipline, and multidiscipline are labels
useful to highlight the relationship of a certain discipline with existing disciplines; on the
other hand, they conceal its nature to be a discipline in the first place.
As for semiotics, it needs to dispel two delusions: that it is merely a meta-science,
interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline; that it is a discipline as well as a
meta-science, interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or/and mutltidiscipline. Physicists and chemists
use signs---ordinary language or special symbols---to discuss physical reactions and
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chemical reactions, and we can further use ordinary language to talk about such signs.
Biology, social sciences, and humanities use a set of disciplinary signs to talk about their
object of study that might involve sign phenomena, and we can further use ordinary language
to talk about these disciplinary signs. In such examples, we have signs about signs (about
signs), and therefore, according to Posner (2003: 2360-2361), we have meta-signs as well as
a metadiscipline or meta-science called meta-semiotics. This claim is questionable. It is true
that one sign system can be interpreted to an extent by another one, and that language is
especially capable of this task, whether to render language itself or other sign systems. Terms
like meta-language and meta-sign help to foreground these traits of signs or sign systems.
However, when taken to be the object of study of a discipline, the phenomena in
question---ordinary language, scientific symbols, signs involved in non-natural sciences,
etc.---are merely different kinds of signs to be investigated by semiotics which, as a
discipline, naturally aims at all kinds of signs. They involve nothing that is really “meta-.”
When Posner regards semiotics as a metadiscipline of all academic disciplines, he reasons
like this: Academic disciplines comprises methods, theories, and means of representation, all
of which involve signs or sign processes; therefore, academic disciplines are
object-disciplines of semiotics (2003: 2366-2367). The truth of the matter is this: Academic
disciplines study their own respective domain; they resort to signs or sign processes in
following their method, in theorizing, and in presenting their achievements; semiotics studies
signs or sign processes; therefore, semiotics studies something necessary for academic
disciplines to explore their domain. Academic disciplines need to use signs or sign processes
in some aspects, but do not study signs or sign processes. Semiotics studies something about
academic disciplines, but not object-semiotics. Morris is much more reasonable on this point:
“The sciences must look to semiotic for the concepts and general principles relevant to their
own problems of sign analysis. Semiotic is not merely a science among sciences but an
organon or instrument of all the sciences” (1938: 56). Morris refrains from calling semiotics
in such cases metasemiotics, but rather calls it metalanguage or metasign (1946: 179). In fact,
as argued earlier, it is debatable whether there is metadiscipline or meta-science of any kind.
If, as discussed earlier, a discipline is defined by its peculiar domain and perspective, a
metadiscipline would be a discipline of an object-discipline, only if the object of study of the
former is exactly the same as that of the latter. Nevertheless, it is impossible to have, say, a
semiotics of semiotics, i.e., a study of signs that is a study of signs, because “a study of signs”
is not a kind of sign. Methodology, logic of science, and the so-called metalinguistics---the
often-cited examples of metadiscplines or metasciences---are, respectively, a science
studying the methods, logic, and language employed in sciences. The so-called metaphysics,
metamathematics, and metapsychology are, respectively, about physics, mathematics, and
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psychology; they are not, or need not be physics, mathematics, or psychology itself. The
situation is no different with respect to the so-called interdiscipline, transdicipline, and
multidiscipline. Simply because semiotics plays a role in several disciplines, it does not
follow that semiotics is essentially interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, or multidisciplinary.
Semiotics studies all kinds of signs or semioses; signs or semioses also appear or are
involved in other disciplines bent on studying certain domains from certain perspectives;
therefore, semiotics may assist the other disciplines in their peculiar investigation, by
clarifying the structure and functions of signs or semioses that make up part of the
disciplines. These other disciplines not only involve semioses, but also involve non-semiosic
activities and not utterly semiosic activities---observation of the world, sorting out the target
phenomena, experimenting, reasoning, etc.. Signs or semioses show up in academic
disciplines, hence a role semiotics can play in them---nothing really interdisciplinary,
transdisciplinary, or multidisciplinary here. Should semiotics be interdisciplinary,
transdisciplinary, or multidisciplinary in this sense, what about the whole range of disciplines
studying things that are needed by all academic disciplines, such as eyes, brain, the motor
system, the human body, matter, energy, and information? What is the point in declaring
these disciplines to be interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, or multidisciplinary? Unfortunately,
semiotics often falls prey to an even more severe delusion, namely that semiotics is not a
discipline, but merely an interdisciplinary approach. Such a view faces two fundamental
challenges: Why should semiotics be an exception among all the branches of human
knowledge? Whence come the grounds for its interdisciplinary power if it is not a discipline
in the first place? Proponents of the view either ignore the question or find it almost
insurmountable. In conclusion, it is not proper or meaningful to conceive of semiotics as a
metadiscipline, interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline; instead, it is, first and by
nature, a discipline.
In summary, semiotics is, first and by nature, a discipline, and needs to consummate in a
discipline made up of three interlocking branches, namely, descriptive semiotics, theoretical
semiotics, and applied semiotics. Like other disciplines, it aims at a theory, which functions
as the pivot of the whole enterprise; on the other hand, it bases its whole construction on its
object of study, i.e., its domain together with its perspective. It only makes sense to label
semiotics as a field, doctrine, project, program, enterprise, or movement temporarily,
expediently, for convenience, or for practice; however, it is not proper to view semiotics as a
metadiscipline, interdiscipline, transdiscipline, or multidiscipline.
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2.2 Demands of an Ideal Discipline
Like other disciplines, semiotics is to be built on its object of study and aims for a
general theory. This immediately raises two questions: What is the object of study of
semiotics? What is the general theory of semiotics like? Underlying these two questions are
two topics universal to all disciplines: What is a proper object of study like? What makes a
sound general theory?
2.2.1 Proper Object of Study
What makes a proper object of study of a discipline? Posner suggests the following
requirements: a homogeneous domain plus a unified perspective; or more strictly, a fixed
domain of objects studied in its totality plus a specific set of value-free perspective (2003:
2350). Then, what does such a domain or perspective look like?
On this point, studies on concept or category prove to be helpful. It could be said that an
object of study aims at a category (of phenomena) represented by a concept in the mind. A
concept is largely “an idea about something that provides a means of understanding the
world”; a category is “a group of items into which different objects or concepts can be placed
that belong together” (Sternberg 2011: 322). Features of concepts and categories are disputed
between competing theories of categorization in cognitive psychology (for a review, see
Eysenck and Keane 2000: 306-333, 2015: 231-238; Margolis and Laurence 1999; Medin and
Smith 1984; Murphy 2002; Smith and Medin 1981). These theories include the classical
view (e.g., Frege 1960; Katz and Fodor 1963; Miller and Johnson-Laird’s 1976), the
prototypic view (e.g., Hampton 1979; Posner and Keele 1968, 1970; Rosch and Mervis 1975;
Rosch 1978), the exemplar view (e.g., Brooks 1978, 1987; Hintzman 1986; Hintzman and
Ludlam 1980, Medin and Shaffer 1978; Nosfosky 1986, 1988, 1991; Ross 2000; Ross et al.
1990; Ross and Spalding 1994), the theory view (e.g., Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976;
Cohen and Murphy 1984; Keil 1989; Murphy and Medin 1985), and the situated simulation
view (e.g., Barsalou 2009, 2012). Stefan Wrobel (1994: 23-26) summarizes empirical
observations about concept or category into three groups: non-necessary features, disjunctive
concepts, relational information, and features as concepts; typicality, basic levels, and
superordinate distance; unclear cases, context effects, and multiple categorization. Robert L.
Goldstone (1994) characterizes category as dependent on theories, goals, non-local
information, and, in many cases, similarity. More specifically, L. W. Barsalou makes a
distinction between common categories and ad hoc categories, which are “created
spontaneously for use in specialized contexts” (1983: 211), or between common categories
and goal-derived categories, which comprises “both ad hoc categories and better established
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categories that were once ad hoc” (1985: 632). Common categories, be it natural or invented,
may be concrete or abstract, simple or complex; whereas ad hoc categories are generally
complex in form, such as “things to take on a camping trip,” “possible costumes to wear to a
Halloween party,” and “places to look for antique desks.” Common categories are relatively
common; they can develop to a high degree; they are generally stable because they possess a
taxonomic organization and a correlational structure, and, thanks to this stability, they easily
become well established in memory (Barsalou 1983: 212-214). Ad hoc categories, in contrast,
are “usually not thought by most people” (Barsalou 1983: 214); they are devoid of
correlational structure, and are ill-developed in memory (Barsalou 1983: 213-214); they are
invariably inchoate, though they may become well-developed through frequent processing
and thus cease to be ad hoc (Barsalou 1983: 224). Common categories tend to display family
resemblance among their members (Rosch and Mervis 1975) and a taxonomic organization
featuring the basic level (Rosch et al. 1976); thereby manifesting salient, albeit not defining,
perceptual similarities among their members (Barsalou 1985: 648), an overall correlation
between their members (Barsalou 1983: 213), basic level effects (Rosch et al. 1976),
typicality effects (Rosch et al. 1976; Rosch 1978), and fuzziness (McCloskey and
Glucksberg 1978). In comparison, ad hoc categories typically possess no internal structure,
i.e., no apparent similarity or correlation among its members (Barsalou 1983: 213-214), but
may display equally salient typicality effects as common categories (Barsalou 1983: 223).
Common categories are mainly determined by their central tendency, which, as a
manifestation of the family resemblance of a category, originates from experience with
exemplars; whereas goal-derived categories are determined mainly by ideals, which, as a
manifestation of the goal of a category, originates from the process of planning regarding
how to attain the goals (Barsalou 1985: 630-631).
Overall, several conclusions seem to be warranted regarding the characteristics of
concept and category. First, concepts and categories fall into various kinds: Some are
concrete, others more abstract; some simple, others more complex; some common and stable,
others rare and provisional; some well-developed, others still inchoate. Concrete categories
are generally simple, common and stable. They may develop into abstract ones, and thus can
be fairly well developed for a community yet still inchoate for individuals. Abstract ideas
may be simple, when formed from concrete ones, or complex, when formed from several
abstract ones, in which case they may develop into simple ones by further abstraction. Thus,
abstract yet simple concepts or categories are normally fairly developed, common, and stable;
whereas abstract yet complex ones are often inchoate, rare, and provisional. Second, those
simple, common, stable, and well-developed categories are mostly characteristic of family
resemblance and taxonomic organization, thus displaying perceptual similarity, correlational
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structure, typicality effects, basic level effects, fuzzy borderline, etc.; whereas those complex,
rare, and provisional categories exhibit typicality effects, but lack internal structure and
hierarchical organization, thus manifesting discreteness, disjunctiveness, etc.. Third, the
former group of the above point is more a result of observation and abstraction, whereas the
latter group is more goal-derived; on the other hand, the former group is not free from
influence from goals and contexts, whereas the latter cannot emerge without building on
categories relying more on observation and abstraction.
What are the implications of these findings for the topic of object of study of a
discipline? For one thing, an object of study favors common categories over goal-derived
categories---natural categories over artifact categories for the former kind, and
better-established ad hoc categories over ad hoc categories for the latter kind. This is
apparent because the latter side of the above three groups, which is prone to be rare,
provisional, or ill-developed, hardly deserves the efforts of a scientific study. For another, an
object of study needs to be a fully developed category. As mentioned above, categories can
develop from concrete to abstract, from complex to simple, and from ad hoc to common---a
natural consequence of the process of acquiring a category. This means that categories might
differ from one another in their degree of development, and that the same category might
vary among individuals in its degree of acquirement. An object of study obviously has no
reason to exclude from a category those instances that are not included by an ill-developed
category. Finally, an object of study needs to respect the nature and characteristics of a
category, since the former belongs to the latter. An object of study, for instance, is expected
to prioritize prototypical members, in three possible senses: to prioritize members in
descending order of typicality, to prioritize relations between members in descending order
of typicality, and to examine borderline cases in relation to prototypical members of the same
category as well as to those of alien categories. This should be the case when it comes to
delineating the characteristics of an object of study, to determining its nature, and to deciding
upon its boundary. Besides, an object of study needs to attend to its family resemblance and
taxonomic organization, as well as its underlying mechanism. Since family resemblance
originates from experience with exemplars, since it results largely from observation and
abstraction, an object of study had better explore its characteristics and those of its members
by resorting to descriptive studies and comparative studies. In other words, it is advisable to
describe its members in detail to figure out their characteristics, to compare its members for
their similarities and differences, and to determine the relationship between its members,
before deciding on its nature and borderline.
These three implications define the object of study of a discipline in terms of the
characteristics of a category; yet they do not exhaust the requirements for an object of study,
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as a category does not equal an object of study. A category is probably formed like this: I
decide to lump such phenomena together on a certain basis, out of a motivation conducive to
my life. By comparison, an object of study of a discipline is normally formed like this: We
decide to study such a group of phenomena as they are, in pursuit of in-depth, systematic
knowledge intended for future use by the public. Three differences come forth. First,
categorization primarily serves individuals’ needs, though it may become a collective affair;
whereas an object of study serves disciplinary activities meant as a collective enterprise,
though it is built on individuals’ activities. This means that categories unique to individuals,
such as individuals’ under-developed categories implied in the third implication above, do
not qualify as an object of study. Seen from the angle of concept acquisition, many
categories develop from one exemplar, through several exemplars, into an indefinite number
of exemplars in the form of an abstract concept. Categories in the early stages are too narrow
or personal to be an object of study. Second, categories are often driven by immediate needs,
whereas an object of study primarily serves future use. This disqualifies as an object of study
those categories standing a slim chance of appearing in the future, such as ad-hoc categories.
Third, a category might be formed by an individual whenever needed and for whatever
purposes, whereas an object of study comes into existence for one sole purpose, namely, the
pursuit of in-depth, systematic knowledge. In-depth, systematic knowledge presupposes the
existence of deep-lying, systematic regularities, rules, and laws underlying a wide range of
phenomena. It follows that most categories experienced by individuals do not become an
object of study. Most categories that cover only a small set of instances lack underlying
systematic regularities, rules, or laws; therefore, they are not worthy of scientific interest and
effort. For example, goal-derived categories, such as things I bought from Wal-Mart today,
hardly have any regularity, much less rules or laws, to make an object of study. Another
consequence is that a category can extend or contract in extension as needed; nevertheless,
an object of study cannot unduly expand in extension. Even for those categories that involve
systematic regularities, rules, and laws, the broadening of extension results in reduction in
the number and content of shared regularities, rules and laws, thus decreasing the value of
these categories as an object of study. The longer a category extends, the fewer its
regularities, rules, or laws; and even when they are found, they tend to be too slim to yield
any substantial knowledge for future use. Still another consequence is that a category is
relatively free to decide its boundary, whereas an object of study varies in the degree of
reasonableness from one boundary to another. This is because any shift in the extension of an
object of study incurs a difference with regard to the depth and systematicity of knowledge
involved in the object of study. In other words, the boundary of an object of study is better so
placed as to yield more in-depth, systematic knowledge.
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On the other hand, an obvious link is there between a category and an object of study:
An object of study takes a category to be its foundation, though only a portion of categories
measure up to an object of study. It follows that an object of study had better respect the
characteristics of a category. A category qualifying as an object of study, as noted before, is
characterized by family resemblance and taxonomic organization, displaying a gradient
ranging from prototypical members through less prototypical members to borderline
members. An object of study, therefore, is expected to prioritize prototypical members,
which can be understood in three senses: to prioritize members in descending order of
typicality, to prioritize relations between members in descending order of typicality, and to
examine borderline cases in relation to prototypical members of the same category as well as
those of alien categories. Observing this principle, one can describe the members of an
object of study one by one for their respective characteristics; one can compare these
characteristics for their similarities and differences, and then grade the similarities according
to the descending order of typicality, so as to determine the nature of the category; one can
compare and contrast the borderline cases with prototypical members of the category in
question and with those of neighboring categories, so as to determine where the borderline is
better placed. This sounds reasonable, but not before answering one question: How do we
know which members are prototypical, and how do we determine the order of typicality? A
discipline generally begins with some exemplar phenomena, together with certain initial
curiosity resulting from observation and intuition of the phenomena. These phenomena often
become the prototypical members of the discipline, while the initial curiosity becomes its
disciplinary interest, the two of which being fit for each other. As the discipline develops, it
brings up other prototypical members, as well as less prototypical members and borderline
members. During the process, the prototypical members and the disciplinary interest are
likely to shift. Such a shift may or may not be well grounded, depending on whether the
constructed category reflects the nature of the phenomena concerned, and whether the
discipline increases overall human knowledge. At any event, the ideal solution is to form a
benign dynamic among three forces: Let the core disciplinary interest determine the
prototypical members of a category and its order of typicality; let descriptive and
comparative studies of the category in descending order of typicality lay bare its
characteristics and nature; let its characteristics and nature define the core disciplinary
interest.
The last piece of requirement for a proper object of study springs not from the contrast
between a category and an object of study, but from the relation between objects of study of
different disciplines. This requirement suggests that an object of study of a discipline
complement, rather than clash with, objects of study of adjacent disciplines. This is
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necessary for maximization of overall human knowledge. Except for the case between
disciplines and their sub-disciplines, an object of study, when taking in instances better
subsumed under other objects of study, is liable to deform the other objects of study, and
risks flattening itself to the extent that it is no longer complicated enough for scientific
research. This does not mean, of course, that an object of study cannot challenge already
existing disciplines. This only means that when a clash does come up, it must be grounded. It
must not jeopardize the internal coherence of all the objects of study concerned, and, more
importantly, it must help coordinate disciplines in such a way as to increase overall human
knowledge. All in all, an ideal situation is to let each discipline fully play its role and have
them cooperate with one another to advance human knowledge as a whole.
To recapitulate, an object of study of a discipline is probably formed like this: We
decide to study such a group of phenomena as they are, in pursuit of in-depth, systematic
knowledge intended for future use by the public. The rationality of an object of study issues
from three sources: nature of a category, requirements of an object of study, and harmony
between objects of study. All things considered, an object of study should be (a) the whole of
a fully developed, collectively shared, common category, covering a relatively wide range of
instances that involve deep-lying systematic regularities, rules, or laws, which knowledge is
useful for guiding extensive future public practice; that is, (b) a category structured by family
resemblance and taxonomic organization, displaying a gradient ranging from prototypical
members, less prototypical members, and borderline cases. A proper object of study is to be
formed in line with the following principles:
1. When it comes to delineating the characteristics of an object of study, to determining
its nature, or to deciding upon its boundary; a proper object of study prioritizes its
members in descending order of typicality, prioritizes relations between the
members in descending order of typicality, and examines borderline cases in
relation to prototypical members of the same category as well as to those of alien
categories.
2. As a reasonable category is formed under two major influences, namely, the
phenomenon world as it is and the aim of categorization, so a proper object of study
decides upon its typicality in accordance with two criteria: whether it better reflects
the range of phenomena pegged out by revealing their underlying in-depth,
systematic knowledge; whether it contributes to the maximization of overall human
knowledge.
3. Once the typicality of an object of study is determined, there comes a need for
detailed descriptive studies and comparative studies of its members and of adjacent
objects of study, the results of which serve to reveal the characteristics of the object
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of study in question as well as its reasonableness in relation to its members and
adjacent objects of study.
4. If the results of the preceding job indicate a failure to respect the phenomenon
world---e.g., incongruence between the members of an object of study or between
the object of study in question and adjacent ones---or a failure to maximize the
overall knowledge of relevant disciplines, there comes a need to replace the
typicality of the object of study and to adjust its border.
5. A proper object of study investigates the whole, rather than part, of a category that
qualifies as an object of study.
6. A proper object of study does not aim at a category that covers a wide range of
phenomena united by merely tenuous family resemblance.
2.2.2 “Good” Scientific Theory
What makes a good theory of a discipline? This question splits into two minor ones:
What makes a theory of a discipline? What are the virtues of a good theory of a discipline?
i. What makes a theory?
A theory is the pivot of a discipline or science: On the one hand, it is the chief objective
of a scientific inquiry (Hempel 1965: 245, 2001: 218); on the other hand, it serves to guide
future practice by foreseeing changes in the environment and controlling them to our
advantage (1965: 333, 2001: 276). Accordingly, to characterize a theory entails a good
understanding of scientific enquiry. A scientific inquiry, according to Carl G. Hempel (1952:
1), has two main objectives: first, to describe phenomena in our experience; second, to
explain and predict phenomena by dint of general principles. To describe phenomena in our
experience, as suggested by Hempel (1952: 20-32), involves two steps: observation of
objects; observation of relations between objects or events happening between objects. The
former step gives rise to concepts, typically expressed as “observation terms” (Hempel 1952:
22); the second to judgments of particular facts, expressed as “singular statements” (Carnap
1966: 4) employing observation terms. To explain and predict phenomena, as held by Rudolf
Carnap (1966: 3-17), entails “general principles” (Hempel 1952: 20) or “laws” (Carnap 1966:
6), typically expressed as “general statements,” quantitative or universal. General principles
or laws fall into two kinds, namely, empirical laws and theoretical laws; the former employs
observation terms such as color, temperature, and hue, whereas the latter employs theoretical
terms such as electron, electricity, magnetism, gravity, and molecule (Carnap 1966: 232-234).
Theoretical laws can be systematized to form a logically unified theoretical system, and be
formalized to form an axiomatic calculus, like Euclidian geometry. Theoretical laws or
theoretical systems, in turn, can be applied to future cognition or practice. Hence, a scientific
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inquiry consists of multiple stages: formation of concepts, of singular statements, of
empirical laws, of theoretical laws, of a theoretical system, and application of the achieved
theory. It resorts to observational or theoretical concepts, expressed in observation terms and
theoretical terms, for categorization of the world; to particular facts, expressed in singular
statements, for description of the world; to empirical laws, for explanation or prediction of
particular facts; to theoretical laws or theoretical systems, for explanation and prediction of
empirical laws and particular facts; and to theoretical laws or systems, for guidance of later
practice. In this sense, a scientific inquiry fulfills more functions than Hempel recognizes.
Other than the basic function shared by non-scientific inquiries, namely, categorization of the
world, it performs four basic functions: description, explanation, prediction, and control (e.g.
Posner 2003: 2346; Rescher, 2000: 105). These functions form an interrelated whole:
Categorization facilitates description; description demands explanation; explanation enables
prediction; prediction instructs control. To wrap all up, for a crude approximation, a theory is
a (logically unified body of) theoretical laws, expressed in general statements, that are
constructed to explain and predict empirical laws formulated to explain and predict facts
happening in the world, and to guide later practice. Three characteristics of theories come to
the fore: (a) It is meant to explain and predict the world on the one hand, and to guide later
practice on the other; (b) it presupposes and relies for its adequacy on the existence of
appropriate concepts (observational and theoretical), singular statements, and empirical laws;
(c) it consists of theoretical laws in the form of general statements.
A scientific theory, however, is much more complicated and demands more than the
above three characterizations. In the first place, a theory is not merely theoretical laws in the
form of general statements. As the pivot of a scientific enquiry, a theory presupposes
categorization and description, and enables control over the world; nevertheless, its chief
mission is to explain and predict phenomena experienced in the world. As Hempel notes,
“The goal and the proudest achievement of basic scientific inquiry is the construction of
comprehensive theories which enable us to understand large sectors of the world, to predict,
to retrodict, to explain what occurs in them” (2001: 237). As mentioned above, laws in the
form of general statements, quantitative or universal, all have the power to explain and
predict facts (Carnap 1966: 6). Nevertheless, not every general statement or law qualifies as
a theoretical law for a science; because the former can be genuine or lawlike, causal or
non-causal (Nagel 1961: 46-49) while the latter requires scientific explanation aspiring after
causal laws (Nagel 1961: 4). General statements can be patently false, neither true nor false,
possibly true, true yet not being laws, or being true laws yet being non-causal. For a general
statement to be a scientific law, according to Ernest Nagel (1961: 56-67), it needs to meet
four types of requirements:
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1. syntactically, it needs to be “unrestricted universals,” in the sense that its “scope of
predication is not restricted to objects falling into a fixed spatial region or a particular
period of time” (1961: 59);
2. logically, it is derived from a set of other assumed laws, or is followed by a set of
other assumed laws;
3. functionally speaking, the evidence on which it is based does not constitute its total
scope of predication, so that it is capable of predicting the set of phenomena;
4. cognitively speaking, it is better backed up by both direct evidence and indirect
evidence, since such a statement has a higher standing in the corpus of our knowledge
and thus is less likely to be abandoned.
According to Hempel, a genuine law “can support subjunctive and counterfactual conditional
statements about potential instances, i.e., about particular cases that might occur, or that
might have occurred but did not” (1966: 57). For a statement to be causal, as maintained by
Nagel (1961: 74), it must involve between its antecedent and consequence a relation that is
spatially contiguous, temporally continuous, invariable or uniform in the sense that the latter
occurs whenever the former does, and asymmetrical in the sense that the former causes the
latter but not the other way around. By virtue of these specifications, Nagel exclude from
scientific laws not only those general statements that are only accidentally true or vacuously
true (1961: 56-67), but also laws asserting the existence of natural kinds or substances, laws
asserting a sequential order of dependence, laws asserting statistical (or probabilistic)
relations, and laws asserting functional (in the mathematical sense) dependence (1961:
75-78).
In the second place, a scientific theory does not equal a body of general statements with
explanatory and predictive power, but rather call for theoretical laws adequate to explain and
predict empirical laws formulated to explain and predict facts happening in the phenomenon
world. As noted above, a scientific inquiry is a systematic enterprise meant to perform
multiple functions, namely, categorization, description, explanation, prediction, and control;
correspondingly, a theory is a (logically unified body of) theoretical law(s) constructed at
once to explain and predict empirical laws formulated to explain and predict facts happening
in the world, and to guide later practice. Ideally, a scientific inquiry is expected to possess
maximal overall adequacy in all of its functions: its concepts for categorization; its singular
statements for description; its empirical laws for explaining and predicting particular facts
described by singular statements; its theoretical laws for explaining and predicting empirical
laws and particular facts on the one hand, and for application to the guidance of future
practice on the other. Correspondingly, a scientific theory is expected not only to fulfill its
mission to explain, predict, and, potentially, control the world; but also to ensue from
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adequate empirical laws which, in turn, ensue from adequate singular statements made up of
adequate observational terms. In other words, a theory with adequate explanatory and
predictive power does not qualify as a scientific one, if it builds on inadequate empirical
laws, singular statements, or terms; much less, if it does not build on any empirical law,
singular statement, or observational term at all. After all, a theoretical law can prove its
explanatory potential through application to another theoretical law, as is the case with
metaphysical accounts. A scientific theoretical law or theory must possess more qualities.
One of them is, for example, its empirical import, i.e., its connection with the empirical
world. Philosopher of science unexceptionally lists this piece as a basic requirement of
scientific explanation. For instance, Nagel requires a scientific explanation to be at once
systematic and “controllable by factual evidence” (1961: 4). Hempel sees it as a basic
principle of scientific inquiry that “no proposition and no theory is to be accepted without
adequate grounds,” and that “the grounds for the acceptance of a theory consist in the
agreement of predictions based on the theory with empirical evidence obtained either by
experiment or by systematic observation” (2001: 3).
In the third place, ideally, scientific theories are derived directly from empirical laws,
empirical laws from singular statements made up of observational terms, and observation
terms from sense data; in reality, however, none of these works. This impossibility reflects
David Hume’s famous “problem of induction,” to the effect that the foundation of inductive
inference is questionable because we cannot really infer from what we have observed to
what are not yet observed (1739 bk. 1, pt. iii, sec. 6). The philosophy of science is especially
concerned with the chasm separating observational terms and theoretical terms, between
empirical laws and theoretical laws, and between observational language and theoretical
language. Philosophers of science (e.g. Carnap 1966: 228-230; Hempel 1952: 32-37, 1965:
140; Popper 2002 [1935]: 45) believe that theoretical constructs, theoretical laws, and
theories do not grow naturally out of pure observation and gradual generalization, but rather
are introduced, hypothesized, and invented. A theory is not inferred from observed facts, but
results from “happy guesses” (Whewell 1967 [1847]: 41), “invention” (Popper 1962: 46),
“poetic intuition” (Popper 1962: 192), or “creative imagination” (Hempel 1966:15). This
realization leads most philosophers of science to relinquish the efforts after theory formation.
On the other hand, they do not give up the pursuit of scientificity; they are still committed to
the distinction between metaphysics and science, between scientific questions and
pseudo-scientific questions; they, like always, base the scientificity of a theory upon its
empirical relevance. The question then becomes this: How to guarantee the scientificity of a
theory if it is not possible to be inducted from phenomena? The solution adopted by
philosophers of science is theory testing. The topic of theory formation gives way to theory
24

testing, or in Hans Reichenbach’s (1961 [1938]: 6-7) parlance, “the context of discovery” is
replaced by “the context of justification.” A theory is then treated as a hypothesis, a
conjecture, or a guess. Some academics advocate “jumping first to any theory and then
testing it, to find whether it is good or not” (Popper 1962: 53), or “inventing hypotheses as
tentative answers to a problem under study, and then subjecting these to empirical test”
(Hempel 1966: 17). There is need to note in passing that these philosophers sidestep one
question inevitable for a theory: Where comes the conjecture or hypothesis? How does the
invention, happy guesses, poetic intuition, or creative imagination come into existence in the
first place? In any event, the focus shifts onto theory testing. Then, how can a theory be
tested? After all, the hiatus persists between theoretical laws and empirical laws, and
between theoretical systematization and description. The solution suggested is to translate
theoretical language into observation language, through something labeled as “coordinating
rules,” “operational definitions,” “rules of interpretation,” “correspondence rules,”

or

“bridge principles” (e.g. Carnap 1966: 233; Hempel 1966: 72-75; Nagel 1961: 93). Hence a
scientific procedure like Hempel’s hypothetico-deductive-observational model (1952: 36-37).
However, due to the hiatus between theoretical language and observation language, a theory
can never be fully translated into empirical statements (Carnap 1966: 238; Nagel 1961: 105).
A theory “cannot be exclusively proved by any set of available data, no matter how accurate
and extensive” (Hempel 1966: 27-28), whereas it is “easy to obtain confirmations, or
verifications, for nearly every theory---if we look for confirmations” (Popper 1962: 36).
Considering that theories are “never empirically verifiable” and that a scientific theory must
be “capable of being tested by experience” (2002 [1935]: 18; italics original), Karl R. Popper
proposes falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science,
holding that “every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it” (1962:
36). Popper’s proposal of falsification, however, is called into question too. Pierre Duhem
(1954: 183-188) points out that a hypothesis or proposition is joined to a whole group of
hypotheses or theories, and therefore any relevant error or disagreement condemns not the
former, but the latter. By analogy, Willard Van Orman Quine (1963 [1953]: 42-44) endorses a
holistic view of science to the effect that reevaluation of some elements entails that of others,
according to which it is possible to hold any statement true or to accommodate any
recalcitrant experience through reevaluation in various quarters of the system. Thomas S.
Kuhn (1996 [1962]) echoes the holistic view of science by subsuming theories under
paradigms, i.e., constellation of definitions, laws, beliefs, values, exemplars, and so on
shared by community members. As highlighted by Imre Lakatos, facts cannot prove
propositions (1978: 11); propositions of science are invariably theoretical and fallible (1978:
16); theories can neither be proved nor be disproved (1978: 16). Lakatos (1978: 46-52)
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submits that the basic concept of the logic of discovery is not a theory, but a series of theory
welded into a whole called research program, composed of a hard core, which forbids
refutation, a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses, which permit of refutations, and
metaphysical principles, which actively predict and digest anomalies. Criticizing Lakatos’
research program on six points, Larry Laudan (1977: 77-81) suggests replacing research
program with research tradition, a set of ontological and methodological assumptions in a
domain of study.
To sum up the foregoing discussions, several characterizations can be made about
scientific theories. Firstly, scientific theories cannot be derived from observable phenomena
inductively. As one consequence, a theory results only partly from observation and
generalization; it also relies partly on subjective creation. As another consequence, there
exists no single objective theory corresponding to a given set of phenomena. For a third, no
theory is perfect or definitive; instead, it may be improved and superseded. Secondly,
scientific theories cannot be fully translated into observable phenomena; consequently, they
can never be conclusively verified or falsified, but only be partially tested. Thirdly, scientific
theories are not autonomous or self-sufficient; rather, it is usually incomplete in terms of its
fundamental theses, always dependent upon auxiliary hypotheses and underlying
metaphysical assumptions, and sometimes in need of singular statements acting as initial
statements. Fourthly, despite the first two characterizations, scientific theories still need to
follow a process of formation and one of testing. Such processes will be difficult and
inadequate, as there is no single criterion or route to follow. Still, one has to strive after all
those needed to form a good theory that fulfills its functions adequately, because scientific
theories require certain empirical import, and because they aspire after maximal adequacy in
terms of their function and role within scientific projects.
ii. What makes a good theory?
Then what makes a good theory? What are the typical virtues of a good theory? The
final criterion is surely the intended functions a good theory is expected to fulfill. As
indicated above, an ideal theory assumes two layers of functions. First, it is expected to
adequately explain and predict empirical laws formulated to explain and predict facts
happening in the phenomenon world, and, potentially, to be applied to control the world.
Second, it is expected to fit in with other constituents of a scientific inquiry---such as
concepts, singular statements, and empirical laws---so that the scientific inquiry, as a whole,
would possess maximal overall adequacy in all of its functions: categorization of the
phenomenon world through concepts in the form of linguistic terms, description of the
phenomenon world through particular statements in the form of singular statements,
explanation and prediction of particular facts through empirical laws, explanation and
26

prediction of empirical laws and particular statements through theoretical laws, and control
over the world through application of theoretical laws.
The virtues of a good theory obviously belong to those qualities that measure up to the
two functions. Before going into detail, two clarifications are in order. For one thing, virtues
vary in degree, a minimum amount of which constitutes a basic requirement whereas a great
amount counts as a virtue. Therefore, every virtue to be listed below implies one basic
requirement of a theory. For another thing, accordingly, some virtues to be listed below have
already been adumbrated or mentioned in previous discussions of what makes a theory. In
view of this bond between basic requirements and virtues, to avoid excessive complication,
the following discussion will not separate the two lines of analysis.
The first and somewhat basic virtue of a theory is internal consistence or coherence.
Popper views it as “the first of the requirements to be satisfied by every theoretical system,
be it empirical or non-empirical” (2002 [1935]: 72). For empirical sciences, Popper lists it as
the first of the four different lines to test a theory (2002 [1935]: 9), and of the four
fundamental requirements of an axiomatic theory, to the effect that its fundamental theses are
free from contradiction, be it self-contradiction or mutual contradiction (2002 [1935]: 50-51).
Laudan takes it to be one of the two manifestations of internal conceptual problems (1977:
49). Kuhn (1977: 321-322) sees it as the virtue immediately following accuracy, the most
important criterion in his mind. Bas C. van Fraassen views it as one of the “rock-bottom
criteria of minimal acceptability” of a theory, asserting that one cannot advocate a theory as
correct yet inconsistent (1980: 94).
The second basic virtue is empirical adequacy, i.e., how well a theory agrees with facts
in the world. Empirical adequacy has two layers of meanings. On the one hand, it falls into
two kinds: fit to facts already established and fit to facts not yet known. On the other hand,
both kinds may vary in degree of accuracy or extensiveness to which a certain theory fits the
facts. For the former layer of meaning, fits to already established facts, and that to a great
extent if not completely, is acknowledged as a fundamental requirement of a scientific theory
by all scientists or philosophers of science (e.g. Carnap 1966: 6; Hempel 2001: 3; Nagel
1961: 43; Popper 2002 [1935]: 9; Schurz 2014: 26). Kuhn subsumes it under the virtue of
“accuracy,” which is “the most nearly decisive of all the criteria” (1977: 321). Fraassen
perceives it as another one of the “rock-bottom criteria of minimal acceptability” of a theory
(1980: 94). Fit to facts not yet known is another basic requirement of a theory universally
acknowledged by philosophers of science (e.g. Carnap 1966: 231; Duhem 1954: 28; Hempel
1966: 37; Nagel 1961: 63; Popper 1962: 241; Schurz 2014: 26). Kuhn subsumes it under the
virtue of “fruitfulness” (1977: 322). Due to the divide between theoretical language and
observational language, this requirement actually encompasses two stages: prediction of
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empirical phenomena; partial testability of the predicted phenomena. Lakatos regards the
former as the hallmark of a “theoretically progressive” theory, the latter as the hallmark of an
“empirically progressive” theory, and both as the hallmark of a “progressive” problemshift
(1978: 33-34). Jointly, fit to established facts and fit to novel facts contribute to the
scientificity of a theory. Nagel, for instance, considers the former to be requisite for the
simple demand “that there should be no grounds for regarding the premises as false,” and
takes the latter to be necessary “to exclude so-called ad hoc premises” and “to eliminate
explanations that are in a sense circular and therefore trivial” (1961: 43). Fit to novel facts is
indispensable for avoiding ad hoc explanations, because “it is always possible to produce a
theory to fit any given set of explicanda” (Popper 1962: 241-242). Avoidance of ad hoc
explanation turns out to be one of the major concerns of a good theory. Empirical adequacy
also involves another layer of meaning, namely, the accuracy with which a theory explains
facts and the range of facts a theory can explain. As for the former, it can be said that, for
instance, a theory explaining the causal mechanism of a phenomenon is more accurate than a
non-causal explanation; a theory capable of explaining the empirical problems with greater
“weight” in Laudan’s (1977: 31-40) terms is more accurate than a theory capable of
problems of less weight. As for the latter, a difference in requirements arises between
established facts and novel facts. Simply put, a theory must fit the majority of established
facts, but it is only supposed to fit some novel facts. In other words, it is a basic requirement
for a theory to be compatible with established facts to a great extent, or with at least some
novel facts. In contrast, a theory is a good one if it explains the established facts exhaustively,
or if it predicts testable facts that are great in number or “dramatic, unexpected, stunning”
(Lakatos 1978: 6). A theory that fails to explain a great proportion of established facts is
unreliable, even if it manages to predict some testable facts. A theory that manages to explain
the majority of established facts but predicts no novel fact is inadequate or ad hoc. A theory
that explains the majority of established facts and predicts a great range of novel facts has a
great virtue.
The third virtue is scope, to the effect that the more facts a theory can explain, the better.
Popper advocates “the highest possible empirical content” (2002 [1935]: 105), regarding as
preferable a theory “which contains the greater amount of empirical information or content”
(1962: 217; italics original). Kuhn (1977: 322) lists this factor as the third out of the five
virtues of a good theory. Lakatos stresses this factor under the name of a “theoretically
progressive” theory (1978: 33); Laudan under the name of “overall problem-solving
effectiveness” (1977: 68); Quine and Ullian under the name of “generality” (1978: 73-74).
There is need to note that the amount of empirical content cannot be construed simply as the
number of facts. Variety also matters. As demonstrated by Hempel (1966: 33-34), ceteris
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paribus, the strength of a hypothesis increases with the number and the variety of evidence.
The amount of empirical content, be it in number or variety, can be easily amplified by an
increase in the generality of a theory. Roughly speaking, the more general a theory is, the
greater its scope of its empirical content. Schurz, for instance, makes such an association
while characterizing as one of the four features common to all empirical sciences the search
for hypotheses “as general and as content-rich as possible” (2014: 26). On the other hand,
this association does not always obtain. The key lies with the meaning of empirical content.
When it is construed in relation to a domain of objects, the association certainly obtains. The
problem, however, is that a theory does not so much aim at a domain of objects as a
perspective on a domain of objects, i.e., some feature shared by the objects of the domain.
When the level of generality rises, the domain it covers expands, and so does the number and
variety of objects; but the feature shared by the objects gets thinner and thinner in content.
Therefore, when the level of generality gets too high, the loss on the part of the perspective
outweighs the gain on the part of the domain, hence a genuine decrease in the empirical
content of the corresponding theory. As Popper notes while quoting Frank, “Statements of a
high level of universality—such as the principle of the conservation of energy in Planck’s
formulation—are apt to become tautological, and to lose their empirical content, unless the
initial conditions can be determined” (2002 [1935]: 111). “Why not invent theories of the
highest level of universality straight away?” asks Popper. Because, Popper answers, “Those
theories which are on too high a level of universality, as it were (that is, too far removed
from the level reached by the testable science of the day) give rise, perhaps, to a
‘metaphysical system’” (2002 [1935]: 276-277). Put in reference to the preceding virtue,
empirical adequacy involves both accuracy and extensiveness of the fit between a theory and
facts, the latter of which implies the factor of scope. Accuracy and extensiveness come to
contradict each other when the number and variety of objects go too high. The gain in scope
might undermine the accuracy of an explanation, hence loss in empirical adequacy. In brief,
it is desirable to pursue a theory with a bigger scope within some limit, but not when the
accuracy of the theory is at a heavy cost. Even when the scope is a virtue, two priorities are
recommendable for a theory: priority to established facts over novel facts; priority to the
object of study for which a theory is devised over other objects of study. An increase in
scope at the expense of either priority does not really count as a virtue.
The fourth virtue is external coherence. Hempel holds that “conflicts with hypotheses or
theories that are accepted at the time as well-confirmed” undermines the credibility of a
hypothesis (1966: 37). Kuhn perceives the consistence “with other currently accepted
theories applicable to related aspects of nature” as part of the second out of the five virtues of
a theory (1977: 321-322). Laudan goes into more detail under the term of “external
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conceptual problem” (1977: 50). Laudan (1977: 54) identifies five kinds of relationships
between

theories---entailment,

reinforcement,

compatibility,

implausibility,

and

inconsistency---and perceives the latter four kinds as possible cases for conceptual problems.
He illustrates with historical examples the latter three kinds of conceptual problems: when
one theory is logically inconsistent with another accepted theory; when one theory makes
another accepted theory less plausible; when one theory ought to reinforce another theory but
only manages to be merely compatible with the latter (1977: 51-54). Laudan (1977: 54-64)
also recognizes three sources of conceptual problems: other theories, norms and
methodologies, and worldviews. Later, he elaborates conceptual problems with the following
four situations, the first concerning internal conceptual problem and the latter three
concerning external conceptual problems:
1. when T is internally inconsistent or the theoretical mechanisms it postulates are
ambiguous;
2. when T makes assumptions about the world that run counter to other theories or
to prevailing metaphysical assumptions, or when T makes claims about the
world which cannot be warranted by prevailing epistemic and methodological
doctrines;
3. when T violates principles of the research tradition of which it is a part (to be
discussed below);
4. when T fails to utilize concepts from other, more general theories to which it
should be logically subordinate. (1996: 79)
An external conceptual problem, as stressed by Laudan (1977: 56), constitutes a challenge
for both parties concerned. Incompatibility between two theories, for example, might point to
the need for improvement on either theory or both. One possible criterion is the combined
explanatory power of the two theories, i.e., whether the two theories, as a whole, better
explain the portion of the phenomenon world. Obviously, ideally all the theories would
coordinate with one another and combine to explain the whole phenomenon world as
accurately and adequately as possible. Altogether, the virtue of external coherence stems not
from requirements of a theory itself, but from those for the sake of overall human knowledge.
The demand for external coherence, other than that for accuracy, puts another curb on the
urge of a theory to expand its scope to extremes.
The fifth virtue is simplicity. Simplicity is acclaimed by many philosophers of science
(e.g., Hempel 1966: 40-42; Kuhn 1977: 322; Popper 2002 [1935]: 121-132; Quine and
Ullian 1978: 69-73). On the other hand, as noted by Hempel (1966: 41), it is no easy to assert
its criterion or to justify it. Richard Swinburne (1977: 23-30), for instance, claims that
simplicity of a theory may be variously construed in the following six ways: (a) involving
fewer postulated entities; (b) involving fewer kinds of entities; (c) involving fewer variables;
(d) involving fewer laws; (e) containing more basic terms; (f) employing mathematically
simpler formulations. As for the grounds for simplicity, philosophers of science tend to
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attribute them to the economy of thought (e.g., Mach, Avenarius, Ostwald, and Pearson; see
Hempel 1966: 42) or to truth or truthlikeness (e.g., Swinburne 1977). Popper takes a
somewhat different route by linking simplicity with falsification, arguing that simple
statements are valuable in that they tell us more, has greater empirical content, and are better
testable (2002 [1935]: 128). In practice, he urges for fewer auxiliary hypotheses as well as
fewer fundamental hypotheses (2002 [1935]: 273). Overall, simplicity is widely
acknowledged as a virtue ceteris paribus. Other things being equal, it is indeed desirable for
a theory to involve fewer auxiliary hypotheses for the sake of greater self-sufficiency of the
core theory; fewer fundamental hypotheses, for a higher degree of unification of the theory;
fewer variables or parameters in a hypothesis, for greater unification of the hypothesis; fewer
number or kinds of entities, for neater categorization of the world; more basic terms, for a
more lucid structure of the whole theoretical system; and simpler expressions, for less
ambiguity or redundancy.
The above five virtues, of course, do not exhaust the virtues of a theory. The latter, for
instance, might also be taken to include aesthetic virtues (e.g., Martin 1989; Benovski 2013),
such as beauty and elegance. As Jiri Benovsky notes, many people in the history of science
approve of a theory with comments such as “‘elegant,’ ‘attractive,’ ‘beautiful,’ or even ‘sexy’”
(2013: 191). On the whole, however, the five virtues listed above are the most important and
mostly widely acknowledged.
iii. Profile of a scientific theory
Several groups of conclusions can be reached about a theory for a discipline or science.
First, a scientific inquiry consists of several possible stages: formation of concepts,
singular statements, empirical laws, theoretical laws, and a theoretical system; testing of the
theoretical laws or system; application of the theoretical laws or system. It fulfills, through
its constituents, five basic functions: categorization, description, explanation, prediction, and
control of the world.
Second, a theory is the main objective, and the pivot, of a scientific inquiry. It
presupposes the prior existence of concepts, singular statements, and empirical laws; it
consists essentially of theoretical laws that tend to ascend to a theoretical system; it requires
testing through translation into observation statements via correspondence rules; it aspires to
be applied for the controlling the world.
Third, a theory assumes two layers of functions. First, it is expected to adequately
explain and predict empirical laws formulated to explain and predict facts happening in the
phenomenon world, and, potentially, to be applied to control the world. Second, it is
expected to fit in with other constituents of a scientific inquiry---such as concepts, singular
statements, and empirical laws---so that the scientific inquiry, as a whole, would possess
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maximal overall adequacy in all of its five functions.
Fourth, a theory, explicitly or implicitly, involves four possible elements: (a)
metaphysical assumptions, which are often merely implied; (b) fundamental theses, which,
as the kernel of a theory, consist of theoretical laws; (c) auxiliary hypotheses and
correspondence rules, which, respectively, supplement theoretical laws tacitly and interpret
them into observation statements; and (d) initial conditions, expressed by singular
statements.
Fifth, as the kernel of a theory, the theoretical laws had better be general statements,
universal or statistical, that are genuine laws that are causal. Most important of all, they need
to contain at least some elements that are unrestricted universals, and be able to support
subjunctive conditional statements about potential instances.
Sixth, due to the inadequacy of induction, there always involves a logical jump in the
formation of concepts, empirical laws, and theoretical laws; accordingly, a theory is formed
partly through observation and generalization, and partly through creative imagination.
Consequently, there exists no single, true, perfect, or definitive theory that corresponds to a
given set of phenomena.
Seventh, due to the chasm between observation language and theoretical language, a
theoretical law cannot be fully converted into observation statements; consequently, a theory
cannot be conclusively verified or falsified, but is only partially testable.
Eighth, a theory strives for such requirements or virtues as internal consistency, fit to
facts, broad scope, external coherence, and simplicity. In particular, a theory is expected to
be adequate, first, to explain the majority of established facts and, secondly, to predict some
novel testable facts---and do so sufficiently accurately. When such requirements are met, a
greater degree of accuracy and scope would be a virtue, but not if the scope is expanded to
extremes. When within the limits, priority is to be given to more weighty problems over less
weighty ones, to the object of study in question over other phenomena. A theory also needs
to be so coherent with other theories, norms or methods, and metaphysical assumptions that
they conjoin to bring about greater overall human knowledge. With the above factors being
equal, it is desirable for a theory to be as simple as possible.
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Chapter 3 Recasting Semiotics as a Discipline
3.1. Sign Phenomena Recorded in the History of Semiotics
If semiotics is first and by nature a discipline, the first topic it is faced with will be to
determine its object of study. The object of study of semiotics, however, is notoriously fuzzy
and endlessly disputed. People disagree on its prototypical member, border, distinguishing
features, typology, and purpose (see Nöth 1990: 79-120). Given this state, the only viable
way out is to conduct a detailed descriptive and comparative study of those phenomena
called signs and their adjacent phenomena. Below, we will begin with a list of sign
phenomena described by scholars in the past. The potential risk of relying on statements on
sign phenomena rather than sign phenomena found in observation will be discussed later in
Section 4.3.1, on the relationship between sign statements and sign phenomena. Simply put,
sign statements might diverge from sign phenomena. It is possible that the phenomena do not
really deserve the label sign; it is also possible that the statements do not capture the essence
of the phenomena described. In spite of all these, sign statements offer the first chance for us
to get to know about the phenomena behind the term sign, and, accordingly, to evaluate how
well the existing semiotic discourse fares in relation to the phenomenon world.
3.1.1 Instances and Types of Signs
The history of semiotics and some adjacent disciplines present a rich bank of examples
of phenomena called signs, as outlined below.1 For ease of later discussion, they are grouped
under different labels, some of which are borrowed from the history of semiotics while
others are coined. Neither the classification nor the labels are meant to be definitive or final.
Rather, they are expedient categories helpful to foreground the similarities and dissimilarities
between the instances, paving the way for later discussions or analyses.
i. Symptom
One ancient type of signs, recognized by many (e.g., Baer 1982, 1983; Sebeok 2001;
Petrilli and Ponzio 2010), is the symptom, commonly found in works of Greek physicians
like Hippocrates and Galen. Some examples from Hippocrates are as follows:
(1) When bubbles form in the urine, it is a sign that the kidneys are affected, and that the
disease will be protracted. (1931: 199)
(2) The following is a sign of approaching elimination of bone in a case thus treated. A
large amount of pus flows from the wound, which appears turgid. (1928: 161)
1

Examples listed below are direct quotes whenever possible. They are modified when the
modification is minute, with the aid of square brackets. They are rephrased, when redundancy
would be striking otherwise. The last case bears the mark *.
33

(3) If fever continues longer than sixty days, and swelling does not subside, it is a sign
that there will be suppuration. (1923: 17-19)
Afterwards, quite a few other scholars also mention such phenomena, as listed below:
(4) That a woman has milk is a sign that she is with child. (Aristotle 1984: 256) *
(5) If this person has thrown up bronchial matter, [it is a sign that] she has a wound in
his lungs. (Empiricus 2005: 138)
(6) Breathing is a sign of life in animals. […] Pallor is only a probable sign of
pregnancy in women. (Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 35)
(7) A cough is an index of a cold. (Sebeok 2001: 8-11)
Occasionally, however, only the symptom is specified whereas the corresponding health
condition is not, as illustrated below:
(8) Spontaneous perspiration […] is rightly regarded as a sign of disease. (Aristotle
1984: 2910)
(9) Cold sweating [is] a sign of serious illness. (Aristotle 1984: 3235)
(10) Urine is the sign of health in animal. (Aquinas 1947: 93)
ii. Physiognomic sign
One kind of sign phenomena similar to the symptom is the physiognomic sign. The
physiognomic sign indicates the mental character of an organism with apparent bodily
features, including “movements, gestures of the body, color, characteristic facial expression,
the growth of the hair, the smoothness of the skin, the voice, condition of the flesh, the parts
of the body, and the build of the body as a whole” (Aristotle 1984: 2704). Sounding dubious
to modern ears as they are, ancient philosophers take seriously the link or interaction
between the body and the mind. As Plato has it, “the body is a sign (sēma) of the soul” (1997:
118). Aristotle devotes a long chapter to the topic and offers ample examples like these:
(11) Lethargic movements are a sign of a soft character, rapid movements of a fervid
temper (Aristotle 1984: 2705)
(12) As to the voice, when deep and full it is a sign of courage; when high-pitched and
languid, of cowardice. (Aristotle 1984: 2705)
(13) Knock-knees are a sign of the effeminate. (Aristotle 1984: 2717)
(14) Straight eyebrows are a sign of softness of disposition; such as curve in towards the
nose, of harshness; such as curve out towards the temples, of humour and
dissimulation (Aristotle 1984: 1721)
(15) Iris in greenish color is the sign of an excellent disposition. (Aristotle 1984: 1722)
*
Aristotle sometimes goes beyond mental characters. He also mentions signs of good
memory, good or low spirits, abusive men, and men addicted to gaming (1984: 2707-2711).
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After Aristotle, some later philosophers also echo his ideas, as shown below:
(16) Flesh of fine texture and a keen sense of touch, which reveal evenness of bodily
temperament, are signs of mental acuteness. (Aquinas 1956: 309)
(17) The forehead of the Americans, overgrown with hair on both sides, is a sign of
innate feeble-mindedness. (Kant 2006: 199)
iii. Indicative sign
Both the symptom and the physiognomic sign can be grouped under the more generic
term indicative sign, in Sextus Empiricus’ parlance, in contradistinction to the recollective
sign---the former applicable to things that are unclear by nature and the latter to things that
are unclear for the moment. The indicative sign is said to “signify that of which it is
indicative simply by means of its own nature and constitution, all but giving voice,” such as
the soul revealed indicatively by means of the motions of the body (Empiricus 2005: 119).
Examples abound throughout the history of semiotics:
(18) Blushing is a sign of shame. (Empiricus 2005: 123) *
(19) Weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. (Aquinas 1947: 739)
(20) […] an open countenance, and a placid eye, is a sign of amity; […] a contracted
brow, and a fierce look, is the sign of anger. (Reid 2010: 332)
Again, as is the case in discourse on symptoms, it often happens that what is indicated
by the appearances is not specified, as illustrated below:
(21) All the vocal sounds of brutes and many vocal sounds of humans, e.g., groans of
the sick, sighs, many expressions of awe, pains, exclamations, and many suchlike […]
are signs given by a soul by a kind of natural instinct and impulse. (Roger Bacon 2013:
40)
(22) Features of the face, modulation of the voice, motion and attitude of the body are
natural signs for thoughts, purposes, and dispositions of the mind. (Reid 1823: 64) *
(23) Involuntary facial expressions and gestures are indicators for inner thoughts or
emotions. (Husserl 2001 [1970]: 187-188) *
A special kind of phenomena, which is similar to yet different substantially from
ordinary indicative signs, could be termed the sense sign, i.e., something external as a sign of
a mental representation that is analogous with the former. This view is seldom endorsed. One
rare proponent is Roger Bacon.
(24) Artifacts are signs of art and of the species of the artifacts in a soul; a vocal sound
is a sign of its own species in a soul. (Roger Bacon 2013: 123; Appendix A)
The word species here does not mean “kind,” but, following the tradition of Aristotle, is
closer to “form.” Although Bacon does not specify what forms---sensible or intelligible---he
is referring to here, he uses the very example to illustrate the claim that something is a sign
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of its likeness (2014: 123; Appendix 123). Thus, the above example amounts to saying that a
thing, such as an artifact or a vocal sound, is a sign of its sensation or mental image. The
former is perceptible while the latter is imperceptible; in this sense, it is akin to the other
indicative signs.
iv. Divinatory sign
Another ancient type of signs, the earliest in the view of Giovanni Manetti (1993: xv;
Introduction), might be credited to the divinatory activities of primitive people. Cicero
construes divination as “presentiment and knowledge of future things,” believing that within
any people, irrespective its degree of civilization and education, certain individuals can give,
interpret, and foretell signs of the future (2006: 45). He identifies several common sources of
such signs: entrails, birds, lightening, portents, stars, visions of dreamers, and utterances of
the inspired (2006: 83). For example, the Cilicians, the Pisidians, and the Pamphylians hold
that “the future is revealed by the flight and singing of birds, <as> very reliable signs”
(Cicero 2006: 45-46; brackets original). Here are some more fully formulated examples.
(25) If the [dog] star appears brilliant and very clear, this is a sign that the atmosphere is
thin and pure and consequently [the year would be] healthy. (Cicero 2006: 88)
(26) A crow croaking on the left was considered a sign of good fortune. (Cicero 2006:
130; Commentary)
(27) A raven croaking on the right was a sign of good fortune, on the left ill-omened.
(Cicero 2006: 130; Commentary)
Here are some more examples Cicero cites as divinatory signs, though they do not
explicitly contain the word “sign”:
(28) […] if an eclipse of the moon occurred a little before sunrise in the sign Leo,
Darius and the Persians would be defeated militarily by Alexander and the
Macedonians [in battle] and Darius would die; if a girl were born with two heads there
would be popular revolt and seduction and adultery in the home; and if a woman
dreamt that she gave birth to a lion, the country in which this had happened would be
overcome by foreign nations (2006: 84; square brackets original).
Besides Cicero, Thomas Aquinas also mentions omens as divinatory signs:
(29) Men make these observations [of omens], not as observing causes, but as observing
signs of future events, good or evil (1892: 175).
Immanuel Kant also addresses divinatory signs. Under his prognostic signs, a subcategory of
his natural sign, Kant rejects as “childish and fantastic” the following practice:
(30) Constellations of stars and conjunctions and changes in the positions of the planets
are represented (in the Astrologia iudiciaria) as allegorical signs written in heaven of
impending human fate (2006: 85-87; parenthesis original).
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Under his miraculous signs, Kant (2006: 85-87) sees as signs heralding doomsday the
wonders in the sky---such as comets, balls of light shooting through the high atmosphere,
northern lights, solar and lunar eclipses)---especially when several of them concur and are
accompanied by war, pestilence, etc.. Manetti (1993) devotes to divinatory signs two
chapters of his historical survey on signs. Here are some of the examples he attributes to
ancient Mesopotamians, Babylonians, and Greeks (1993: 6; parentheses original):
(31) If on the day of its disappearance the moon lingers in the sky (instead of
disappearing all at once)---there will be drought and famine in the country.
(32) If a man dreams that someone gives him a seal---he will have a son.
(33) If the lung is bright red on the right and on the left---there will be fire.
(34) If, from the center of the oil (thrown onto the water), two "bridges" form, one
larger than the other---the wife of the enquirer will bear a male child. If the enquirer is
ill, he will recover.
(35) If when you pour (the aromatic substance) on the coals, smoke rises up (only) on
the right, and not on the left---you will have the better of your enemy. If it rises up
(only) on the left and not on the right---your enemy will have the better of you.
v. Recollective sign
If stripped of the unscientific aspect, most divinatory signs are akin to the recollective
sign. According to Empiricus (2005: 119), the recollective sign is something that
immediately impinges on us and leads us to a recollection of another thing that is not now
striking us plainly but has been observed together with the former.
One subtype of recollective signs comes from the physical world, in which case
something coming from a natural source acts as a sign vehicle. Such signs may indicate “the
existence---past, present, or future---of a thing, event, or condition” (Langer 1948: 45); or, in
Wolff’s (see Nöth 1990: 27-28) or Kant’s (2006: 86-87) parlance, can be remonstrative,
demonstrative, or prognostic. Prognostic signs, i.e., signs of something in the future, are
probably the first signs noticed by the ancients. One subtype of prognostic signs is
meteorological signs, i.e., weather signs, discussed in detail by Aristotle or mentioned in
passing by some other philosophers:
(36) Mist is a sign of fine weather. (Aristotle 1984: 1241) *
(37) Halo is a sign of rain; halo fading away, of fine weather; halo broken up, of wind.
(Aristotle 1984: 1313) *
(38) Mock sun is a surer sign of rain than the rods. (Aristotle 1984: 1326)
(39) A red [sky] in the morning is a sign of rain the same day, and a red [sky] in the
evening is a sign of fair weather (serenitas) the next day (Roger Bacon 2013: 38;
parenthesis original)
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(40) A rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather. (Aquinas 1947: 2142)
Also noted early in the history of semiotics are some astronomical signs apparent to common
eyes, and some signs common in daily life:
(41) The entrance of a star into the shadow is a sign of the eclipse. (Aristotle 1984:
1617)
(42) Dawn is a sign of sunrise. (Roger Bacon 2013: 38)
The value of prognostic signs is apparent in that they serve directly to guide our practice.
Also directly significant for practice are demonstrative signs indicating an existing thing or
ongoing event:
(43) Smoke is a sign of fire (Empiricus 2005: 119) *
(44) A patter on the roof is a sign that it is raining. (Langer 1948: 46)
In contrast, remonstrative signs seldom contribute directly to the guidance of practice;
instead, they usually serve to add to the stock of human knowledge, which might prove to be
useful someday in future:
(45) Layers of shells in regions far from the sea, the holes of Phalades in the high Alps,
or volcanic residue where no fire now bursts forth from the earth signify to us the
ancient condition of the world and establish an archaeology of nature. (Kant 2006: 87)
Another subtype of recollective signs has a sign vehicle that is produced by an organism
or results from the interaction between an organism and its surroundings. Similar to the
preceding subtype, this subtype can also be prognostic, demonstrative, or remonstrative, as
illustrated below:
(46) A trauma to the heart is a sign of impending death. (Empiricus 2005: 119) *
(47) Repeated cries of a crow are a sign of imminent rain. (Aquinas 1997: 162) *
(48) A low barometer with a moist air is an index of rain. (Peirce CP 2.286)
(49) A scar is a sign of a previous wound. (Empiricus 2005: 119) *
(50) A footprint is a sign of an animal. (Roger Bacon 2013: 39)
(51) A piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it [is] sign of a shot. (Peirce CP 2.304)
(52) Burial mounds and mausoleums are signs of remembrance of the dead, just as
pyramids are also everlasting reminders of the former great power of a king. […] the
scarred-over wounds of a warrior [signify past fights]. The ruins of Plamyra, Baalbek,
and Persepolis are telling monuments of the state of art in ancient states, and sad
indications of the change of all things. (Kant 2006: 87)
To mention in passing, on noting the great proportion of causal relation underlying the
recollective signs as well as the indicative signs, some philosophers go so far as to say
something like these:
(53) Every effect is a sign of its cause. (Aquinas 1947: 3124)
38

(54) The effect is a sign of its cause. (Ockham 1974: 50)
(55) Natural causes are natural signs of their effects. (Reid 1823: 65) *
A special case of recollective signs is the conditional reflex, whereby “a concomitant of
a stimulus takes over the stimulus-function” and acts as a sign of the reaction of the original
stimulus (Langer 1948: 22). For instance,
(56) The buzzer sound is to the dog a sign of food at the given place. (Morris 1946: 5)
Another special case of recollective signs is the sign of similitude, for instance:
(57) Whatever arises as a likeness of something else is a sign. […] every image is a sign
of the thing whose image it is. […] a son looking like his father [is a sign of the latter].
(Roger Bacon 2013: 123; Appendix A)
(58) An image that appears in a mirror is a natural sign of what it represents. (Arnauld
and Nicole 1996: 37)
(59) Every picture (however conventional its method) is essentially [an icon of the thing
represented]. (Peirce CP 2.279; parenthesis original)
(60) Photographs and commercially produced perfumes are icons (Sebeok 2001: 10) *
vi. Abstract inferential sign
The above kinds of signs, be they indicative or recollective, all involve two relata:
something clear on one hand, and something unclear by nature or something unclear for the
moment on the other. Now the “something” on both relata can be either an object or an event.
When expressed in verbal language, it seems spontaneous to express an object with a word
or phrase, and to express an event with a gerund, a participle, or a clause. The examples cited
above witness ample use of words or phrases for objects, some use of gerund for events, and
occasional use of clauses for both. What follows are one example in the form of the infinitive,
two examples involving a clause, and two more involving two clauses:
(61) To have large limbs in the case of an animal, e.g., a lion or another, is a sign of
strength. (Roger Bacon 2013: 38)
(62) A rain [is] a sign that a cloud has gone before. (Hobbes 1839: 14)
(63) Wet streets are a sign that it has rained. (Langer 1948: 46; italics original)
(64) The fact that she is giving milk is a sign that she has lately borne a child. (Aristotle
1984: 4630)
(65) If this person has a scar, she has had a wound. (Empiricus 2005: 139)
The problem is that for languages like English, it is possible to shift between a word, a
phrase, and a clause, or between a gerund, an infinitive, and a nominalization. For instance,
Example 61,2 when applied to a lion, can be rephrased as follows: Large limbs in a lion is a

2

Hereinafter, for brevity, the example number will be mentioned without parentheses.
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sign of strength; having large limbs in a lion is a sign of strength; a lion’s having large limbs
is a sign of possession of strength; to have large limbs in a lion is a sign of having strength;
that a lion has large limbs is a sign that it has strength. Example 62 can be reformulated in
the following ways: Raining is a sign of earlier cloud; to rain is a sign of earlier cloud; that it
is raining is a sign that a cloud has gone before. Hence, it is better to disregard the exact form
a sign phenomenon takes. In this sense, examples from 61 to 65 all belong to indicative signs
or recollective signs.
Also in this sense, the Stoic’s (see Empiricus 2005: 137) position that the sign is a
proposition, in which sense both relata involved in a sign must take the form of a clause, is
doubtful. All the instances of signs, one relatum or both relata being in the form of a
clause---let us call them propositional sign for convenience---can be readily subsumed under
other subcategories of signs.
Another problem arising from verbal expressions of sign phenomena is their propensity
for fuzziness or ambiguity on the one hand, and elliptical or improper use on the other. For
instance, Example 7---A cough is an index of a cold”---would be better rephrased as
“Coughing is an index of getting a cold” or “That somebody coughs is an index that he or
she has got a cold.” Example 10---“Urine is the sign of health in animal.”---would be better
if reformulated as “The color of urine is the sign of animal health” or “The color of urine is a
sign of whether an animal is healthy or ill.” Hence, it is also better to give a charitable
interpretation to instances of signs in elliptical forms or improperly formulated. If we do,
even the following instances might be grouped under the indicative sign:
(66) If a convalescent while taking nourishment remains weak, it is a sign that the body
is being overnourished; if there be weakness while he takes none, it is a sign that
evacuation is required (Hippocrates 1931: 111)
(67) That a child halts in its speech and plays like a child is a sign of its good breeding.
(Plato 1997: 829) *
(68) That hair protected by hats or other coverings goes grey sooner is a sign of the fact
that greyness comes about by some sort of decay (Aristotle 1984: 2640) *
However, even if given a charitable interpretation, some examples cited by Plato,
Aristotle, and Aquinas could hardly be subsumed under the category of indicative or
recollective signs. The following examples are in the form of the infinitive, found in Plato
and Aristotle:
(69) It is the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophical person to try to
separate everything from everything else. (Plato 1997: 283) *

Therefore, for example, “Example 61” actually refers to “Example (61).”
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(70) It is a great sign of vulgarity to be forced to make use of justice imposed by others,
as masters and judges, because one is unable to deal with the situation oneself. (Plato
1997: 1042)
(71) To trust men one has never seen or heard before, when you’re well aware that most
men are rogues and liars---that’s no small sign of simplicity. (Plato 1997: 1705)
(72) It is a sign of foolishness to act without deliberation. (Aristotle 1984: 4869)
(73) To be a master of metaphor is a sign of genius. (Aristotle 1984: 5003) *
More of this kind of phenomenon is in the form of proposition, frequently found in Aristotle
and commonly found in Aquinas:
(74) The fact that Socrates was wise and just is a sign that the wise are just. (Aristotle
1984: 4630)
(75) It is always the first sign of love that besides enjoying some one’s presence, we
remember him when he is gone. (Aristotle 1984: 4679)
(76) It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through
observing his own faults. (Aquinas 1947: 1794)
(77) A sign that this affection, viz. recollection, is something bodily and an inquiry for
an image within such a thing is the fact that some people get very upset whenever they
cannot recollect. (Aquinas 2005a: 229)
(78) That given any finite quality, our intellect can think of a great one is a sign of the
fact that our intellect extends to the infinite in understanding. (Aquinas 1955: 167) *
(79) That for the forms of material things to be made actually intelligible they must be
abstracted from matter is a sign of the fact that it is materiality that is incompatible
with intelligibility. (Aquinas 1956: 236) *
(80) That fortune seems to be the same as happiness, or very nearly so is a sign of the
fact that fortune pertains to the practical. (Aquinas 1995: 116) *
(81) The very fact, then, that there happens to be error in art is a sign that art acts for the
sake of something. …And this very fact that error occurs in natural things is a sign
that nature acts for the sake of something. (Aquinas 1995: 132)
Aquinas also resort to simpler structures, as shown below:
(82) Weakness is […] naturally a sign of virtue. (Aquinas 2005b: 59)
(83) Forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem. (Aquinas 1947: 1056)
(84) Martyrdom is […] the sign of the greatest charity. (Aquinas 1947: 2295)
Differing from the preceding subtypes of signs, examples from 69 to 84 do not involve
any relatum that is strictly perceptible; instead, the two relata they involve tend to include
something essentially abstract. Accordingly, the two relata are linked not so much by means
of direct or indirect observation, as by way of inference---plus definition in some cases. For
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the sake of brevity for later discussion, let us name the phenomenon illustrated by examples
from 69 to 84 the abstract inferential sign.
vii. Sensational sign, perceptual sign, conceptual sign, and thought-sign
Another type of signs falling outside of indicative and recollective signs can be termed
sensational sign, perceptual sign, or conceptual sign. A few philosophers take a sensation to
be a sign of something external, for instance:
(85) The imprints in the soul are signs of the things that come through the senses. (Plato
1997: 215) *
(86) The icon or sensible form of specification expressed in the interior sense powers is
a formal sign in respect of those powers. (Poinsot 1985: 247)
(87) The sensation one gets when feeling hardness in a stone is a sign of something in
the stone. (Reid 1823: 61) *
Much later, biologist Jakob von Uexküll (2010: 164-165) puts the sense signs---seeing
signs, hearing signs, smelling signs, tasting signs, and touching signs---under the same
category named perception sign. It is only that Uexküll does not confine perception signs to
human beings, but apply them to other organisms, such as a tick. The so-called
biosemioticians follow suit on this point.
Some other philosophers also regard concepts as signs of external things, for instance:
(88) Letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing.
(Scotus 1963: 112)
(89) Spoken words are used to signify the very things that are signified by concepts of
the mind. (Ockham 1974: 50)
(90) A concept is sign and signified, just as it is also the thing [known].” (Poinsot 1985:
225)
(91) A concept or specifying form expressed by the understanding is most properly a
formal sign. (Poinsot 1985: 246)
(92) The signs we chiefly use are either ideas or words; wherewith we make either
mental or verbal propositions. (Locke 1824, bk. II, ch. XXXII, sec. 19)
Some philosophers even extend the notion of sign to the relation between mental
entities. Peirce, for instance, proposes the term thought-sign. He claims, “Whenever we think,
we have present to the consciousness some feeling, image, conception, or other
representation, which serves as a sign” (CP 5.283). On the other hand, he argues, “Each
former thought suggests something to the thought which follows it, i.e., is the sign of
something to this latter” (CP 5.284). In so doing, he extends far beyond the above notions of
sign, which subsist between sensations, perceptions, or concepts on one hand and external
things on the other, to the thought-thought relation. What’s more, he also includes deliberate
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thoughts within the thought-thought relation, thus going beyond the fundamentally natural
relation inherent in the above notions of sign. For Peirce, “We think only in signs” (EP 2:10);
“Every cognition is a sign” (1906), “All association is by signs” (W 2:237-8; CP 5.307-9);
and “Man is a sign” (CP 5.314).
viii. Bio-Sign
A step further from the perceptual sign and the thought-sign leads us to those
phenomena seen as signs by biosemiotics. This step extends the subject, to which something
is a sign, from human beings to living systems of all levels, ranging from cellular organelles,
cells, tissues, organs, to organ systems (Sebeok 2001: 12), as well as organisms running the
gamut from Monera, Protista, Fungi, Plantae, to Anamalia (Sebeok 2001: 28). The extension
results, on the part of biology, from the shift in the notion of intelligence, which goes from
human brain to living systems of all levels; and on the part of semiotics, from the broadening
extension of the sign to active utilization of information. As a result, information exchange
between a living system and its environment or other living systems is deemed as a semiosis,
whose studies go by the name of endosemiotics (Thur von Uexküll et al. 1993),
mycosemiotics (Kraepelin 1997; see Posner et al. 1997: 488-507), phytosemiotics (Krampen
1981), or zoosemiotics (Sebeok 1963), with their generic name biosemiotics (Sebeok 2001:
134).
For Sebeok, the sign phenomenon also includes “signaling behavior in and across
animal species” (1963: 465). Krampen (1981) extends it to information utilization or
exchange by plants. Kraepelin (see Posner et al. 1997: 488-507) broadens it to
microorganisms like bacteria and fungi. Thure von Uexküll and his collaborators (1993: 8-9)
encompass information exchange within or between cells, between organs, and between
organ systems---such as the exchange of genetic information within cells, the transmission of
neuroendocrine between the nervous system and internal organs. In a sense, the sign
phenomena under Uexküll’s endosemiotics are an extension of Peirce’s thought-signs
beyond the human brain to other within-organism living systems of all organisms. Alexi A.
Sharov gives a shrewd summary of sign phenomena examined by biosemiotics, when saying
that a sign is “everything that has significance for the system, i.e., value (either positive or
negative)” (1999: 525; parentheses original).
For the sake of future discussion, let us give the label bio-sign to the above sign
phenomena except those signs of animals over which they have control. In other words, the
bio-sign is here taken in the narrow sense, in comparison with sign phenomena examined by
biosemiotics in the broad sense. Thus defined, bio-signs are like most of the preceding types
of signs in that they are based on some fundamentally natural connection.
In this sense, the above-mentioned types of signs---indicative signs (including
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symptoms, physiognomic signs, and other signs like them), recollective signs (including
divinatory signs, conditional reflexes, and other signs like them), abstract inferential signs,
sensational signs, perceptual signs, conceptual signs, part of thought-signs (excluding
deliberate thoughts), and bio-signs in the narrow sense---all fall under the umbrella term
natural sign in the broad sense.
viv. Instituted sign
In contradistinction to the natural sign, some signs involve a connection between two
relata deliberately instituted by a certain subject. Let us term them the instituted sign3.
Among the instituted signs, the linguistic sign, spoken or written, are one of the earliest
noticed in the history, as exemplified by Plato:
(93) A name is a kind of spoken sign that’s applied to things. (1997: 285)
Aristotle links a word directly with something in the mind:
(94) Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. (Aristotle 1984: 72)
Since Aristotle, very few philosophers insist on linking a word directly with something
external. Here are some exceptions:
(95) Letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing.
(Scotus 1963: 112)
(96) Spoken words are used to signify the very things that are signified by concepts of
the mind. (Ockham 1974: 50)
Instead, most of the later philosophers echo Aristotle’s view, as shown below:
(97) Speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. (Aquinas 1947: 2587)
(98) The letters are the signs of words, while the words themselves in our speech are
signs of the things of which we are thinking. (Augustine 2002: 187)
(99) Seeing names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it is
manifest they are not signs of the things themselves. (Hobbes 1839: 17)
(100) Words are conventional signs of thoughts, and characters are conventional signs
of words. (Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 37)
(101) Words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas
in the mind of him that uses them. (Locke1824, bk. III, ch. II, sec. 2)
Among these philosophers, however, some also link words with external things as well, for
instance,
(102) A word is a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be

3

The instituted sign is closely relevant to such more common terms as conventional sign,
symbol, and arbitrary sign. The reason why it is so called is given in Section 5.1 entitled “Name
and Nature of the Instituted Sign.”
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understood by a hearer. A thing is whatever is sensed or is understood or is hidden.
(Augustine 1975: 87)
Another kind of instituted signs noticed early in the history is the instituted signal, i.e.,
an instituted sign targeted at and directly sent to somebody or some people. That is to say,
like other instituted signs, they involve a connection deliberately constituted by a certain
subject; in addition, they are explicitly targeted at somebody or some people---they are
meant as a signal for the recipient(s).
Of the instituted signals, one common subtype is the conative signal or appellative
signal, i.e., a message sent directly to a living being, asking or demanding it to do something
immediately, as if saying to it, “Do …!”, as illustrated below:
(103) a. a sign from a master for his/her possession to kill itself (Plato 1997: 54);
b. a sign from their director of a chorus (Plato 1997: 713);
c. a sign from the commander of an army for pursuing the enemy or yielding (Plato
1997: 1592)
(104) The sound of trumpet is a sign for a soldier to advance or to retreat. (Augustine
1958: 34) *
(105) The voice [i.e., sound] a cock makes when finding food is a sign for the hen to run
to him. (Augustine 1958: 35) *
Another subtype of instituted signals is the representative signal or referential signal,
i.e., a message sent directly to a particular group of living beings or living beings within a
particular range, notifying them of something of immediate concern, as if saying to them,
“Attention, something is happening or is going to happen. You could or had better do …
now.” Examples are as follows:
(106) The lifting of a torch is a sign of approaching enemies or arrival of friends; the
sound of a bell is a sign of the selling of prepared food, or of the need to sprinkle the
roads. (Empiricus 2005: 127) *
(107) A whistle means that the train is about to start. A gunshot means that the sun is
just setting. (Langer 1948: 47)
The last subtype of instituted signals is the expressive signal or emotive signal, i.e., a
message sent directly to a living being, telling it about the sender’s attitude, feeling, opinion,
or other mental state relevant to a living being, as if saying to it, “I … you.” Such
phenomena are common in daily communication, though seldom fully formulated in works
of semiotics. Examples include what Eco calls codified social behavior (1976: 9), such as
kisses, embraces, smacks, and slaps on the shoulder, as well as some cases of the witting
signal mentioned by Sebeok (2001: 10), such as nodding, winking, glancing, looking,
nudging, kicking, and head tilting.
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Overall, the instituted signal---conative, representative, or expressive---is one of the
most common and diversified kind of signs for human beings and animals. They are seldom
fully formulated, but are frequently mentioned or listed in the history of semiotics. Examples
include these: nodding and motions of hands (Augustine 1958: 35-36); signs of gesticulation
(Kant 2006: 85-87); watch-fire (Peirce W 1:257-258); polite formulas and military signals
(Saussure 1959: 16); traffic signals, flares, warning sounds, and horn beeps (Jakobson 1971:
706); tactile communication among the blind and in proxemics behavior, also including
codified social behavior such as kisses, embraces, smacks, and slaps on the shoulder (Eco
1976: 9); witting signals, such as nodding, winking, glancing, looking, nudging, kicking, and
head tilting (Sebeok 2001: 10); signals for conventional social purposes, such as railway
signals, smoke signals, warning lights, flares, beacons, balefires, red flags, traffic lights,
alarms, distress signals, danger signals, whistles, sirens, bleepers, buzzers, knocking, gongs,
bells, and drums (Sebeok 2001: 10).
Instituted signals function properly only when they are made and sent directly to an
intended living being or an intended group of living beings. They are meant to make the
intended recipient(s) take some immediate action, or to notify them of an emergent
occurrence that commands immediate attention or action, or to communicate a current
mental state of the sender toward them. Other instituted signs may also be sent to other living
beings, but do not rely on a communicative activity targeted at an intended audience to
function properly. They are meant not so much to communicate something to a particular
audience, as to represent something. Let us call them the representative sign, for ease of
future discussion. Here are some examples:
(108) Bread is a sign of Christ’s body. (Aquinas 1957: 254)
(109) A stone set in the ground signifies the bound of a field. (Hobbes 1839: 14)
(110) The dove is a symbol of the Holy Ghost; the cleansing of baptism is a symbol of
spiritual birth. (Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 36) *
(111) A bunch of red roses [is] a sign of love. (Jakobson 1971: 702)
(112) The white color is a symbol of cleanliness, purity, or innocence; the dark color is a
symbol of uncleanness, impurity, or corruption. (Sebeok 2001: 11)
Other examples include these: odor of the ointment with which His feet were anointed,
the taste of the sacrament of His body and blood, the hem of His garment (Augustine 1958:
35-36); religious symbols, such as a cross, or literary symbols, such as a “golden bowl”
symbolizing life, or social symbols, such as representations of a totemic animal (Morris 1946:
26); and monuments (Morris 1946: 206).
Besides representing something, some representative signs also serve as a silent
notification---to notify any potentially interested living being of something that is happening
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at a particular place, as if saying to the potential recipient, “Hey, something is taking place
here.” Examples are as follows:
(113) The barrel-hoop is a sign of wine in the tavern. (Ockham 1974: 50)
(114) A bush hung up signifies that wine is to be sold there. (Hobbes 1839: 14)
(115) A crepe on the door means someone has just died. (Langer 1948: 47)
The above representative signs have two apparent features. For one thing, they have so
much materiality that they are just like daily physical objects. A chunk of bread, a stone, a
dove, a bunch of red roses, a barrel-loop, a bush, and a crepe can all be ordinary material
things without being signs. For another, they depend on special circumstances for their
proper functioning. Bread in a supermarket does not signify Christ’s body; a stone set in the
ground but not between two fields does not signify a boundary; doves in a park do not
represent the holy ghost; a bunch of red roses one buys for oneself do not mean love. So to
speak, the representative signs mentioned above, as well as the preceding instituted signals,
are all restricted to some circumstances: to certain recipient(s), or to certain places where
they are used.
Some representative signs serve both to represent something and to distinguish among
like things. Very often, such signs resort to a physical thing that is carried by a living being
or appended to a physical object. The physical thing serves to distinguish the being or object
from others, as if saying, “This being/thing is ….” Here is an example:
(116) A crown is the sign of royalty. (Aquinas 1947: 3599)
Other examples, though not fully formulated in works of semiotics, are abundant:
banners and military standards (Augustine 1958: 35-36); signs of social standing for free
men honored with hereditary rank (coats of arms), signs of service in prescribed clothing
(uniforms and liveries), signs of honor for service (ribbons awarded by orders), and signs of
disgrace (brandings and so on) (Kant 2006: 85-87); theatre ticket (Peirce W 1:257-258);
badges and other insignia, trademarks, stamps, emblems, coats of arms, banners, and ensigns
(Jakobson 1971: 706); signatures, trademarks, logos, watermarks, and heraldic devices
(Sebeok 2001: 21). Like the preceding representative signs, these representative signs also
depend on special circumstances for proper functioning: the living being or physical object
to which they are appended. In addition, these representative signs all resort to artificial sign
vehicles. Some of them are used at once for daily practice and for representing purposes. In
such cases, the sign vehicle look like daily physical objects; on the other hand, they are made
special in design or form. Some of the above-mentioned examples, such as crowns, uniforms,
liveries, coats of arms, and heraldic devices belong to this category. However, most of
these representative signs are used not for daily practice, but for representing purposes. In
such cases, the artificial vehicle tends to be materially simple: stripped, to a great degree, of
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material irrelevant to its representing function. It tends to be dimensionally simple; that is, it
prefers to be two-dimensional rather than three-dimensional. It tends to be small in thickness
or size. It tends to be simple in structure or form. Most examples listed above belong in this
kind.
Some representative signs are much more universal than the preceding subtypes, being
free from the restrictions binding the instituted signs mentioned above. Such representative
signs tend to have an even lesser degree of materiality---typically in the form of simple
sounds, written marks, or sketchy pictures. They are not appended to a living being or
physical object to distinguish it from other like beings or thing, but they tend to form a sign
system which distinguish its members through minor variations in form. What is more, the
members can be easily combined with one another to form a text. The linguistic sign, spoken
or written, belongs in this group. Other examples include these: chemical, astronomical,
Chinese, and hieroglyphic figures, or musical, stenographic, arithmetic, and algebraic marks
(Leibniz GP, VII, 204-207; see Dascal 1987: 181, Appendix 5); tone signs and punctuation
marks (Kant 2006: 85-87); the alphabet of deaf-metes (Saussure 1959: 16); speech-fixing
signs---such as script and punctuation---numerical signs, phonetic symbols, astrological
signs, cabalistic and magical signs, technical and scientific signs, pictograms, and other such
imagery used extensively in advertising (Sebeok 2001: 21).
x. Other miscellaneous signs
In addition to the above types of signs, the history of semiotics also proposes other
ways of categorization. Among them are Aristotle’s necessary sign and non-necessary sign
(1984: 4630), as well as common sign and peculiar sign (1984: 2702); Augustine’s given sign
(signa data) (1958: 34-35); Roger Bacon’s signs constituted by the soul (signa ordinate ab
anima) (2013: 37-41); Poinsot’s customary sign (1985: 27); Condillac’s accidental sign
(2001: 36); Kant’s miraculous sign (2006: 85-87); Hegel’s symbol (1916 [1817]: 8-9);
Degérando’s sign and sign of language (1800 1: 66); Bolzano’s contingent sign, derived sign,
and indirect sign (2014: 45-50); Peirce’s icon, index, and symbol (CP 2.276-308); Husserl’s
indication and expression (2001 [1970]: 183); Bühler’s symbol, symptom ( or index), and
signal (2011: 58); signal and symbol in the sense of Cassirer (1944: 51), Langer (1953: 26;
footnote 1), and Morris (1946: 24-27); Piaget’s signal, index, symbol, and sign (1958: 22-86);
Hjelmslev’s connotator (1961: 116); Buyssens’ substitutive sign (see Nöth 1990: 291); Eco’s
ostensive sign (1976: 203) and super-sign (1976: 231); Kamlah and Lorenzen’s actual sign
and potential sign (see Nöth 1990: 81); Sebeok’s zero sign and six species of signs (1976:
117-147), etc..
These types of signs cut across the above-mentioned subcategories. Most of those that
are illustrated with examples have also been given under the preceding subcategories. Here
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are some examples not yet mentioned:
(117) A call by the name is a customary sign for a dog. (Poinsot 1985: 205) *
(118) A dog frequently seen accompanying someone [is a customary sign] that that
person is its master. (Poinsot 1985: 278)
(119) Napkins set out is a customary sign for a meal. (Poinsot 1985: 278) *
(120) A sound a people by their customs introduce and propose for signifying is a
customary sign. (Poinsot 1985: 278) *
On the other hand, some of them are mentioned without exemplification, such as those
brought up by Aristotle, Degérando, and Bühler. This practice is common, as already
observable with the subtypes of instituted signs mentioned earlier. It becomes increasingly
common with the development of semiotics, when the discipline expands its horizon. People
sometimes argue for a certain type of sign or assert the existence of sign phenomena in a
certain field, without specifying what is a sign of an object, of what object something is a
sign, and in what sense something is a sign of an object. Here are some examples.
(121) For the language in which people talk, the rites they perform, the monuments they
erect, the works of art they make, the devices they utilize to indicate social prestige
are all cultural phenomena, and all sign phenomena. (Morris 1946: 206)
(122) Types of meaning situation or modes of symbolism: language, ritual, myth, music;
art, science or mathematics, behavior or fantasy or dream, adaptation of ideas. (Langer
1948: 83) *
(123) The study of signs, however, cannot be confined to such exclusively semiotic
systems but must take into consideration also applied semiotic structures, as for
instance, architecture, dress, or cuisine. (Jakobson 1971: 703).
(124) Art has long escaped semiotic analysis. Still there is no doubt that all of the arts,
whether essentially temporal like music or poetry, or basically spatial like painting or
sculpture, or syncretic, spatio-temporal, like theater or circus performances or film
showings, are linked to the sign. (Jakobson 1980: 21)
(125) Semiology therefore aims to take in any system of signs, whatever their substance
and limits; images, gestures, musical sounds, objects, and the complex associations of
all these, which form content of ritual, convention or public entertainment: these
constitute, if not languages, at least systems of signification. (Barthes 1967: 9;
Introduction; italics original)
(126) … against the background of nonculture, culture appears as a system of signs. In
particular, whether we speak of such features of culture as “being man-made” (as
opposed to “being natural”), “being conventional” (as opposed to “being spontaneous”
and “being nonconventional”), or as the ability to condense human experience (in
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opposition to the primordial quality of nature)---in each case, we are dealing with
different aspects of the semiotic essence of culture. (Lotman 1978; parentheses
original)
In this fuzzy vein, the sign quality tends to be overly accentuated, to the extent that a
thing involving sign phenomena is equaled with a sign, to the extent that a field involving
signs is equaled with a semiotic system, or to the extent that a variant of sign is taken to be a
type of sign. Thus we come across an array of bewildering terms, such as aesthetic sign
(Morris 1971: 415), art-sign (Shapiro 1975: 34), musical sign (see Nöth 1990: 430),
architectural sign (see Nöth 1990: 435), object sign (see Nöth 1990: 441) or object-sign (see
Nöth 1990: 444), pictorial sign (see Nöth 1990: 453), photographic sign (see Nöth 1990:
460), filmic sign (see Nöth 1990: 464), and theatrical sign (see Nöth 1990: 363). While there
is no disputing that these phenomena often involve signs or “are linked to the sign”
(Jakobson 1980: 21), they seldom consist merely of signs---except for some cases of
photographs. They are more like “types of meaning situation” (Langer 1948: 83) or “systems
of signification” (Barthes 1967: 9; Introduction) than sign systems, much less proper signs,
even much less types of signs.
3.1.2 Initial Characterization of Signs
i. Recollective sign
Of the many types of signs cited above, the recollective sign is probably the most vast
and common. As Empiricus defines it, “the recollective sign, when it has been observed
through plain experience together with the thing signified, leads us, immediately it impinges
on us when the other thing is unclear, to a recollection of the thing that has been observed
together with it but is not now striking us plainly” (2005: 119). Empiricus’ definition tells
much about this type of signs, but is still too sketchy. A scrutiny of the instances illustrated in
Section 3.1.1 indicates that the recollective sign generally undergoes the following four
phases. (a) Something perceptible (Y) is connected, by nature,4 with another perceptible
thing (X).5 (b) Somebody observes the connection. (c) The observation is retained in the
subject’s memory. (d) When one of them is later perceived by the subject but the other not,
the subject recollects the other by virtue of the memory. In phase (a), the two things are
connected first by nature---by contiguity, as is illustrated by most examples from 36 to 52, by
4

Hereinafter, the connection is “natural” or established “by nature,” in the sense that their
connection could be observed directly or indirectly, and does not vary with the will of a subject.
5
The letter Y and X are used somewhat arbitrarily, but not without a reason. The two letters
look like a pair, hence their appropriateness to be symbols of sign vehicle and object. As shown
in the examples listed in Section 3.1.1, sign vehicles are more likely to logically follow their
object, hence Y for the former and X for the latter. Coincidentally, the letter X often has the
connotation of “unknown,” thus being more proper a symbol for the object.
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cause, as is the case with Example 43, 44, and 51, or by resemblance, as is the case with
examples from 57 to 60. The connection is natural, in the sense that it can be observed
directly, that it remains fundamentally the same in spite of a subject’s will, and that it appears
to be the same to all subjects that are physiologically normal. Through phase (b), a subject
cognizes the natural connection, and transforms it into a cognized natural connection. Phase
(c) stores the connection in the subject’s memory. The memory could be vivid or dim, as the
observed occurrence might be vivid or dim; engraved or shallow, due to the vividness and
frequency of the occurrence; and conscious or unconscious, depending on the mental state of
the subject during the act of observation---when the memory is conscious, it becomes the
subject’s conscious knowledge. Phase (d) utilizes the memory to serve the subject’s
recollection of something when perceiving another. When the connection is so strong in
memory, the recollection could be automatic; when it is not that strong, the subject---if it is
intelligent enough to be capable of reasoning---could infer something from the thing
presented on the basis of the memory (or knowledge) of the connection. In this phase, the
thing presented to the subject is clear by nature, that is, perceptible; whereas the recollected
is unclear for the moment---being either something to come in the future, something already
gone, or something current but hidden from the subject due to contingent circumstances.
Besides, the thing perceived by the subject in phase (d) may differ to an extent from the
corresponding thing in phase (a). For most of the examples from 31 to 55, such a variation
does not turn the table. As long as the weather condition is taken to be a mist or a rainbow by
a person, it would be a sign of fair weather to him or her, no matter how different the mist or
rainbow is from the one he or she observed together with fair weather for the first time. The
same is true for a halo, a mock sun, or a red sky in the morning as a sign of rain; so does a
footprint as a sign of a big goat or a small one. The variation makes a difference only when it
is so great that it goes beyond the very subcategory or category, as is the case between the
patter on the roof made by rain and by hail, and between the patter on the roof by rain or hail
and the great noise made by a meteorite.
ii. Indicative sign
In the same vein, the indicative sign can be characterized as follows. (a) Something
perceptible (Y) is connected, by nature, with another imperceptible thing (X). (b) Somebody
experiences the connection indirectly. (c) The experience is retained in the subject’s memory.
(d) When the perceptible thing is later perceived by the subject but the latter not, the subject
recollects the latter by virtue of the memory. In phase (a), the two things are connected first
by nature, mostly by cause. For symptoms, the inner conditions of the body cause the bodily
manifestations, as is the case with examples from 1 to 7, among which Example 4 and
Example 7 are caused indirectly. For physiognomic signs, the mental characters cause, or are
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believed by some to cause, the bodily manifestations, as illustrated by examples from 11 to
17. For other indicative signs, like examples from 18 to 23, emotions or feelings cause the
bodily manifestations.
In phase (b), in contradistinction to that of the recollective sign, the subject does not
observe the two things together, but, at most, experiences the connection indirectly, as one
cannot experience a perceptible thing together with an imperceptible thing directly. For a
subject to experience such a connection, three steps are necessary. First, the subject indirectly
experiences something imperceptible (X) by virtue of the feelings of one or a set of
physiological reactions relevant to it (X’), when it can be felt by the subject; or when it
cannot be felt by the subject, by virtue of the observation of one or a set of bodily
manifestations relevant to it (X’’). Second, the subject senses something perceptible (Y),
sometimes accompanied by the feeling of physiological reactions related to it (Y’). Third, the
subject forms the belief that the perceptible thing (Y) is connected with the imperceptible
thing (X), on the basis of the contiguity between bodily manifestations of the imperceptible
thing (X’’) and the perceptible thing (Y), or between physiological reactions relevant to the
imperceptible thing (X’) and the perceptible thing (Y) (together with that between X’ and Y’).
Which imperceptible things could be felt by a subject? Emotions and feelings---such as
shame, grief and sorrow, anger, awe, and pain, as illustrated in examples from 18 to 23---are
felt partly by everyone occasionally. In contrast, mental characters or dispositions---such as
courage or cowardice, soft character or fervid temper, effeminacy, softness of disposition or
harshness of disposition, humor and dissimulation, excellent disposition, mental acuteness,
and innate feeble-mindedness, as illustrated from examples from 11 to 17---are felt partly
only by some people. Likewise, of the examples of symptoms from 1 to 10, a cold is felt
partly by everyone; life, disease, and health are felt slightly by anyone; problem with kidneys,
suppuration, being with child, wound in the lung, and serious disease are felt partly or
slightly by only some people; approaching elimination of a bone is not felt by anyone as it is
to happen in the future, though elimination of a bone could be felt. Let us illustrate the
multiple steps with some examples. Take Example 7: A cough is an index of a cold. For
ordinary people, a cold was and is something that could be felt. The example might involve
three steps. First, a subject feels a cold (X) by feeling one or a set of physiological reactions
within the body (X’), such as fever, fatigue, headache, stuffy nose, sore throat, chest
discomfort, and muscle aches. Second, the subject [feels the physiological reactions of
coughing (Y’) and] hears the sound he or she makes (Y). Third, the subject forms the belief
that the sound of coughing (Y) is connected with a cold (X), on the basis of the contiguity
between Y and X’ (together with that between Y’ and X’). X’ and Y’---that is, physiological
reactions relevant to X and those relevant to Y---may be bonded together by instinct, so that
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they are readily felt as inextricably related or even as a whole, as is the case for groans, sighs,
facial expressions, and bodily motions out of emotions and feelings, as illustrated in
examples from 21 to 23. Take Example 18: Blushing is a sign of shame. This example could
unfold like Example 7, except that in the second stage, the subject does not hear the sound he
or she makes, but has to rely on something like a mirror to see the blush on his or her face.
Yet the example could also unfold in another way: not by feeling something within one’s
own body, but by observing others’ behavior. In this way, the example would go as follows.
First, a subject experiences a shame (X), partly and indirectly, by virtue of observations of
one or a set of bodily manifestations displayed by another subject (X’’), such as head lowered,
eyebrows arching outward, eyes looking down, mouth dropping, face or/and neck flushing,
voice lowered and slowed, and stuttering or speechless. Second, the subject also sees
blushing on the face of the other subject (Y). Third, the subject forms the belief that blushing
(Y) is connected with a shame (X), on the basis of the contiguity between Y and X’’. This
process has a greater reach than the previous one, in that it applies not only to those
imperceptible things that could be felt by a certain subject, but also to those that could not be
felt by the subject, except for Example 2, which would be discussed later. Whichever the way,
however, due to the indirectness of the experience, the subject is never certain of the
connection between the two relata; instead, the subject only feels, believes, or guesses that a
connection holds between the two. Consequently, the indicative sign has a great liability to
error. It happens that the subject believes in a causal connection between two things when
there is not. For instance, blushing is not necessarily a sign of shame as claimed by Example
18. Nor are the physiological states in the following examples:
(121) That a woman is pale is a sign that she is with child. (Aristotle 1984: 257) *
(122) The fact that he breathes fast is a sign that he has a fever. (Aristotle 1984: 4631)
In spite of all this, a subject manages to experience the connection between something
perceptible and something imperceptible, thus concluding phase (b).
The experience in phase (b) would become the observer’s memory, thus constituting
phase (c). Unlike with the recollective sign, however, memory here is rarely vivid, due to the
indirect nature of the connection. Nor is it engraved, unless the subject makes a great effort
to guarantee sufficient frequency of the connection. Nor is it ever unconscious; even in those
cases where Y’ and X’ are so bonded as to be felt almost as a whole, as illustrated by
examples from 21 to 23, because in these cases it still takes other things to enter into the
connection between Y and X. Of course, in cases like examples from 21 to 23, the piece of
memory involved sometimes verges on being subconscious; as attested by the fact that some
people are susceptible to tears or sorrow on hearing the sound of crying or on seeing a crying
face. Overall, however, memory formed in the second phase of an indicative sign usually
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becomes the subject’s conscious knowledge. In fact, many indicative signs are learnt only
after a great effort, as testified by all the examples of symptoms or physiognomic signs from
Example 1 to Example 17. On the other hand, relevant knowledge might be turned into
something like a disposition or instinct after sufficient acquisition or rehearsing. In phase (d),
the subject avails of his or her memory to recollect the imperceptible thing when presented
with the perceptible thing. Since memory here is mostly conscious knowledge, recollection
here tends to be conscious and deliberate. Besides, as is the case with the recollective sign,
phase (d) allows of variations in the perceptible thing, to the extent that it is still regarded as
the same thing as that in phase (a). Unlike the recollective sign, the indicative sign here
happens between something clear, namely, the perceptible thing, and something unclear by
nature, namely, the imperceptible thing. There is only a need to add that some things unclear
by nature might become something unclear for the moment. This applies especially to the
symptom, as illustrated by examples from 1 to 7. Suppuration, pregnancy, wound in the lung,
and things like that could well be observed if anatomy is resorted to; affected kidney, life,
cold, and so on could also be partially observed if modern medical instruments are used.
iii. Divinatory sign and physiognomic sign
Both the recollective sign and the indicative sign have a subtype that sounds
unscientific to modern ears, namely, the divinatory sign and the physiognomic sign. Why do
they sound unscientific whereas the others do not? Both subtypes undergo exactly the same
multiple phases as other recollective signs or indicative signs. The physiognomic signs, such
as examples from 11 to 17, and the divinatory signs, such as examples from 31 to 35 except
Example 32, all undergo the following four phases. (a) Something perceptible is naturally
connected with an imperceptible thing, or another perceptible thing. (b) Somebody
experiences the connection, indirectly or directly. (c) The experience becomes the subject’s
memory. (d) When the perceptible thing, or one of the two perceptible things, is later
perceived by the subject while the other is not, the subject recollects the other by virtue of
memory. As is the case with other indicative or recollective signs, what phase (b) involves is
an experience of a connection, an act that happens with somebody in some place at some
time. Phase (d), in contrast, involves an act of recollecting, based on the memory of a
connection formed in the second phase---another act that happens with somebody in some
place at some time. Here we witness an application of something formed in one act to
another act. Since an act is unrepeatable in an absolute sense, the two acts are different;
accordingly, the application is by nature deficient. If we use N and M to label the two relata
in phase (b), and use Y and X for those in phase (d), then the application makes some sense,
only when the N-M connection equals the Y-X connection in some way. The history of
semiotics offers one possible situation meeting such a requirement. That is, N and Y are seen
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as two tokens of the same thing or two members of the same kind of thing, and so are M and
X; moreover, the N-M connection and the Y-X connection are but two tokens of the same
connection, or two cases of a regularity or law that applies to varied situations. In other
words, from a token-connection is derived a type-connection, a regularity, or a law; the latter,
in turn, is applied to other token-connections or cases of connection. The former stage
involves a process of generalization from case; the latter, a deductive inference.
Generalization from case is pervasive with human beings, because they long to learn from
experiences something useful to facilitate future practice. Yet for standard signs, it is not only
pervasive but also necessary, because it is probably the only way to apply one act directly to
another act. For ease of future discussion, let us call this phenomenon the generalizing
tendency of sign. This tendency might lead to valid knowledge or to errors. Accordingly, the
sign might serve as an organon for knowledge or for misbelief. All the examples of
physiognomic signs and divinatory signs, for instance, claim to be grounded on something
valid, but not all of them actually are. Errors arise when the claimed regularity or law does
not exist; when a coincidence is exalted to the position of regularity, an accidental regularity
stretched to a probable law, or a probable law taken to be universal; or when several laws
coexist. All these errors are due to overgeneralization. Let us call it the overgeneralizing
tendency of sign. For example, the physiognomic signs, like those cited in examples from 11
to 17, are at best regularities. Aristotle, however, exalts them to the law that “an alteration of
the state of the soul produces an alteration in the form of the body” (1984: 2711). While it is
generally true that the states of the soul, like grief or joy, incur a gloomy or cheerful
countenance (Aristotle 1984: 2711), and probably true that the soul and the body are affected
sympathetically by one another (Aristotle 1984: 2711); it does not follow that a person with
lethargic movements, straight eyebrows, or greenish iris has a soft character. Even if the soul
affects the body, the affection is not necessarily as strong as to trigger a change to the look of
the body; and even if it is, a certain feature of the body does not necessarily result from, or
solely result from, the soul. Similarly, the divinatory signs, like those cited in examples from
31 to 35, are at best coincidences, or coincidences that appear several times; in consequence,
the inference is unreliable even if the consequent happens to be true. To mention in passing,
as naive as divinatory signs seem to modern minds, they probably have served as a valuable
source of knowledge for remote ancients who, practically ignorant of the surrounding world,
badly needed knowledge of nature for guidance of their future practice. Divinatory signs
may not be utterly fantastic, but are based upon some experience. They might have
originated, like true knowledge, with the urge to infer something new from something known
so as to guide their future practice; it is only that, with so little knowledge of the natural
world, all that the ancients have got to rely on are experiences of concurrences, which turn
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out to be coincidences. If we follow the line of Aristotle and distinguish between sure sign
(Aristotle 1984: 1326) or certain sign (Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 35), probable sign
(Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 35), and accidental sign (Condillac 2001: 36); then the
physiognomic signs are mainly accidental signs, at best probable signs; whereas the
divinatory signs are purely accidental signs. Errors happen to them because the claimed
regularity or law does not exist, or because a coincidence is exalted to the position of
regularity, or because an accidental regularity is stretched to a probable law.
The overgeneralizing tendency of sign is not confined to physiognomic signs and
divinatory signs. With some modifications, it also applies to other indicative signs and
recollective signs, to the instituted signs, and possibly to all kinds of signs. For signs other
than physiognomic signs and divinatory signs, errors occur typically when one stretches an
accidental regularity to a probable law, or a probable law to a universal one; or when one
fails to recognize the possible coexistence of several laws. A modified version of Example
46---for example, an injury to the head is a sign of impending death---illustrates the first
cause. An injury to the head sometimes causes death. There is a causal law here, but of
accidental regularity. Error strikes when one literally means that an injury to the head is a
sign of impending death. A more common error stems from the stretching of a probable law
to a universal one. In effect, most examples cited in Section 3.1.1 are grounded upon
probable laws at the most, and thus do not hold if taken to be universal. For instance,
meteorological signs, as illustrated by examples from 36 to 40 and by Example 47, are only
probable because, theoretically, the two relata they involve are linked largely by a common
cause, and because, practically, the weather condition is likely to change before the next day.
When Aristotle cites Example 38---“Mock sun is a surer sign of rain than the rods”---he
obviously does not consider either mock sun or rods as sure signs proper. The error to
universalize also appears when the special circumstances requisite for a certain sign are
omitted. This happens most commonly with the instituted signs, particularly the so-called
representative signs. For instance, a stone set in the ground, a barrel-loop, a bush hung up, or
a crepe---cited respectively in Example 109, 113, 114, and 115---could be a sign or not a
sign at all, if it is not, respectively, set between two fields, hung up in a tavern or the like, or
attached to a door. In these examples, errors result from omission of the special
circumstances. Errors also set in when the circumstances are changed, which typically
happens with the instituted signs, particularly signals. This is often the case when a
phenomenon is an ambiguous sign in Bolzano’s (2014 3: 46) or Morris’ (1946: 21) parlance.
Empiricus offers some good examples: “The lifting of a torch signifies the approach of
enemies to some people, but shows the arrival of friends to others, and the sound of a bell is
to some people a sign of the selling of prepared food, to others of the need to sprinkle the
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roads” (2005: 127). Langer gives even richer examples.
A shot may mean the beginning of a race, the rise of the sun, the sighting of danger,
the commencement of a parade. As for bells, the world is mad with their messages.
As for bells, the world is mad with their messages. Somebody at the front door, the
back door, the side door, the telephone---toast is ready---typewriter line is
ended---school begins, work begins, church begins, church is over---street car
starts---cashbox registers---knife grinder passes---time for dinner, time to get
up---fire in town! (1948: 47-48)
Among the examples cited in Section 3.1.1, examples from 104 to 107 all have the potential
to mean other things when the circumstances change. Errors also pop up when several
possible laws are likely whereas only one is recognized. Example 7, 18, and 19 all fall into
this situation. A cough probably comes from a cold, blushing from shame, and weeping from
grief and sorrow; yet they might also be due to something spicy, feeling of shyness, or great
excitement.
iv. Instituted sign
In contrast with natural signs, be it indicative or recollective, the instituted sign
generally undergoes three phases. (a) Somebody voluntarily links something perceptible (Y)
with another perceptible or imperceptible thing (X), by means of voluntary mental
association. (b) The experience is retained in the subject’s memory. (c) When the subject
later thinks of X, thanks to memory, he or she thinks of Y, or uses Y to express X; or when the
subject later perceives Y but not X, the subject recollects X by virtue of memory. To facilitate
the comparison with natural signs, let us add something similar to the first phase of natural
signs. If so, the above characterization could be rephrased into four phases. (a) Something
perceptible (Y) is not connected, by nature, with another perceptible or imperceptible thing
(X). (b) Somebody voluntarily links the two up. (c) The voluntary act is retained in the
subject’s memory. (d) When the subject later thinks of X, thanks to memory, he or she thinks
of Y, or uses Y to express X; or when the subject later perceives Y but not X, the subject
recollects X by virtue of memory. Unlike indicative or recollective signs, the two relata of the
instituted sign are not connected by cause, contiguity, or resemblance. This is the case with
all the examples from 87 to 108. None of the Xs in these examples causes the Ys; nor are the
two relata connected by contiguity---a kind of connection that could be observed. Even when
resemblance holds between the two relata, as is the case with onomatopoeic words and
hieroglyphics, instituted signs differs from natural signs of similitude---such as photograph,
image formed in reflection, and image formed in sensation. The latter is fundamentally
causal, whereas the former is not. This is exactly what it means to say, in phase (a), that Y is
not connected, by nature, with X. On the other hand, not being connected by nature does not
mean that there could be no direct or indirect connection between them. Onomatopoetic
words and hieroglyphics have direct relation to the things they represent, and Chinese
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ideograms are at least indirectly related to the things they represent. Besides, Ys are often not
chosen or fabricated at random, but are so made as to be appropriate to certain functions. Of
the examples from 93 to 116, some Ys are evidently chosen for a reason. A barrel-hoop is
apparently related to a barrel, as is a barrel to the wine it contains. A stone is an ideal thing
for the bound of a field, and something easy to come by. A whistle is piercing enough to
notify a noisy crowd in a station while a gunshot is loud enough for people scattered across a
small town. The sound of a bell is sufficiently marked to inform nearby people of sold food
without getting on their nerves. The light of a torch is likely to signal to people at a distance
the approaching of enemies or friends. The same is true for gestures from an army
commander or chorus director, written words, and spoken words---all meeting certain
requirements appropriate for some function. In fact, it is highly likely that none of Ys,
utilized as signs for Xs, is chosen or made purely at random. The why and how of this will be
addressed later. In spite of all this, for instituted signs, the connection between the two relata
is voluntarily instituted, as specified by phase (b). In phase (c), the act of voluntary
instituting turns into the corresponding subject’s memory, as does the act of experiencing for
natural signs. The memory of the connection is probably less vivid than that of the
recollective sign, yet more vivid than that of the indicative sign. This is because, unlike the
recollective sign, the connection could not be observed directly; on the other hand, unlike the
indicative sign, it is established directly. Besides, the piece of memory of the connection
must be generally more conscious than that of the indicative, and even greater than that of
the recollective sign. This is because the connection of the instituted sign is established first
by the will, and the indicative sign takes more steps to establish the connection than the
recollective sign. As to the extent to which the piece of memory is likely to become engraved,
the instituted sign stands a greater chance than the indicative sign, and often greater than the
recollective sign. This is because, though the recollective sign might be more vivid, the
instituted sign could be rehearsed whenever the subject wills it. Anyhow, in phase (d), the
subject manages to avail of the piece of memory for recollection. Different from recollective
signs and indicative signs, the instituted sign in this phase offers two possible directions of
recollecting: to recollect X from Y, or to recollect Y from X. The latter recollection, in most
cases, means expressing X with Y. Throughout the examples from 93 to 116, it is not only
possible to infer X from Y as do natural signs, but to use Y to express X (to others). Like
indicative signs, the recollection of the instituted sign tends to be conscious and deliberate;
on the other hand, it could become automatic, if rehearsed sufficiently frequently---no hard
job for an instituted sign. As is the case with recollective signs and indicative signs, phase (d)
allows of variation in the perceptible thing (Y) presented, as long as it is regarded as the same
thing as phase (b); and while expressing X with Y, this phase also permits variation in the
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perceptible or imperceptible thing (X) to be expressed. For a person named Trump, for
instance, the connection is not altered by variation in the voice qualities when one
pronounces the word, or by variation in the hairstyle, clothes, or even age of the very person,
as long as the word or the person is taken to be the same one. Apparently, the instituted sign
subsists in a connection between something clear, i.e., a perceptible thing (Y), and something
unclear for the moment or something unclear by nature, i.e., another perceptible thing or
imperceptible thing (X). It is only that the instituted sign allows two directions of recollecting,
either from X to Y or from Y to X.
Some may note that the subject in phase (b) may not be the same as the one in phase (d).
It happens that we know that a whistle signals a starting train, that a bunch of red roses
represents love, or that a crown signifies royalty, not because we gain such knowledge from
an antecedent process in which we ourselves institute these connections, but because we
acquire such knowledge from others. These “others” usually know these connections via still
others. If we distinguish between knowledge gained through direct experience and
knowledge gained through acquisition, we may say that instituted signs based on knowledge
gained through direct experience are exceptional cases, whereas all the other cases are based
on knowledge gained through acquisition. As discussed above, the former subtype undergoes
four phases. Then the latter subtype could be said to undergo seven phases, the first four
being basically the same as the four phases of the latter. (a) Something perceptible (Y) is not
connected, by nature, with another perceptible or imperceptible thing (X). (b) Somebody
voluntarily links the two up. (c) The voluntary act is retained in the subject’s memory. (d)
When the subject thinks of the latter, he or she uses the former to express the latter, by virtue
of the memory. (e) Subject2 experiences the preceding process indirectly. (f) This experience
becomes subject2’s memory. (g) When subject2 thinks of X, he or she thinks of Y or uses Y to
express X, by virtue of the memory; or when subject2 perceives Y but not X, he or she
recollects X by virtue of the memory. Considering that the acts involved in phases (b), (d),
(e), and (g) are distinct acts, it is more accurate to attach different labels to the two relata in
each phase, say, E and F in phase (b), M and N in phase (d) and (e), and X and Y in phase (g).
However, in line with the conclusion drawn in the above section, namely that application
from one act to another act entails equivalence between the relata in some sense, the
corresponding relata are usually different tokens of the same thing or different members of
the same kind of thing. Now knowledge gained through acquisition itself falls into two
situations: knowledge about the very connection between Y and X; knowledge about a
regularity or law that applies to the connection between Y and X. Examples from 93 to 101
all belong to the latter situation. In such a case, phase (g) calls for a mediate process which
relates Y (or X) in phase (g) first to the kind of thing it belongs to, say, B (or A) involved in
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each regularity or law. The subject then draws on the knowledge about the very regularity or
law and recalls the other kind of thing A (or B), and then seeks for the corresponding
manifestation X (or Y). For the sake of clarity, let us give the name standard sign to those
sign phenomena that rely on knowledge gained through direct experience, the name
non-standard sign to other sign phenomena, and the name sign by acquisition to those
non-standard sign phenomena that rely on knowledge based on acquisition.
The phenomenon of sign by acquisition is not restricted to instituted signs. It is only
that, for an instituted sign, the standard sign situation happens only once, with only one
subject; whereas the corresponding signs by acquisition are potentially countless. For other
types of signs, such as recollective signs and indicative signs, the situation is somewhat
different. For one thing, the standard sign situation normally happens with only one subject
for instituted signs, as the signs themselves have to be instituted---normally by one
individual; whereas recollective and indicative signs do not have this restriction, and thus
might happen with one subject or potentially countless subjects. For another, the
phenomenon of sign by acquisition happens with most instituted signs, and often frequently
and widely, except those signs instituted for personal use; whereas it does not necessarily
happen with recollective signs or indicative signs, nor as frequently or widely. Most
recollective signs do not need to be acquired from others, though they could be. Among them,
the divinatory sign is the subtype relatively more common with the phenomenon of sign by
acquisition. Of indicative signs, symptoms and physiognomic signs are common with the
phenomenon of sign by acquisition; whereas those indicating emotions and feelings do not
need, and thus are not as common with, the phenomenon of sign by acquisition.
v. Sense sign
The sense sign, illustrated by Example 24, is rarely applauded, with the exception of
Roger Bacon. Bacon (2013: 123; Appendix A) sees artifacts and vocal sounds as a sign of
their respective species in a soul. This amounts to saying that something, such as artifacts or
vocal sounds, is a sign of its sensation or mental image. Granting that the phenomenon
constitutes a sign, this sign phenomenon works as follows: Something perceptible (Y) is
sensed by somebody as a mental image (X). If stretched to the four-phase framework for ease
of comparison, this phenomenon would involve the following phases. (a) Something
perceptible (Y) is connected, by a physiological reaction, with another imperceptible thing
(X), namely, a mental image. (b) Somebody senses the perceptible as a mental image. (c) The
experience is retained in the subject’s sensory memory. (d) When the subject perceives the
perceptible thing but not the mental image, the subject forms the mental image in the mind
by virtue of physiological reaction. The stretched formula appears to bear resemblance to
that of preceding sign phenomena; in essence, they differ fundamentally. First, in phase (b),
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the subject is unconscious of the process. In contrast, for the recollective sign, the subject
directly observes the connection; for the indicative sign, the subject indirectly but
consciously experiences the connection; for the instituted sign, the subject voluntarily
establishes the connection. Second, due to the first point, in phase (c) of the sense sign, the
experience is not retained in the subject’s conscious memory but, at most, in the subject’s
sensory memory (or called sensory register; see Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968: 94), i.e.,
memory stored in the sensing channels for a short period of time during acts of sensing.
Third, due to the preceding two points, in phase (d), the later sensational process hardly
avails of anything inherited from the second phase; rather, the later process begins almost
anew. The situation is very much different in the case of other signs involving involuntary
physiological processes, such as most of the indicative signs illustrated by examples from 1
to 23. All of the examples are typically applied to others; some might also be applied to the
subject itself. When applied to others, the observation of the perceptible thing serves as a
sign that enables the subject to infer something imperceptible about the others. On seeing a
woman giving milk, for instance, one comes to know that the woman is with child. When
applied to the subject itself, it typically happens when the subject itself cannot feel the
imperceptible thing, or feels it but cannot ascertain what its nature is, or feels only part of it,
as is the case with examples from 1 to 8 with the exception of Example 4. On seeing a
swelling on one’s own arm that does not subside, one could infer that there will be
suppuration. On seeing bubbles in one’s own urine and feeling dull pain in the back waist,
one might ascertain that something is wrong with the kidney. Noticing oneself coughing, one
might infer that he or she has contracted a cold and that a series of reactions are to appear. In
these examples, the perceptible thing helps the subject know something about the
imperceptible thing that he or she did not know before, or something more about the
imperceptible thing than he or she did before. They manage to do so because the subject
could observe the perceptible thing but do not know or feel the whole of the imperceptible
thing. When the subject could feel the whole of the imperceptible thing---such as shame,
grief and sorrow, and inner motions involuntarily triggering sounds, gestures, and facial
expressions, as illustrated in Example 18, 19, 21, 22, and 23---the sign phenomenon is
generally said of other subjects who does not have actual access to the imperceptible thing.
Otherwise, it would be funny to say that noticing oneself blushing or weeping is a sign to
him or her that he or she is feeling shame or sorrow. Contrary to above examples, the sense
sign is very different. In the first place, the subject could not observe or feel the perceptible
thing without forming the mental image in the mind. To notice an artifact or a vocal sound is
to form their mental image in the mind. In other words, one observes a thing by forming a
mental image; one forms a mental image on observing a thing. That is to say, one cannot
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attend to a thing and then to its mental image, or the other way around. In the second place,
the subject feels the whole of the mental image. In the third place, the subject is not
conscious of the whole process, nor can one observe, even indirectly, the process on others.
In consequence, it does not make much sense to say that something is a sign of its mental
image, either to the subject responsible for the process or to a bystander---not to the former
because all that the subject has is the mental image, and because the subject could not attend
to the perceptible thing in another way, nor to the latter because all that the subject sees is the
perceptible thing, and because the subject has no access to the mental image. This explains
why so few people view such a phenomenon as a sign while so many recognize icons as
signs.
vi. Sensational sign, perceptual sign, and conceptual sign
The sensational sign, perceptual sign, or conceptual sign seems to be the opposite of the
sense sign. Take Example 87: The sensation one gets when feeling hardness in a stone is a
sign of something in the stone. Such a phenomenon is obviously inaccessible to a
by-standing observer. For the subject within whom the phenomenon happens, he or she could
not attend to the sensation and the thing separately. Reid makes an observation similar to this
when giving the example. He notices that when a person runs his or head against a pillar
violently, he or she attends only to the sensation, i.e., the feeling of pain, without feeling
anything in the stone; whereas when he or she leans the head gently against the pillar, he or
she feels hardness in the stone without attending to the sensation (1823: 61). Reid is here
giving a crude psychological explanation. To be more exact, the feeling of hardness is all that
he or she could experience. The hardness in the stone, as a physical quality, is inaccessible to
him or her, except qua the feeling of hardness, no matter whether the two are ontologically
separate. He or she could not attend to the sensation and then to the thing, or the other way
around. As a result, it does not make much sense to say that the feeling of hardness is a sign
of the hardness in a stone, either for a by-standing observer or for the experiencing subject. It
may be objected that the sensational sign phenomenon permits another interpretation,
namely that it is only concerned about the relation between a mental image and a thing,
without regard for the corresponding sensational process. Take the following example: The
mental image of my brother is a sign of my brother. After the first time I saw my brother, the
mental image is kept in my memory, and occasionally surfaces again in my mind; on the
other hand, I could see my brother whenever he is around. In this sense, I could attend to the
mental image and my brother separately. Granted all this, what good does it do to say that the
former is a sign of the latter? It makes no sense to say that when the mental image surfaces in
my mind, I see my brother, because the latter does not depend upon the former. Moreover,
seeing my brother always means forming a mental image of my brother at a point of time.
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Then, the above would mean that when the mental image of my brother surfaces in my mind,
I form a mental image of my brother at a point of time. Still, the latter does not depend upon
the former. If, alternatively, the statement means that when the mental image surfaces, I think
of something about my brother, or hold the belief that there is a person who is my brother;
then the statement should be rephrased differently: A mental image is a sign of some other
mental image, or of a belief in the existence of something. In this case, we are no longer
talking about the sensational sign, but a thought-sign or abstract inferential sign. The
conceptual signs, cited in examples from 88 to 92, are in almost the same situation. Take
Example 88, and look at the following instance: The written letters TREE, the vocal sound
/tri:/, and the concept tree are ordered signs of a physical tree. On the one hand, a concept
comes from a sensational process starting from a physical object; but, once formed, it is
independent of the latter. On the other hand, a physical object could be observed and noticed.
In this sense, a subject could attend to the concept tree and a physical tree separately.
However, saying that the concept tree is a sign of a physical tree is very much different from
saying that the written letters TREE is a sign of a physical tree, or that the vocal sound /tri:/
is a sign of a physical tree. With the latter, when one sees the written letters or hears the
vocal sound, he or she forms a mental image of a physical tree. With the former, it would
mean that when the concept tree surfaces in one’s mind, one forms a mental image of a
physical tree. If the concept here means a concrete concept, that is, a mental image, then the
above statement amounts to saying that when one thinks of something, he or she thinks of it.
If the concept here means an abstract concept, then the above statement is tantamount to
saying that having the abstract concept tree means having a mental image of a physical tree.
This hardly says anything substantial, because an abstract concept itself is abstracted from
mental images of physical objects. An abstract concept could hardly exist without the aid of
mental images. As pithily noted by Aristotle, “The soul never thinks without an image”
(1984: 499), and “when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it
along with an image” (1984: 1502). The statement would make sense, only if it actually
means to say that the concept tree is a sign of a physical tree. For instance, I am so
impressed by a tree in my garden that whenever the concept tree surfaces in my mind, I think
of the very tree in my garden. This statement seems significant, but it is in essence no longer
a conceptual sign, but a thought-sign---a concept being a sign of a mental image.
We can hazard a guess about the origin of the four notions of signs: sense sign,
sensational sign, perceptual sign, and conceptual sign. The origin lies with the ancient
conception of the relation between body and mind. Plato and Aristotle, for instance, both
endorse a natural connection between body and mind. This natural connection is believed to
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be causal, hence Aristotle’s idea of the physiognomic sign. The causal relation sometimes
results in a relation of analogy, as is the case with sensation or perception. When an external
thing is sensed or perceived, the mind forms a sensible species (i.e., mental image) of it,
hence a relation of likeness. This notion, when coupled with that of sign, results in two ideas.
One is that the body is a sign (sēma) of the soul (e.g., Plato 1997: 118). Carried to the
extreme, this idea culminates in Roger Bacon’s view that something is a sign of its
corresponding mental image, as cited in Example 24. The other idea is that of the sensational
sign, namely that a mental image is a sign of a thing (e.g., Poinsot 1985: 247). The
perceptual sign is merely an umbrella term of the five subtypes of sensational signs, or a
result of the recognition of the subtle differences between sensation and perception. Another
step forward gives rise to the conceptual sign. Besides, the latter three notions---sensational
sign, perceptual sign, and conceptual sign---might also partly stem from another idea.
Aristotle makes an argument to the following effect: Written marks are symbols of spoken
sounds; spoken sounds are symbols of affections of the soul; affections of the soul are
likenesses of actual things (1984: 72). Some later philosophers interpret, or misinterpret, the
last part as sign phenomena, as can be seen in Example 88 cited by Scotus and Example 89
by Ockham. Now that the “affections of the soul” include emotions (Aristotle 1984: 1408),
sensations, feelings, and reasoning (Aristotle 1984: 1430), the above interpretation or
misinterpretation ushers in the three notions of signs, namely, sensational sign, perceptual
sign, and conceptual sign. The idea underlying these three types of signs, namely that the
mental images or concepts are signs of something external, appears to contradict the first
idea. Nevertheless, the notion is not utterly ungrounded. Mental images or concepts are in a
sense more knowable than external things, in the sense that we access external things via
mental images or concepts. Mental images or concepts are immediately given to a subject,
whereas external things are distant from a subject, as something to be known or something
unknowable. Poinsot makes this point crystal clear:
For the concept, for example, of man, represents another besides itself, namely,
human beings; and it is more known, not objectively, but formally, since indeed it
renders known and cognized a being who without the concept is unknown and not
presented to the understanding; and for the same reason it is something first known
formally, that is, it exists as the rationale whereby an object is rendered cognized.
(1985: 227)
A third possible origin of the three notions of signs is that of mental language, which likens
thoughts to languages. Plato, for instance, calls thought “speech that occurs without the voice,
inside the soul in conversation with itself” (1997: 287). Following Plato, philosophers like
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham all subscribe to a similar idea. Since
written letters and spoken sounds are taken to be signs of things, the mental words should
also be signs. A fourth possible origin is the idea of signs by similitude or iconic signs. If, as
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argued by Roger Bacon (2013: 123; Appendix A), whatever arises as a likeness of something
else is a sign, then a mental image is naturally a sign of something external. It is only that
this does not apply to those conceptual signs that involve a concept.
vii. Bio-Sign
The bio-sign resembles the sense sign, sensational sign, perceptual sign, and conceptual
sign, in that they are all driven fundamentally by physiological reactions. For them, previous
experiences hardly play any role in later behaviors. Even when the influence occurs, it is still
under the control of some innate program born out of heredity. On the other hand, the
bio-sign differs from the latter four mainly on three points. First, the subject is not a human
being, but a living system of any level within an organism or an organism of any of the five
kingdoms. Second, except for some bio-signs related to animals, most bio-signs do not
require a brain, and thus do not involve things like feelings, emotions, desires, mental images,
or concepts. Third, due to the second, except for some bio-signs related to animals, it is not a
thing as a whole but some chemical matter of it that acts as a sign. Overall, the so-called
bio-sign phenomena are more like stimulus-reactions in terms of a subject, be it any living
system of any organism.
viii. Abstract inferential sign
The abstract inferential sign, as illustrated in examples from 69 to 84, differs markedly
from the indicative or recollective sign, on at least three points. First, the two relata involved
in these examples are on the main imperceptible: abstract notions, mental operations
pertaining to such notions, or judgments. Second, unlike indicative signs and recollective
signs, they do not build on an earlier experience, in which the subject, directly or indirectly,
observes or feels a connection between two relata, nor do they presuppose such an
experience. As mentioned earlier, the imperceptible relatum of an indicative sign could be
experienced partly and indirectly, through the feeling of a set of physiological reactions
within the body, or through the observation of a set of bodily manifestations. In this sense,
the indicative sign might well build upon a preceding experience, in which the subject
experiences the connection between a perceptible thing and an imperceptible thing. The
possibility for such an experience diminishes drastically, when it comes to the abstract
inferential sign, whose constituent elements are essentially imperceptible. How could one
observe or feel the following pairs even indirectly: “to trust men one has never seen or heard
before” together with “simplicity”; “to act without deliberation” together with “foolishness”;
“weakness” together with “virtue”; “forgetfulness” together with “slight esteem”;
“martyrdom” together with “charity”? Rather than building on a preceding experience of
direct or indirect observation, abstract inferential signs tend to assert the connection between
two relata directly. Some of them manifestly predicate the assertion upon reasoning. When
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Plato cites Example 69, to the effect that it is unmusical and unphilosophical to try to
separate everything from everything else, he backs it up with the following arguments: “To
dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The
weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us” (1997: 283). When
Aristotle claims that feeling joy for no reason than that the other feels joy is a sign of
friendship, he does not reach the conclusion through observation. Rather, he is juxtaposing it
with other examples: to wish someone good not on one’s own account but for the sake of that
other; to wish to live with someone for the sake of his company and for no other reason; to
sorrow with the sorrowing for no other reason than their sorrow (1984: 4214). He uses all
these examples to demonstrate people’s tendency to measure friendship by “a man’s attitude
to himself” (1984: 4214). When Aquinas gives Example 82, namely that weakness is a sign
of virtue; he makes the assertion not out of observation, but out of reasoning as follows:
“because the weaker someone’s body when he attempts an act of virtue, the more virtuous
the soul is shown to be” (2005: 59). When he mentions Example 83, namely that
forgetfulness is a sign of slight esteem, he bases it on the argument that “the more we think
of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory” (1947: 1056). Likewise, Example 84, namely
that martyrdom is the sign of the greatest charity, is a conclusion drawn from the following
argument: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends”
(Aquinas 1947: 2295). In the same vein, Examples 70, 71, 73, 75, 80, and 81 all result from
reasoning from evidence, or from a chain of reasoning. Other abstract inferential signs, such
as Example 74, 76, 77, 78, and 79, do not manifestly build on reasoning, but are in
themselves a kind of inference. Example 74 and 79 are largely inductions themselves: from
“Socrates was wise” to “the wise,” and from “material things” to “materiality.” Example 76,
77, and 78 are also inferences themselves: from “not think too much of himself” to
“humility,” from “upset” to “bodily,” and from “any finite” and “greater” to “infinite.”
Given the above two marked differences, why are such phenomena viewed as signs by
some people? The three main proponents---Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas---subscribe to the
notion, probably because they have a very broad view of the sign. In Aristotle’s conception,
“[…] anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has come into being the other
has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or having come into being”
(1984: 256). Put differently, “the sign of a thing is that which usually occurs before, or
simultaneously with, or after it” (Aristotle 1984: 4902). Though most examples cited by
Aristotle belong to indicative signs or recollective signs, he does, occasionally, follow the
broad view, as shown in examples from 72 to 75. Aquinas, in contrast, seems to oscillate
between Aristotle and Augustine. Under the influence of Augustine, he admits, “the name
sign is given primarily and principally to things which are offered to the senses” (1947:
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3125). On the other hand, echoing Aristotle, he sees a sign as something by means of which
“to discover the unknown by means of the known”, as something “by means of which one
attains to the knowledge of something else” (1947: 3125). In practice, however, Aquinas
gives the term an even freer rein than Aristotle: He even includes concepts within the sign
phenomenon, as illustrated by examples from 82 to 84. With such fuzzy terms as unknown,
known, and knowledge, the latter criterion is better in characterizing the abstract inferential
sign. For instance, within examples from 69 to 76 except Example 74, the first relatum is
more easily known than the second relatum, in the sense that the former is but one possible
realization of the latter. The latter relatum in these examples--- “ unmusical and
unphilosophical,”

“vulgarity,”

“simplicity,”

“foolishness,”

“genius,”

“love,”

and

“humility”---is essentially an abstract notion, which has an open set of potential realizations.
A realization is naturally more simple and concrete, and therefore more easily known, in
principle, than an abstract notion. For examples 74 and 79, the first concept is more easily
known than the second concept, in the sense that the former relatum is but one instance of
the latter: “Socrates” is an instance of “the wise”; “material things” of “materiality.” As for
Example 78, “finite” and “greater” are obviously more knowable than “infinite.” As for
examples from 80 to 84, the first concept has nothing evident that makes it more knowable
than the second concept. However, it is of course likely that a subject is more familiar with
the former relatum than the latter one. This, in turn, reveals how unreliable the criterion in
question is. If really taken as signs, abstract inferential signs seem to be closer to natural
signs than to instituted signs, as the connection involved is established mainly by inference
and thus do not vary with the will or among people.
vix. Thought-Sign
The thought-sign endorsed by Peirce, i.e., a thought-thought connection---be the
thought a feeling, image, conception, or some other mental representation---does not make
sense to a by-standing observer, because thoughts are essentially not observable. Such
phenomena make sense only to a subject who experiences such a connection. Thus
interpreted, the thought-sign could be the mental part of the above-mentioned types of signs
except the bio-sign. Some recollective signs or instituted signs might involve a mental part
consisting of an image-image connection. For instance, the seeing of a smoke triggers an
image of the smoke that, in turn, triggers the image of a fire; the hearing of the name Trump
triggers an acoustic image of the sound that, in turn, triggers the image of the ex-president
Trump whose weird hairstyle reminds one of a toxic caterpillar, an ear of corn, or a
golden-haired pheasant. Some indicative signs involve a mental part consisting of an
image-disposition connection, such as physiognomic signs illustrated in examples from 11 to
17; of an image-emotion connection, such as indicative signs illustrated in examples from 18
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to 20; or of an image-feeling connection, such as indicative signs illustrated in examples
from 21 to 23. Most instituted signs involve a mental part consisting of an image-concept
connection, such as the word justice representing the concept justice. All the abstract
inferential signs involve a mental part consisting of a concept-concept connection.
Nevertheless, Peirce’ thought-sign goes far beyond the above types of signs: He actually
claims that every thought is a sign of anther ensuing thought. If every thought were a sign of
an ensuing thought, then every thought would be a sign of any other thought, because a
human being can, in principle, deliberately relate one thought to any other thought. This
seems to be exactly Peirce’s position. He goes so far as to argue like these: “We think only in
signs” (EP 2:10); “Every cognition is a sign” (1906); “All association is by signs” (W
2:237-8; CP 5.307-9); “Man is a sign” (CP 5.314). If such a position were granted, the
reverse of the above-mentioned types of signs would also be signs. In this case, the image of
a man looking like a golden-haired pheasant would be a sign of the name Trump; courage
would be a sign of a deep and full voice; shame would be a sign of blushing; the feeling of
pain would be the sign of groaning; the concept justice would be a sign of the word justice;
the greatest charity would be a sign of martyrdom. Such a position goes against the
traditional usage of the term sign, and undermines the value of the very term.
Peirce predicates this position on two beliefs. For one, whenever we think, we have a
mental representation---feeling, image, conception, or the like---that serves as a sign (CP
5.283). For another, every thought is interpreted by a previous thought (CP 5.284). These
two beliefs were claimed to be deduced from the third and the second of four principles he
reached earlier (CP 5.265): We have no power of thinking without signs; every cognition is
determined logically by previous cognitions. The four principles, in turn, are derived from
his criticism of Cartesianism in an article entitled “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties
Claimed for Man.” Like his triadic model of signs, Peirce takes such as position, out of his
metaphysical presuppositions rather than observation of phenomena called signs. The
conclusions reached are contingent on the presuppositions. In some cases, his
presuppositions sound shaky and stretched. For instance, he claims, “Every cognition is a
sign as Leibniz and other nominalists have sufficiently shown and all deliberate meditation is
of the nature of a dialogue as Plato represented it to be” (1906). Plato does call thought
“speech that occurs without the voice, inside the soul in conversation with itself” (1997: 287),
but it does not follow that every cognition is a sign. Neither Plato nor Leibniz goes as far as
that. To liken thought to language does entice one to take images or concepts to be signs, as
do sensational signs, perceptual signs, and conceptual signs. A great many philosophers in
the history subscribe to the notion of mental language; some of them, such as Plato, Poinsot,
and Reid, take images to be signs, while some others, such as Scotus, Ockham, Aquinas, and
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Locke, take concepts to be signs. Yet it is probably only Peirce who puts all kinds of mental
representations in the same pocket, and treats a mental representation as a sign of another
representation. To treat a mental representation as a sign of any other mental representation
goes far beyond the idea of mental language, i.e., thoughts are like a language; this amounts
to saying that every word in our daily language is a sign of any other word. Such a stretched
notion, however, is no great wonder to one for whom “man is a sign” (CP 5.314), and to a
pan-semiotic mind for which “the entire universe is perfused with signs” (CP. 5.448).
3.1.3 Further Characterization of Signs
i. Diverse kinds of sign-relation6
The signs discussed in the history of semiotics involve relations so diverse in kind that
are hard to be united under the same designation. Of the various subtypes of signs listed,
symptoms consist in a connection between a bodily manifestation and certain internal
conditions of the body, particularly an illness; physiognomic signs, between a bodily
manifestation and a mental character or disposition; other indicative signs, between a bodily
manifestation and an emotion or feeling. All these indicative signs could be said to involve a
connection between something perceptible and something imperceptible. Recollective signs
consist in a connection between a physical thing that immediately impinges on the subject
and another physical thing that does not now strike the subject plainly. Oftentimes, the latter
physical thing is something to happen in the future, as is the case with divinatory signs,
meteorological signs, astronomical signs, and some signs common in daily life. Occasionally,
it is something present but hidden from the subject, as is the case with some signs common
in daily life as well as some instances of signs of similitude. Sometimes, it is something that
happened in the past, as is the case with all the signs of a cause, some instances of signs of
similitude, and those remains or traces of history. All these recollective signs could be said to
involve a connection between something perceptible and another perceptible yet currently
inaccessible thing. Instituted signs are much more complicated. They might consist in a
connection between an artificial thing and an expected action, as is the case with conative
signals. They might happen between an artificial thing and an event that is yet to take place
or that is happening yet beyond the subject’s vision, as is the case with representative signals
and representative signs serving as a silent notification. They might happen between a
physical thing, natural or artificial, and something mental or something imagined, as is the

6

By sign-relation we mean the relation between the two relata of a sign, whatever their
name---signifier and signified (Saussure 1959: 67), signan and signatum (Jakobson 1971: 103),
sign vehicle and meaning (Nöth 1990: 79), etc.. Jin and Cao (2016) call the relation intrasign
relation, as opposed to the intersign relation, i.e., the relation between signs.
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case with expressive signals, normal representative signs, and representative signs also
serving to distinguish. They might also happen between an artificial thing on the one side,
and something mental, something imagined, or something physical on the other. The former
two types of instituted signs involve a connection between something perceptible and
another perceptible thing that is yet to happen or that is happening yet currently hidden from
the subject. The third type happens between something perceptible and something
imperceptible. The last type happens between something perceptible on one side and, on the
other, something imperceptible, another perceptible thing that is yet to happen, or another
perceptible thing that is happening yet currently hidden from the subject. Sense signs consist
in a connection between something physical and its corresponding sensation---that is,
between something perceptible and something imperceptible. Sensational signs, perceptual
signs, and conceptual signs consist in a connection between a sensation, perception, or
concept on the one side and something physical on the other---that is, between something
imperceptible and something perceptible. Abstract inferential signs and thought-signs consist
in a connection between two abstract things or between two mental entities---that is, between
two imperceptible things. In sum, the various types of signs seem to involve relations of all
kinds: something perceptible plus something perceptible or imperceptible, something
imperceptible plus something perceptible, something imperceptible plus something
imperceptible.
ii. Frequency order and chronological sequence
The various types of signs listed above differ in time and times of mentioning by
scholars in the history of semiotics. Though such mentioning is subjective to no small extent,
it is not random, particularly for scholars that mean to illustrate a key term in their works.
The illustrated examples reflect the scholars’ conception of the term, and tend to be those
instances that are familiar, striking, and frequent for them. Suppose the scholars in the
history of semiotics is not wide off their mark, the instances and types of signs listed above,
particularly the frequency and time of their mentioning, should throw some light on the
features of sign phenomena. Of the various types of signs listed in Section 3.1.1, the
recollective, indicative, and instituted sign are most common: with diverse subtypes; with
many examples; endorsed by scholars throughout history. The recollective sign in the broad
sense includes most of divinatory signs, meteorological signs, astronomical signs, and other
physical or artificial recollective signs; the indicative sign in the broad sense includes
symptoms, physiognomic signs, and other indicative signs; the instituted sign includes the
three subtypes of instituted signals and the three subtypes of representative signs. These three
types of signs are rich in examples, particularly recollective signs and instituted signs. They
are all widely acknowledged throughout the history of semiotics. For one thing, these three
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types of signs all appeared early in history or were noticed early in the history of semiotics.
Divinatory signs are said to be common among ancient Mesopotamians, Babylonians,
Greeks, and early Romans; symptoms are pervasive in Hippocrates’ works; instituted signals
and linguistic signs are within the purview of Plato; physiognomic signs, meteorological
signs, and astronomical signs are well-established topics in Aristotle’s works. For another,
these three types of signs still have vitality today. Though their examples seem to appear
within certain periods of time, they are readily recognized throughout history. After all, who
would deny coughing as a sign of a cold, weeping as a sign of grief, groaning as a sign of
pain, halo as a sign of a coming rain, smoke as a sign of a fire, a name as a sign of a thing,
and a hung-up bush as a sign of the selling of wine? In contrast, the other types of signs are
applauded by only several or a restricted group of philosophers during specific periods of
time. Abstract inferential signs are mentioned mainly by the Greek philosopher Plato and
Aristotle, and by Aquinas during the 13th century. The sense sign is acclaimed mainly by
Roger Bacon during the 13th century. The conceptual sign is popular mainly between the 14th
century and the 17th century. The sensational sign is mentioned mainly by Poinsot in the 17th
century and by Reid in the late 18th century. The bio-sign comes to the fore only in the late
20th century and is recognized mainly by biosemioticians. On the main, these types of signs
are not recognized by other philosophers, nor within other periods of time. Among these
types of signs, only the abstract inferential sign is richly illustrated; nevertheless, the
examples are confined largely to three philosophers. The bio-sign claims a vast territory and
a great variety; nevertheless, almost no fully-formulated example has been given.
What is reflected in such states of affair? It is likely that the frequently mentioned types
coincide with the prototypical examples of the sign, and imply a criterion or criteria by
which people take a thing to be a sign. It is also likely that the infrequent types either arise
from insights of a shrewd mind that discerns something ignored, or from delusions of an
aberrant mind that stretches the notion of sign. In light of the above two points, the first
group of sign types---the recollective, indicative and instituted sign---might hold clues to the
criteria of the sign; whereas the latter group of sign types---the abstract inferential sign,
sense sign, sensational sign, perceptual sign, conceptual sign, thought-sign, and
bio-sign---need to go through more stringent examination to determine their identity as signs.
The time pattern relevant to sign phenomena mentioned in the history of semiotics might
reflect three things: shifts in human interest or the value of things relevant to such interest;
the original notion of the sign and its evolution; changes in the understanding of things in
the world. In light of this, it is likely that the earliest examples of the sign reflect its original
notion, that later examples result from reasonable extension or over-stretching of the notion,
and that sign phenomena recognized throughout the history of semiotics reflect the
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fundamentals of the notion. It is also likely that the shifting examples reflect changes in the
understanding of things in the world as well as shifts in topics of interest to humans.
Consider the following crude sequence of signs mentioned in the history of semiotics:
divinatory signs (from Mesopotamia to early Roman); symptoms (during early Greek);
linguistics signs and instituted signals (in Plato); physiognomic signs, meteorological signs,
and astronomical signs (in Aristotle); other recollective, indicative, and instituted signs (as
early as Empiricus in Greek, all the way into the 20th century); abstract inferential signs and
sense signs (during the 13th century); conceptual signs (from the 14th century to the 17th
century); sensational signs (from the 17th century to the 18th century); thought-signs (in
Peirce, at the turn of the 20th century); other instituted signs and bio-signs (in the late 20th
century). It might be surmised that the sign is originally intended for something that is
characteristic of divinatory signs, and something that is related to indicative signs, instituted
signs, and other recollective signs. It might also be surmised that the sign types starting with
the abstract inferential sign might be reasonable extensions of the notion of sign; or, judging
from the long gap between Greek and the 13th century, run the risk of over-stretching the
notion of sign. It might still be surmised that the sign types which span more centuries and
are still vibrant today---namely, the recollective, indicative, and instituted signs---are more
appropriate candidates for the prototypical member of the sign.
3.2 Sign as a Potential Object of Study
3.2.1 Potential Boundaries of the Sign
The above-mentioned characteristics of signs discussed in the history of semiotics drop
a hint on the potential boundary of the sign. The first choice as to the boundary of the sign is,
of course, to include all the phenomena mentioned above. Given the divergence between
them, however, such a broad category stands a slim chance of having a deep-lying regularity,
rule, or law worthy of special scientific efforts. If such a choice turns out to be impractical,
where could we place the boundary? Section 3.1 provides some clues. The most apparent
division is between recollective, indicative, and instituted signs on the one side; and abstract
inferential signs, thought-signs, sensational signs, perceptual signs, conceptual signs, sense
signs, and bio-signs on the other. This division is based on the cleavage between the two
sides in terms of frequency sequence and chronological order discussed in Section 3.1.3. For
the former group, further division had better be made between instituted signs on one side
and, on the other side, indicative signs and recollective signs. As indicated in Section 3.1.1
and Section 3.1.2, the latter two belong to the natural sign, which is opposite to the instituted
sign. For the latter group, the division is better to be made between abstract inferential sign
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and thought-sign on one side and the other subtypes on the other. As shown in Section 3.1.2,
the former two is occasionally subject to the will of a subject, by way of inference or active
associating, whereas the latter three are largely physiological reactions beyond the control of
the subject.
3.2.2 Possible Unifying Feature of the Sign
i. Unifying feature for the potential boundaries
Given the diverse kinds of relations underlying the various types of signs mentioned in
the history of semiotics, is there any adequate attribute to unify all of them? The closest
account is given by Aristotle: “anything such that when it is another thing is, or when it has
come into being the other has come into being before or after, is a sign of the other’s being or
having come into being” (1984: 256). In line with this definition, Aristotle sees as signs both
necessary signs, such as a woman’s having milk as the proof of being with child, and
non-necessary signs, such as Pittacus being good as a proof of wise men being good, and a
woman being pale as a proof of being with child. Judging from these examples, Aristotle
actually means the definition of sign for necessary or probable connections. At another place
in his works, Aristotle gives a more explicit definition: “the sign of a thing is that which
usually occurs before, or simultaneously with, or after it” (1984: 4902; italics added). On the
surface of the definition, those connections of low frequency would not qualify as signs.
Aristotle, however, intends the statement to stress the position that “one thing taken at
random is not a sign of something else taken at random, nor is everything a sign of
everything else” (1984: 4902). Therefore, he actually means to emphasize that there needs to
be some connection between the two relata of a sign. Such a definition would exclude those
connections out of pure coincidence, such as certain cases of divinatory signs and
physiognomic signs, which is reasonable to a degree; however, it would still view as signs all
non-coincidental relations. What is the point in raising such a broad category, except that
they are not coincidental? All it offers would be an expedient label to mention the group of
relations occasionally. Nothing else. Perhaps for this reason, few people after Aristotle
endorse such a criterion. One of the exceptions is Hobbes, who labels signs as “the
antecedents of consequences and the consequences of antecedents” by virtue of a prior
experiencing of the connection between them (1969: 13).
Another candidate for the unifying feature is Aquinas’ definition of sign as something
by means of which “to discover the unknown by means of the known” (1947: 3123).
Following Aquinas, Poinsot attributes the sign to “something more known by which is
represented and manifested something more unknown” (1985: 138), and Peirce perceives the
sign as “something by knowing which we know something more” (CP 8.332). A criterion
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like this apparently applies to those phenomena involving a connection between something
perceptible and something imperceptible. It applies equally well to those involving a
connection between two perceptible things the latter of which is something currently
inaccessible to the subject at the moment. It also applies, to an extent, to those beginning
with imperceptible things, as analyzed in Section 3.1.2. The only phenomenon excluded, and
with good reason, is the bio-sign. One problem with such a criterion is that the two words
known and unknown vary in meaning with subjects and circumstances, and are thus too fuzzy
to be used for delimiting the boundary of sign. Everything could be said to be more known to
somebody than something else under a certain circumstance. It is not enough for the former
to be more knowable than the latter.
A more restricting criterion lies with the Stoics’ position, according to which “a sign is a
leading proposition in a sound conditional, capable of uncovering the finisher (see Empiricus
2005: 137; italics added). Aquinas probably also implies such a requirement; however, his
criterion, taken at its face meaning, does not necessarily entail an uncovering relation,
because a subject could, in a sense, discover something from anything. In contrast, the
Stoic’s criterion, without recourse to any subject, imposes an explicit requirement on the
connection between the relata involved. Now, for a thing to uncover another thing, it is
necessary that we could attend to both things, and that the awareness of the former would
contribute to that of the latter. This requirement excludes sense signs and bio-signs from the
category of sign; to an extent, it also counts out sensational signs, perceptual signs, and
conceptual signs. As for sense signs, one knows a physical thing only when forming its
sensation; in other words, we could not attend to both relata separately. As for bio-signs, the
subject involved is not a human being, and thus they do not concern the mind or mental
activities. For the latter three subtypes of signs, sensing a physical thing does not presuppose
a pre-existing sensation, perception, or concept; in other words, the awareness of a sensation,
perception or concept does not contribute to the sensing of a physical thing. Thus, the
uncovering requirement serves to narrow down the bounds of sign and prepares it as a
category. For this reason perhaps, this requirement finds reverberation throughout history. In
the history of semiotics, a sign is taken to be something that “causes us to think of”
(Augustine 1958: 34), “makes us know” (Ockham 1964: 53), “prompt[s]” (Arnauld and
Nicole 1996: 35), “excite[s] in us” (Degérando 1800 1: 63), “stimulate[s] in a thinking being”
(Bolzano 2014 3: 44), “evokes” (Osgood, et al. 1965: 286-288; Guiraud 1975 [1971]: 22-25),
or “causes” (Morris 1946: 311) another thing. Nevertheless, the uncovering requirement does
not exclude most cases of abstract inferential signs and thought-signs. In these two subtypes
of phenomena, we could attend to both relata of the connection involved. What’s more, the
awareness of one relatum conduces to that of the other: as for abstract inferential signs, from
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one abstract thing is inferred another abstract thing; as for thought-signs, one thought
triggers another thought. Altogether, the category formed by the uncovering requirement is
still greatly varied: something perceptible plus something imperceptible; something
perceptible plus something perceptible; something imperceptible plus something
imperceptible. Worse still, uncover is too fuzzy a term for the delineation of a clear
borderline. This fuzziness becomes more evident when it is replaced by a less punchy
expression. In the history of semiotics, a sign is seen by some people as something that
“indicates to the mind” (Augustine 1975: 87), “designates […] to that intellect” (Roger
Bacon 2013: 36), “we […] consider to be connected with” (Leibniz 1950; see Dascal 1987:
31), “represents […] to a cognitive power” (Poinsot 1985: 25), “is associated in our minds
with” (Guiraud 1975 [1971]: 22-25), “stand[s] for” (Eco 1976: 16), or “has been imagined or
made externally […] to stand for” (Sebeok 2001: 3) another thing. For all such
characterizations, a clear demarcation line is daunting and impossible.
A more accurate criterion lies with Empiricus. He echoes with the Stoics on the
“uncovering” requirement, claiming that the sign is “what seems to reveal something” (2005:
124; italics added). Immediately afterwards, he classifies the sign into two kinds: the
recollective sign and the indicative sign. The former is used mainly for things “unclear for
the moment,” i.e., something that could be observed but “is not now striking us plainly”; the
latter is for things “unclear by nature,” i.e., something that could not be observed, something
not ever “to fall within our plain experience” (Empiricus 2005: 119). The recollective sign is,
then, a plain thing that, when impinging on us, leads us to the recollection of something
unclear for the moment, which has been observed together with the plain thing earlier. The
indicative sign is a plain thing that, by means of its own nature or constitution, gives voice to
something unclear by nature. Therefore, for Empiricus, the sign involves a connection
between a plain thing on one side and something unclear for the moment or unclear by
nature on the other. By a “plain” thing, he means a clear thing, i.e., something that impinges
on senses and thought all by itself (2005: 117). Empiricus does not choose between the two
alternatives. He discusses at length the debate between a sign as something perceptible and a
sign as something intelligible, and takes the issue to be undecided (2005: 124). Nevertheless,
he is probably more sympathetic to the perceptible view. For one thing, if he had thought
otherwise, he would have discussed how an imperceptible thing is able to reveal unclear
things. For another, all the examples he cites begin with something perceptible. To sum up,
Empiricus raises two requirements of the sign: First, the former relatum reveals the latter;
second, the former is a clear or plain thing while the latter is something unclear for the
moment or something unclear by nature. A more restricting version implied in Empiricus’
account is this: First, the former relatum reveals the latter; second, the former is something
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perceptible while the latter is something imperceptible or something perceptible yet currently
hidden from the subject. This more restricting version finds its full expression in a
shrewd-minded French philosopher during the 18th and the 19th century: Joseph-Marie
Degérando. As Degérando once puts it, “sign, [or] signum, expresses in the origin something
sensible, intended to note, to mark, [or] to announce other things that were not [sensible]; or
if we prefer, [expresses] a fact present in our eyes, destined to teach us other facts that are
invisible or unknown” (1800 1: 122). Granted these two more restricting requirements, the
sign would apply only to recollective, indicative, and instituted signs. This demarcation line
sounds highly reasonable. Better still, the two restricting requirements, particularly the latter,
is much more accurate and easier to follow than former versions.
This criterion has other supporters in the history of semiotics than Degérando and
Empiricus, though only partially. A most approximate version is given by Bolzano, who
defines the sign as an object “through whose idea we intend to stimulate in a thinking being
some other, associated idea,” and, meanwhile, takes the former idea to be “easily stimulated”
and the latter to be “more difficult to generate” (2014 3: 44). A more divergent version takes
the sign to be something sensible or perceptible that uncovers another thing, but does not
specify anything about the latter thing. For instance, Augustine defines the sign as something
“which causes us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes upon
the sense” (1958: 34), or something “which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind
something beyond the sign itself” (1975: 87). Even more divergent versions make further
modifications on one or both of the requirements. For instance, Leibniz defines the sign as
“that which we now perceive and, besides, consider to be connected with something else, by
virtue of our or someone else's experience” (see Dascal 1987: 31; italics added). Degérando
defines the sign as “any sensations which excite in us an idea, by virtue of the connection
which reigns between them” (1800 1: 63; italics added). Hegel defines the sign as “any
immediate perception (Anschauung) representing a content quite different from the one it has
by itself” (see Nöth 1990: 32; italics added). Guiraud defines the sign as “a stimulus---that is,
a perceptible substance---the mental image of which is associated in our minds with that of
another stimulus” (1975 [1971]: 22-25; italics added).
A still more constricting boundary is either to confine the sign to the natural sign
proper7, including and only including recollective signs and indicative signs, or to the
instituted sign. The two sides tend to be juxtaposed with each other for comparison, and both

7

The natural sign in the broader sense includes the first eight subtypes of signs listed in
Section 3.1.1. The natural signs proper only includes recollective signs in the broader sense
(including divinatory sign, conditional reflex, and other signs like them) and indicative signs in
the broader sense (including symptoms, physiognomic signs, and other signs like them).
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sides have various versions with slightly varying boundaries. Augustine means signa
naturalia for those made “without any desire or intention of signifying” (1958: 34-35) and
signa data for those made “for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the action of
the mind” (1958: 34-35). Roger Bacon distinguishes between natural signs, i.e., those
acquiring the character “by their very essence and not by a soul’s intent” (2013: 37), and
signs constituted by the soul, i.e., those acquiring the character “by the soul’s intent” (2013:
39). Francis Bacon differentiates between two kinds of notes of cogitations: “the one when
the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other ad placitum, having
force only by contract or acceptation” (1973 [1605]: 139). Poinsot makes a distinction
between natural signs, i.e., those “that represents from the nature of a thing, independently of
any stipulation and custom whatever, and so it represents the same for all,” and stipulated
signs, i.e., those “that represents something owing to an imposition by the will of a
community” (1985: 27). Hobbes contrasts signs that are natural with those that are arbitrary,
i.e., “those we make choice of our own pleasure” (1839: 14). Arnauld and Nicole classify
signs into two kinds: natural signs that “do not depend on human fancy,” and signs that “are
only instituted or conventional” (1996: 36-37). Reid draws a line between natural signs due
to “the effect of the original constitution of our mind” and artificial signs due to “the effect
of habit and custom” (1823: 64-67). For Condillac, natural signs are mainly “cries that nature
has established for the sentiments of joy, fear, pain, etc.” whereas instituted signs are “those
that we have ourselves chosen and that have only an arbitrary relation to our ideas” (2001:
36). For Bolzano, natural signs arise from “human nature, i.e., in certain properties common
to all of us”; accidental signs arise from “a merely accidental circumstance, i.e., one which
does not apply universally”; arbitrary signs, a species of accidental signs, result from “an act
of will,” i.e., “because we consciously and intentionally associated the idea A with B (1973 3:
308). For Husserl, conventional signs share the same natural laws with natural signs, and
have “as a novel aspect the influence of the will, guided by the drive toward knowledge, and
also the capacity of governing the course of judgment formation by the will into conformity
with, precisely, those epistemic interests” (1994: 24-25). Husserl later adopts another pair of
terms. One is indication, i.e., an object or state of affair, “of whose reality someone has
actual knowledge,” indicating to the subject another one, in the sense that “his belief in the
reality of the one is experienced (though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or
surmise in the reality of the other” (Husserl 2001 [1970]: 184; italics original). The other is
expression, i.e., a sign that expresses a meaning or sense through meaning-conferring
acts---acts that give meaning or infuse sense to an expression (Husserl 2001 [1970]: 192).
Cassirer (1944: 51) ascribes signals and symbols to two different universe of discourse:
Signals are part of the physical world of being, have a sort of physical or substantial being,
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and function as operators; symbols are part of the human world of meaning, have only a
functional value, and function as designators. Morris mentions a similar distinction made by
Robert M. Yerkes. According to Yerkes (see Morris 1946: 24), a signal implies and requires a
succeeding experience-act, loses its meaning apart from its context, and cannot be a
substitute for the original experience-act. A symbol represents or may function instead of
whatever is represented, does not lose its meaning apart from its context, and may substitute
for the original experience-act. Afterwards, Morris defines a symbol as “a sign produced by
is interpreter which acts as a substitute for some other sign with which it is synonymous,”
and sees the symbol as more autonomous, conventional, and often more complex than the
signal (1946: 25-27). Langer (1948: 20-52) gives a more thorough comparison between mere
signs (also occasionally called signal, natural sign, or symptom) and symbols (also
occasionally called substitute sign, representative sign, artificial sign, fortuitous sign, or
conceptual sign). For her, the former indicates or announces a thing (1948: 24); it serves a
practical purpose (1948: 34); it indicates the existence of a thing or of the other things of the
same situation (1948: 45-46); it acts as a proxy for an object, reacts toward it overtly, or gets
aware of its presence (1948: 49); it is something to act upon or a means to command action
(1948: 51). The latter represents a thing, acts as a reminder of a thing, and lets us think of,
refer to, or talk about a thing (1948: 24); it does not serve practical purposes, but serves to
express ideas that the organism yearns to express (1948: 34-35), or serves to retain things for
later reference, for comparing, for planning, and generally for purposive thinking (1948: 30);
it may be something we arbitrarily produce and purposely correlate with something
important acting as its meaning (1948: 46); it is a vehicle for the conception of an object,
something leading one to conceive the object (1948: 49); it is an instrument of thought (1948:
52).
The above versions throw light on the distinction between the natural sign proper and
the instituted sign, but all leave some room for improvement. Of the above versions,
Augustine’s criterion applies to all natural signs, but not to all instituted signs. Natural signs,
as illustrated in Section 3.1.1, are all made without any desire or intention of signifying. It is
only that the definition of signa naturalia needs rephrasing in positive terms and more
qualifications, like the two requirements raised by Empiricus mentioned above, if it is to
serve as the defining feature of the natural sign proper. Augustine’s signa data in contrast,
implies two demands: The sign is intended to signify; the signifying is for communication.
The second demand is unduly restricting, in that it confines the sign mainly to signals and
excludes signs for counting, recording, telecommunicating, memorizing, thinking, and
self-expressing. The excluded phenomena are rich and varied: counting stones, notched tally
sticks, quipus, and wampum belts (see Nöth 1990: 252); petrograms, petroglyphs,
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pictographs, and pictograms (see Nöth 1990: 252); stenograph (see Nöth 1990: 270);
language substitutes (see Nöth 1990: 287); writing (see Nöth 1990: 251); other
representative signs used for memory, thinking and self-expressing. Roger Bacon’s criterion,
namely, whether the sign acquires its character by their very essence or by a soul’s intent, is
suitable for the distinction between the natural sign proper and the instituted sign. The
problem is that Bacon himself does not follow the criterion closely. He shows a tendency to
conflate it with another division: signs given by nature vs. signs given by a soul. In so doing,
he includes among his signs constituted by the soul those phenomena arising from natural
instinct or impulse, such as vocal sounds of brutes, groans of the sick, sighs, expressions of
awe or pains, and exclamations (2013: 40). Such phenomena can hardly be credited to the
soul’s intent; other philosophers would not hesitate to group it under the natural sign. In fact,
Bacon himself wavers on this point, introducing a second notion of “nature” and calling the
above phenomena “signs signifying naturally” instead of “natural signs” (2013: 40; footnote
23). Francis Bacon’s criterion applies, on one side, to a small portion of proper natural signs,
namely, signs of similitude. On the other side, it applies well to instituted signs, since
instituted signs could be said to have force by acceptation or contract. However, it does not
tell how the force by acceptation or contract arises and make instituted signs. Poinsot’s
criterion does more justice to the natural sign proper than those of Augustine and Roger
Bacon. Like Augustine, however, it cannot explain all instituted signs. Poinsot hedges the
natural sign proper with more requirements: representing from the nature of a thing;
independent of stipulation and custom; representing the same for all. The third piece is a bit
too harsh, and would be better if made with some qualification: representing much the same
for all subjects that are physiologically normal. Poinsot’s stipulated sign implies two
requirements: The sign arises from an imposition of the will; the will is shared by a
community. The second demand is unduly restricting, in that it confines the sign mainly to
public signs and excludes signs for uses between a couple of people, such as cloaks and
ciphers (see Nöth 1990: 207, 289-290), and for personal uses like counting, recording,
memorizing, thinking, and self-expressing. What’s more, the will of a community is itself
something dubious and complex, something needing further explanation. Hobbes does not
tell about the nature of natural signs; what is more, his characterization of the other kind of
signs, i.e., “choice of our own pleasure” (1839: 14), has to meet three challenges: How does
an instituted sign arise? Why do sign vehicles chosen at pleasure turn out to be adequate to
various tasks? Why are so great a proportion of instituted signs motivated by iconicity or
indexicality? Arnauld and Nicole’s distinction, between signs not depending on human fancy
and signs instituted or conventional, tallies with the dividing-line between the natural sign
proper and the instituted sign; yet it would be better if they could tell how the former kind of
79

signs arises, and what is the relation between “instituted” and “conventional”. Reid’s
classification of signs conforms, more than it appears, to the distinction between the natural
sign proper and the instituted sign. Reid’s natural signs comprise three subtypes: natural
signs relevant to natural connections studied by natural sciences; natural signs of human
thoughts, purposes, and desires; and natural signs occurring in processes like sensation. The
first subtype is close to, though perhaps broader than, the recollective sign; the second
subtype represents part of the indicative sign; the third subtype roughly amounts to the
sensational sign. Reid’s characterization of natural signs actually involves two layers of
meaning: First, the sign-relation is established by nature; second, the relation is made known
to the subject by “the original constitution of the mind” (1823: 64). The first layer is
explicitly stipulated in the first two subtypes of natural signs; the second layer is suggested
when he construes the first subtype as “discovered by experience” and the second subtype as
“discovered to us by a natural principle, without reasoning or experience” (Reid 1823: 65).
In comparison with the natural sign proper, Reid’s natural sign is too broad on its first
subtype, and too broad to include the third type; on the other hand, it is too narrow on its
second subtype. What is more, his characterization of natural signs is, in final analysis, too
vague. On the other side, his characterization of artificial signs as “the effect of habit and
custom” (1823: 64), awaits further explanations as to how the habit and custom themselves
arise in the first place. Condillac’s natural signs, i.e., those “cries that nature has established
for the sentiments of joy, fear, pain, etc.” (2001: 36), include only part of indicative signs
while excluding recollective signs and other indicative signs. His characterization of
instituted signs, i.e., “that we have ourselves chosen and that have only an arbitrary relation
to our ideas” (2001: 36), carries much truth; yet it would be better if it could also explain the
motivatedness so commonly found with instituted signs, and if it could explain how we have
chosen the signs. Bolzano offers a cogent criterion for characterizing, as well as
distinguishing between, the natural sign proper and the instituted sign. Yet it be much better
if it could explain how natural signs arise from human nature, and how arbitrary signs
resulting from an act of will could be later used habitually, in which process the subject is no
longer that conscious and intentional. Husserl’s characterization of indications, i.e., a being
experienced as motivating a belief in another being, is in itself not accurate enough. In a
sense, everything might be said to be so. As a result, Husserl takes to be indications things
others would not regard as natural signs: a brand for a slave; a flag for a nation (2001 [1970]:
183). The characterization would make more sense with a proviso specified by some of the
above philosophers, namely that the sign arises from nature. Such a proviso is, in fact,
implied in Husserl’s characterization of the second kind of signs called conventional sign or
expression. On his account, conventional signs differ from natural signs in involving the
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effects of the will; expressions differ from indications in involving a meaning-conferring act,
which gives meaning or infuses sense to an expression. It follows that, being the opposite of
conventional signs or expressions, natural signs or indications should result from nature.
Husserl’s characterization of conventional signs and expressions---the factor of the will or a
meaning-conferring act---is appropriate for the delimitation of instituted signs, though it
awaits further elaboration on the genesis of the instituted sign. Cassirer’s, Yerkes’, Morris’,
and Langer’s accounts aim at a distinction between sign phenomena for animals and those
peculiar to human beings, and thus are not necessarily fit or adequate for the distinction
between the natural sign proper and the instituted sign. One of Cassirer’s characterizations of
symbols---i.e., with only a functional value---applies more to part of instituted signs, namely,
those with a low degree of materiality, such as the last subtype of representative signs
mentioned in Section 3.1.1. Another characterization of symbols---i.e., human world of
meaning---resorts to the term meaning, a fuzzy and ambiguous term requiring further
elucidation. Yerkes’ experience-act is too narrow for sign phenomena, counting out those
relations between objects or states of affairs; on the other hand, the capacity for substituting
applies mainly to those instituted signs with a low degree of materiality. Morris’
characterization of symbols, as signs substituting synonymous signs, draws a clear
demarcation line between his signals and symbols, but is too indirect for the defining of
symbols; in the same vein, autonomous, conventional, and complex, being terms of degree,
are inadequate for an accurate division. Langer’s characterizations of signals and symbols
shed light on the distinction between the natural sign proper and the instituted sign. The
natural sign proper is a thing, event, or condition that announces or indicates the existence of
another; the instituted sign is something that represents, acts as a reminder of, or lets us
conceive, think of, refer to, or talk about something. The former serves a practical purpose,
by being something to act upon or a means to command an action; the latter serves as an
instrument of thought, enabling expressing, later reference, planning, or purposeful thinking.
Yet, Langer’s account is still too indirect for the delimitation of the natural sign proper or of
the instituted sign. She does not explain how such differences arise in the first place, or, more
fundamentally, how the two kinds of signs come into being. In spite of all these, Cassirer,
Yerkes, Morris, and Langer contribute several potential criteria to the delimitation work
under discussion: degree of materiality of the sign vehicle as well as degree of non-semiosic
functions; capacity for the sign vehicle to substitute for the object; distinction between signs
for thinking, referring, expressing, and talking on one side and signs for common practical
purposes on the other.
A more qualified criterion should at once give an accurate line of demarcation, and
point to the fundamental feature of each side. Judging from the analyses of signs in Section
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3.1 and from discussions in the above paragraph, the criterion in question might be this: (a)
whether a sign-relation is established by nature or by a subject, (b) when it comes into being
for the first time. The natural sign proper refers to signs whose sign-relation is established by
nature when it comes into being for the first time; the instituted sign refers to signs whose
sign-relation is established by a subject when it comes into being for the first time. Only in
this sense could it be said that natural signs arise from their nature or essence, that they result
from the original constitution of the mind or from human nature, and that they are
independent of human control, stipulation, desire, intention, intent, will, etc.. It is from this
fundamental feature that other features of natural signs ensue, like the following: that natural
signs are based on basic faculties of the mind no matter whether efforts on the part of the
subject are present or not; that natural signs tend to be the same for all subjects that are
physiologically normal. Likewise, only in this sense could it be said that instituted signs arise
from desire, intention, intent, or will; that they result from an act of instituting, stipulating,
imposing, choosing, conscious and intentional associating, an act of will, or a
meaning-conferring act. It is from this fundamental feature that other features of instituted
signs ensue, like the following: that they might serve purposes like recording, referring,
thinking, and communicating; that instituted signs might be arbitrary, at the will of the
subject, or of our own pleasure; that other subjects have to learn the relation directly or
indirectly from the subject who institutes the relation for the first time; that they are often
taught, shared, and communicated among people, so that instituted signs might get extra
force from acceptation, common usage, contract, compact, habit, custom, tradition,
convention, etc.. On the other hand, after the first phase, the natural sign proper and the
instituted sign have much in common. Both undergo a second phase, in which the first phase
becomes a memory of the subject, and a third phase, in which a subject recollects something
on the basis of the memory. This commonality blunts the differences between the two kinds
of signs. For instance, natural signs cannot be said to be purely natural, because they also
entail a subject in the two phases. Neither could they be said to be unrelated to higher-order
mental faculties, such as intention and inference; because, though the subject need not and
cannot change the relation established earlier, he or she often has to make conscious efforts
to set off the recollecting act. In addition, although the relation concerned could be
experienced directly or indirectly, they might also be learnt from others; although it has little
value for daily communicating, it might be taught and shared among people, thus acquiring
some flavor of habit or custom. To recap, the restricting condition for the natural sign proper
is that its sign-relation is established by nature when it comes into being for the first time; the
restricting condition for the instituted sign is that its sign-relation is established by a subject
when it comes into being for the first time.
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The above six criteria make increasingly stringent requirements on the sign: that there
exists a relation between two relata; that there exists a non-random relation between two
relata; that something known enables somebody’s knowledge of something unknown; that
something uncovers or reveals something else; that something perceptible reveals another
thing that is currently not perceptible; that the relation between two relata is established by
nature or by a subject when it comes into being for the first time.
ii. Other unifying features
The history of semiotics has witnessed many characterizations of the sign. Most of them
stipulate something similar to one, or a combination, of the above six criteria. Yet some
accounts go slightly beyond the six criteria, two representatives being Poinsot and Langer.
Poinsot attributes the fundament of the sign-relation to “the very rationale of medium or
means which the sign has relative to the significate as manifestable to a cognitive power, by
substituting for that significate in the rationale of stimulating and representing” (1985: 159).
As implied in this account, Poinsot maintains that a sign involves three elements: the sign,
the significate, and a cognitive power. The sign is a medium or means that manifests,
stimulates, represents, or substitutes the significate to the cognitive power. This point
encompasses the third and the fourth criteria discussed above; more than that, he also
stresses a third type of relation: substituting. Here and there, Poinsot claims that the sign
“represents,” “substitutes,” or “surrogates” the significate, or that the former functions as the
“vicegerent” of the latter (e.g., 1985: 119, 121). This reminds us of the sixth criterion where
Yerkes, Morris, and Langer invoke the capacity for substituting to distinguish between
signals and symbols. Apart from the three types of relations, Poinsot specifies three other
conditions for the sign: “First, that the sign be more known than the signified, not according
to nature, but as regards us. Second, that the sign be subsidiary to or more imperfect than the
significate. Third, that the sign be dissimilar to that significate” (1985: 218). The condition
that the sign should be more known than the significate makes it possible for the sign to
manifest the significate to a cognitive power. Being “more known or manifest” (Poinsot
1985: 218), the sign is “dissimilar [and unequal]” (Poinsot 1985:217; brackets original) to
the significate. It becomes “dependent [on]” (Poinsot 1985: 117), “subordinate and
ministerial to” (Poinsot 1985: 121), “measured by” (Poinsot 1985: 121), “inferior to and less
than” (Poinsot 1985: 218), or “more imperfect and deficient” (Poinsot 1985: 227) than the
significate. The pivot of all these requirements is the first condition, namely that the sign is
more known or manifest, with respect to us, than the significate. It is in this subjective sense
that the above requirements are to be understood. This puts Poinsot in the same boat as
Aquinas: having recourse to fuzzy terms like “known” and “manifest,” hence the inability
for a clear line of demarcation. The conditions enable Poinsot to make clear that many things
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that represent are not signs (1985: 217), and that not every image is a sign (1985: 219), but
little more than that. Overall, Poinsot’s position echoes the third and the fourth criteria
discussed above, and bears relation to the sixth. He falls short of the fifth criterion, because
he, to leave room for “formal signs,” does not proceed from the “known” requirement to the
“perceptible” requirement. His three extra conditions do not say as much as they appear. On
the other hand, they hint to us a valuable question, an objective version of the three extra
conditions: What characteristics make the sign be more known than, subsidiary to, and
dissimilar to the significate?
Langer hints an interesting view when distinguishing between the sign and its object.
For her, the difference is this: “one more interesting than the other, and the latter more easily
available than the former” (1948: 46). She continues, “It is only where one is perceptible and
the other (harder or impossible to perceive) is interesting, that we actually have a case of
signification belonging to a term” (1948: 47; italics original). For this view, Langer actually
has a precursor: Husserl. According to Sonesson (2012: 221), Husserl differentiates between
paired association (or coupling), in which case two things are co-present, appresented
pairing (or appresentation), in which case one thing is present and the other absent, and an
appresentation becoming a sign, in which case the absent thing is the theme. Husserl here, as
put by Sonnesson (2006: 153), reveals the nature of “the real sign relation, where again one
item is directly present and the other only indirectly so, but where the indirectly presented
member of the pair is the theme, i.e. the centre of attention for consciousness.” Langer’s and
Husserl’s first piece of requirement echoes the former part of the fifth criterion mentioned
above. The second piece goes beyond the six criteria. The claim, namely that the object is
more interesting or that the object is the theme, points to an important feature underlying
sign phenomena, which might serve to explain several topics related to the sign.
Nevertheless, interesting and theme are too abstract and fuzzy to qualify as a criterion for
delimiting the boundary of the sign.
There exist other views that are not in line with the six criteria listed above, yet they are
mostly less promising as a unifying feature of the sign. For instance, Peirce’s triadic view---a
triadic relation between a sign, its object, and its interpretant---makes a requirement so easy
to meet that it turns out to be inadequate to peg out a clear category for semiotics as a
discipline. Eco’s view of social convention---that a sign is “everything that, on the grounds
of a previously established social convention, can be taken as something standing for
something else” (1976: 16; italics original)---allows anything to be a sign, and makes one
doubt the necessity of the term sign and whether the object of study of semiotics had better
be social convention instead.
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3.2.3 Demands from a Proper Object of Study
So far, we have, on the one hand, potential boundaries of the sign, as suggested by sign
phenomena mentioned in the history of semiotics; and, on the other hand, the possible
features unifying sign phenomena, as offered by semiotic theories. A third determinant for
the boundary of the sign comes from the demands for a proper object of study. Section 2.2.1
arrives at several conclusions as to the requirements for a proper object of study.
Immediately relevant to the topic in question are fourfold. First, an object of study must
cover a wide range of phenomena. Second, the wide range of phenomena must display some
deep-lying regularities, rules, or laws worthy of efforts of scientific studies. Third, the
regularities, rules, or laws must serve to reveal the nature of an object of study as a fully
developed, stable category, which is structured by family resemblance and taxonomic
organization, and displays a gradient ranging from prototypical members, less prototypical
members, to borderline cases. Fourth, the object of study must contribute to the
maximization of overall human knowledge.
These demands cast light on the delimitation of the sign. First of all, since an object of
study aspires after breadth only if the included phenomena still display deep-lying
regularities, it is not necessarily better for the sign to encompass more or all of the types of
signs witnessed by history. Second, of the six major unifying criteria discussed in Section
3.2.2, the former several criteria---e.g., that there should be a relation, that there should be a
non-random relation, or that something is known and the other unknown---point to too wide
a range of phenomena with shallow shared features; therefore, they are not as worthy of
scientific studies as the latter several. Third, instituted signs are the least explored type of
signs by disciplines other than semiotics, whereas the other types could be explained to a
great degree by other disciplines; in this sense, the inclusion of instituted signs within the
object of study of semiotics contributes to the overall human knowledge, whereas the
inclusion of other types of signs might not. Instituted signs are necessary for the
maximization of human knowledge, also in another sense: they are the most complicated
type of signs, boasting of the richest deep-lying regularities, rules, or laws, many of which
rely on the achievements of semiotics as a discipline.
3.2.4 Sign in the Broader Sense and Sign in the Narrower Sense
The prototypical member matters much to an object of study. An ensuing question is
this: What is the prototypical member of the sign as an object of study? As discussed
formerly, the various types of signs witnessed by history fall into four groups: (a) instituted
signs; (b) indicative signs, recollective signs; (c) abstract inferential signs, thought-signs; (d)
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sensational signs, perceptual signs, conceptual signs, sense-signs, and bio-signs. According
to the frequency order and chronological sequence discussed in Section 3.1.3, recollective
signs, indicative signs, and instituted signs are more qualified to be prototypical members.
On this point, the divinatory sign---common among ancient Mesopotamians, Babylonians,
Greeks, and early Romans---is worthy of special attention. According to the demands for a
proper object of study, particularly the maximization of overall human knowledge, the
instituted sign is the best candidate for prototypical member of the sign. In sum, it is
advisable to regard as the prototypical member of the sign the recollective sign, particularly
the divinatory sign, for the sake of the original meaning of the term sign; or the instituted
sign, for the sake of overall human knowledge viewed from the vantage of now.
The two alternatives make a difference as to the border of the sign as an object of study.
The reason is this: The second alternative, which is significant to now and the future, matters
more than the first, which is significant for the past. In this sense, it is necessary to include
the instituted sign, even if we deem the recollective sign as the prototypical member. Granted
this condition, the analyses in the preceding three sections---from the angle of the features of
sign phenomena noticed in the history of semiotics, of their unifying features, and of the
demands for an object of study---lead us to two best candidates for the sign as an object of
study---one in the broader sense and the other in the narrower sense. Signs in the broader
sense comprise the instituted sign plus the natural sign proper, the latter of which consists of
indicative signs and recollective signs. In this case, either the instituted sign or the
recollective sign could be the prototypical member. Signs in the narrower sense include only
the instituted sign. In this case, the prototypical member falls upon one subtype of the
instituted sign.
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Chapter 4 Sign in the Broader Sense
Once an initial decision is made as to the unifying feature and the borderline of an
object of study, it is possible to delineate its genuine characteristics, to determine its nature,
and to check whether it really qualifies as an object of study for an autonomous discipline.
4.1 Constituents of the Sign
Section 3.2 points out two conditions for the sign in the broader sense. As noted in
Section 3.2.1, the sign in the broader sense, inclusive of instituted signs, indicative signs, and
recollective signs, involves a relation between something perceptible on the one side and
something imperceptible or something not perceptible at the moment on the other. In Section
3.2.2, the fifth criterion best characterizes the sign in broader sense, stipulating that
something perceptible uncovers or reveals something imperceptible or something not
perceptible at the time. Put together, the two conditions amount to two requirements:
something perceptible plus something not perceptible at the moment; an uncovering or
revealing relation between them. These two requirements are adequate to stake out the
boundary of the sign in the broader sense.
Nevertheless, these two conditions, or these two requirements, are not adequate to
reveal the nature of the sign in the broader sense. One problem lies in the fuzziness of the
second condition. Uncovering or revealing generally implicates a mental process. This is
reflected well in the diction of several definitions of signs mentioned in Section 3.2.2, such
as “causes us to think of” (Augustine 1958: 34), “makes us know” (Ockham 1964: 53),
“excite in us” (Degérando 1800 1: 63), and “stimulate in a thinking being” (Bolzano 2014 3:
44). These expressions are not as forceful as they appear to be, because almost every mental
relation could be said to mentally cause, excite, or stimulate something. Our analyses in
Section 3.1.2 stipulate much more, which characterize recollective signs, indicative signs,
and instituted signs as an act of recollecting based on some memory of a preceding act of
experiencing or instituting, or as an act of inferring aided by such an act of recollecting. In
the same section, it is revealed that signs do not happen only to the subject who experiences
or institutes the relation between two relata, but also to others who learn the relation from
them. Then the above characterization had better be amplified to this: recollecting based on
some memory of a preceding act of experiencing or instituting or acquiring, or inferring
grounded upon such an act of recollecting. In other words, on the mental respect, signs do
not involve just any kind of mental process, but an act of recollecting or recollecting-based
inferring, grounded upon an earlier act of experiencing, instituting, or acquiring. Since an act
of acquiring only happens when there is something to acquire, at the very core of sign
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phenomena is an act of experiencing or instituting. On the other hand, an act of recollecting
or inferring is generally reversible, either from X to Y or from Y to X; whereas uncovering or
revealing is generally not reversible. Therefore, the sign in the broader sense does not mean
any act of recollecting or inferring, but an act going from a perceptible thing to another thing
that is not perceptible at the moment. Two subtypes, namely, recollective signs and indicative
signs, are even more restrictive, in that there is a natural connection between the two relata
they involve. The above still does not exhaust the features of the sign in the broader sense.
An apparent fact is that not all the perceptible things, which are naturally connected with
another thing not perceptible at the time, are deemed as signs of the other. Likewise, the
subject who institutes a sign-relation does not choose or invent its vehicle randomly, but
employs only those with certain features serving particular functions. This brings up still
another restricting condition: The act of recollecting or inferring must serve some function.
So what is this function? The history of semiotics offers two clues to this question. The
first clue is the divinatory sign---an ancient sign type believed to be common among ancient
Mesopotamians, Babylonians, Greeks, and early Romans. Divinatory signs exhibit several
features. First, they are signs of an event to happen in near future. Second, the future event
tends to be vital to the subject. As illustrated in examples in Section 3.1.1, they are signs of a
healthy year, a good fortune, a bad omen, a disaster (e.g., seduction and adultery, popular
revolt, drought and famine, fire, etc.), the gender of the child to be borne (e.g., son), the
tendency of an illness (e.g., recovery), the outcome of a battle or war (e.g., defeat or
conquest by a foreign nation), or the impending human fate (e.g., death). Third, divinatory
signs are purely accidental signs, yet of no small value to the subject concerned. As
discussed in Section 3.1.2, divinatory signs are at best coincidences, or coincidences that
appear several times. They are often symptomatic of the overgeneralizing tendency of sign,
in that they are prone to claim a regularity or law that does not exist, or exalt a coincidence
to the position of regularity, or an accidental regularity to the position of a probable law. On
the other hand, however, they originate, like true knowledge, in an urge to infer from
something known something new to guide future actions. They serve as a valuable source of
knowledge for the remote ancients, who had little knowledge of the world and desperately
searched for knowledge to guide their actions. As indicated in the above list of future events,
they needed signs for decisions vital to their life.
The second clue is the chronological sequence of the various types of signs discussed in
Section 3.1.3. As noted in Section 3.1.2, a crude sketch of the chronological sequence is like
this: divinatory signs (from Mesopotamia to early Roman); symptoms (during early Greek);
instituted signals and linguistic signs (in Plato); physiognomic signs, meteorological signs,
and astronomical signs (in Aristotle); other recollective, indicative, and instituted signs (as
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early as Empiricus in Greek, all the way into 20th century). Similar to the divinatory sign,
other types of signs display two features. First, they mainly stand for something in near or
immediate future or something current. Similar to divinatory signs, which stand for
something in near future, symptoms mainly stand for something happening now or
something to happen in the future, though they could, theoretically speaking, apply to past
conditions of the body. Linguistic signs or instituted signals mentioned in Plato are names or
gestures, the latter of which signal an order for a future act. Physiognomic signs stand for a
current character or disposition of a subject, though it might begin much earlier and last long
into the future. Meteorological signs or astronomical signs stand for conditions of the
weather or of heavenly bodies in immediate future. Indicative signs other than symptoms and
physiognomic signs stand for current emotions or feelings of the subject. Recollective signs
other than divinatory signs, meteorological signs, and astronomical signs stand for a thing or
event in the future, at present, or in the past. Of those instituted signs mentioned by scholars
following Plato, instituted signals stand for an order to take an action, or a notification of an
event about to happen or going on now; most representative signs stand for something
mental, or something particular that lasts for some time. Overall, most of the
above-mentioned types of signs stand for something in near or immediate future or
something current, with only two exceptions: a small proportion of recollective signs;
representative signs, as a subtype of instituted signs. The few exceptional cases of
recollective signs were noticed relatively late and only sporadically in the history of
semiotics: Empiricus during the 2nd and the 3rd century, Roger Bacon in the 13th century,
Kant in the 18th century, and Peirce in the 19th century. Representative signs are peculiar.
They might be intended for something mental or something physical. The former is
something direct and current, whereas the latter is realized via something mental, and might
exist in the past, at present, or in the future. Even when a representative sign indirectly stands
for something in the past; directly, it represents something mental that exists at the time. In
brief, sign phenomena recorded in the history of semiotics begin with signs of something in
near future, and are followed predominantly by signs of something in the future or at present.
This bias gets more apparent, in view of the fact that the world is perfused with no fewer
relations to something in the past than relations to something at present or in the future. It
gets even more apparent, if, as some people (e.g., Aquinas 1947: 3124; Ockham 1974: 50)
claim, every effect is a sign of its cause. Then, whence comes this bias? The answer is
implied in the second feature of the sign in the broader sense.
Second, those signs other than divinatory signs also stand for something important to
the subject, or something of value to his or her later actions. Symptoms reveal health
conditions of a subject; physiognomic signs reveal the character or disposition of a subject;
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meteorological signs reveal the weather to come; astronomical signs reveal conditions of
heavenly bodies, such as sunrise and eclipse; other indicative signs other than symptoms
reveal the emotion or feeling of a subject. These things revealed are not as drastic as those
revealed by divinatory signs. Nevertheless, health is important to a subject; weather, sunrise,
or eclipse matters to a subject for his or her ensuing physical work; characters, dispositions,
emotions, and feelings are useful for one subject to deal with another subject. Other
recollective signs, as illustrated in Section 3.1.1 serve to reveal a fire, an impending death, a
previous wound, an animal that passed by, an imminent rain, a shot, the ancient conditions of
the earth or of the human world, a going-on raining, etc.. Death, fire, and rain are obviously
important to a subject. Behind the rest looms a purpose intended to serve the present or the
future. A previous wound might tell something about a person, which aids a subject in
dealing with the very person. An animal that passed by might mean a danger to avoid or a
prey to hunt. A shot might mean something for a detective. The ancient conditions of the
earth or of the human world are the target of archaeology that, as a discipline, does not exist
for the mere sake of the past. Other instituted signs split into two subtypes: instituted signals
and representative signs. Instituted signals signal something important to the receiver for his
or her ensuing actions, such as military attack, military retreat, found food, approaching
enemies, arriving friends, food for selling, the sprinkling of the road, the starting of the train,
and the setting of the sun. Representative signs are somewhat special. The things they
represent are much more varied---not restricted to those of impact on the existence of a
subject or on his or her immediately ensuing actions. This is especially evident, if we
consider the commonly recognized function of language, as a system of linguistic signs, to
have the potential to represent anything we can think of or want to communicate. It does not
follow, however, that existing representative signs really combine to represent everything in
the world, nor do they represent for the sole sake of representing. As will be shown later,
representative signs are also selective in the things they represent. Even linguistic signs, as
elements of a language which is tasked with the mission to represent anything we can think
of or want to communicate, do not represent all the things in our mind. Moreover, the object
stood for by representative signs is of importance to the subject, at least as something covert
in other’s mind waiting to be revealed to others. Unlike other types of signs, representative
signs, as noted by Langer (1948: 24-52), do not serve practical purposes but serve purposes
of memorizing, thinking, expressing, and communicating. In brief, sign phenomena recorded
in the history of semiotics largely display a descending order of importance to the subject.
They range from signs of something vital to the existence of a subject, signs of something
important to the existence of a subject, signs of something of influence on the immediately
ensuing actions of a subject, to signs of something serving non-practical purposes as
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memorizing, thinking, expressing, and communicating. The descending order poses an
interesting question, to be discussed later. What is crucial here is that things represented by
signs tend to be something important to a subject.
To sum up the two clues, the history of semiotics points to two noticeable features of
sign phenomena: Signs predominantly stand for something in near future or at present; signs
tend to stand for something important. These two features point to one probable conclusion:
Signs are to serve certain functions. They stand for something in near future or at present
because it is important to a subject, and it is important to the subject in the sense that it is
vital or important to his or her existence or to his or her immediately ensuing actions. This
statement applies pretty well to indicative signs and most recollective signs, relatively well
to instituted signals, but not as well to representative signs. The cleavage between
representative signs and other types of signs is evident, yet the two are not utterly separated.
Langer’s contrast between signals and symbols might be a lead to the key. According to
Langer (1948: 20-52), the former serves a practical purpose, by being something to act upon
or a means to command an action; the latter serves to retain things for later mental processes,
as an instrument of thought, and to express ideas. What Langer suggests to us here is that
symbols also serve a function. It is only that they do not serve a practical purpose, but such
purposes as memorizing, thinking, and expressing. This point might also apply to the current
topic, to the effect that recollective signs and indicative signs serve practical functions,
whereas instituted signs, particularly representative signs, serve non-practical functions.
Instituted signals mark the transition from practical natural signs to non-practical instituted
signs. In this sense, all the signs in the broader sense serve a function. The question to follow
is why to subsume the two groups under the same category, given the different function they
fulfill? Is there any function shared by both groups? If yes, how do practical functions
develop into non-practical functions? These are interesting questions demanding close
examination later. What can be said tentatively here is that non-practical functions develop
from practical functions. Non-practical functions, like memorizing, thinking, expressing and
communicating, are secondary functions developed from the function of communicating.
The function of communicating builds on a more basic function, i.e., to reveal something in
the mind of a subject. This more basic function is congruent with the function of indicative
signs, i.e., to reveal something hidden underneath the body. This function of indicative signs,
in turn, is in line with that of recollective signs, i.e., to reveal something hidden from
perception for the moment. In conclusion, the function of the sign in the broader sense is
two-tiered. On the lower tier, the signs reveal something important to the subjects, with
respect to their existence, their immediately ensuing actions, or their interpretation of other
subjects. On the higher tier, the signs serve such added functions as expressing,
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communicating, memorizing, and thinking. Within the higher tier, some only serve such
added functions as expressing and communicating, whereas others serve all the four added
functions. Overall, the lower tier points to the function that links up all the signs in the
broader sense.
To conclude, the sign in the broader sense involves at least three constituents: (1) a
relation between something perceptible and something imperceptible or something not
perceptible for the moment; (2) an act of recollecting, or an act of inferring grounded on
recollecting, based upon an earlier act of experiencing, instituting, or acquiring; (3) a
revealing function, i.e., to reveal something important to the subject. Altogether, the sign in
the broader sense consists in a process in which a living being recollects or infers on the
basis of a recollection, with the aid of some memory or knowledge, from something
perceptible something not perceptible at the time that is important to its existence, its
immediately ensuing actions, or its interpretation of other living beings. Such a process
implies at least six elements: (a) a subject; (b) something perceptible; (c) an act of
recollecting or recollecting-grounded inferring; (d) a piece of memory or knowledge, as the
basis of the act; (e) something not perceptible at the time, being the result of the act; (f) a
revealing function, being the effect of the act. Phenomena not belonging to the category fail
at least one or several of these elements; whereas members of the category vary in
prototypicality with their performance on the six elements.
4.2 Essential Feature and Variable Features
Of the six elements, the revealing function is the pivotal factor that deploys the other
five elements. It largely determines whether a phenomenon counts as a sign. The revealing
function varies in magnitude, and takes on two layers of meaning: to make something known
to the subject, and to make known something important to the subject. The former is easy to
attain. It does not matter whether the act involved begins with something perceptible and
ends with something not perceptible at the time. Nor does it matter whether the act builds
upon recollecting. Nor does it matter whether the act entails some memory or knowledge, or
is fundamentally an unconscious or instinctual act. On this interpretation, sense signs,
abstract inferential signs, and thought-signs, though falling outside of the category, still fulfil
a revealing function. The sign in the broader sense, however, not merely reveals something
to a subject. The condition, requiring one thing to be perceptible and the other to be not
perceptible at the time, renders the revealing function necessary and natural. Another
condition, stipulating the act to be grounded upon recollecting that entails some memory or
knowledge, enables the subject to perform the revealing function repeatedly at will. Both
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conditions amplify the magnitude of the revealing function fulfilled by signs. More
importantly, as stressed above, the sign in the broader sense not merely reveals something to
a subject, but makes a point of revealing something that is important to the subject in a
certain way. In the light of this, prototypical members of the sign in the broader sense are
those that reveal something of striking importance to the subject in a certain way.
In this sense, the greater the revealing function, the more worthy something is to be a
prototypical member of the category. The revealing function is greater, when the revealed
thing is important to the subject, and when the revealing act is striking and sound. The
revealed thing is important, when the thing itself or its ensuing action is vital to the subject’s
existence, when it recurs frequently, and when it concerns more people. For instance, a sign
has an increasingly marked revealing function, if it indicates a bad weather, a minor health
problem, a chronic disease, a deadly disease, a pandemic or a disaster or a war, or an
impending danger to the earth. The revealing act is striking, when the thing to be revealed
can be uncovered only partially, indirectly, or with great effort, whereas the thing that reveals
can be easily perceived. For instance, indicative signs tend to have a strikingly revealing
function, in that they are intended to manifest something hidden within the body, such as
diseases, characters and dispositions, or emotions and feelings. Recollective signs, in
contrast, are often restricted to those requiring a trained eye, such as meteorological signs, or
to those revealing something important to the subject, such as a healthy year, a disaster, a war,
and an impending death. The revealing act is sound, when the knowledge on which it is
based is valid and when it is law-like. This is because a revealing function is not really
revealing, if it turns out to be erroneous or merely coincidental. Contrarily, the revealing
function is amplified if the revealing act is law-like and becomes a piece of knowledge
useful for later public use. For instance, divinatory signs tend to reveal something vital to the
subject, but its effects are blunted by their coincidental or superstitious tint. Physiognomic
signs reveal the character or disposition of a living being, something very elusive;
nevertheless, their revealing function is diluted by their susceptibility to falsehood. Ceteris
paribus, a sign of an earthquake is more revealing than a sign of doomsday claimed by a
religion. Likewise, a sign based on knowledge gained through direct experience, such as
perception, is generally more trustworthy than one based on knowledge gained through
inference or acquisition---in the former case, the sign is even more reliable, if the act of
perception accords with reality. For instance, when Roger Bacon (2013: 38) claims that to
have large limbs in a lion is a sign of strength, he obviously predicates the validity of the
statement upon Aristotle, from whom Bacon takes the example. Aristotle’s claim about large
limbs, on the other hand, is probably more reliable than some of his other claims, which do
not build on preceding observation, but on inference. Consider the following example of
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meteorological sign: Halo is a sign rain; halo fading away, of fine weather; halo broken up,
of wind. (Aristotle 1984: 1313). The latter two judgments are inferred from the first. Their
validity depends on the reliability of the first judgment plus something else. Due to this
added dependency, they are more vulnerable to errors.
On the opposite, there are situations where the revealing function of a phenomenon is
minute, raising doubts over its status as a sign. Here is a list of such situations:
(a) when the thing to be revealed is


something distant in the future,



something in the past,



something present,



something too apparent,



something hardly recurring in the world, or



something not more interesting than the thing that reveals;

(b) when the thing that reveals is


something hard to recognize or present, or



something hardly recurring in the world;

(c) when the act is too unconscious, instinctual, or automatic;
(d) when the memory or knowledge is


a belief in something indirectly relevant,



a belief in a regularity or a law, or



a false belief.

Let us elaborate a little. If the thing to be revealed were something far in the future, it would
ordinarily be of little value to immediately ensuing actions of the subject. In this case, the
revealing function would not be big, unless it is something of huge impact, like death or
doomsday. The same is the case with something in the past. The revealing function is
generally small, unless the thing revealed happens to be relative to the task at hand of the
subject, like the footprint of animal for a subject searching for a prey. If the object is present,
there is usually no revealing function at all. Suppose a tourist takes a picture of his or her
companion with a cell phone, he or she will not point at the picture and regards it as a sign of
the nearby companion. As remarked pithily by Zhao, “For any meaning-making process to
happen, there must be some element not present or not completely present. It is precisely this
absence that triggers the process” (2011: 46). When the object is wholly present, no sign
phenomenon is needed. Similarly, if the thing is not within view but is very apparent, we
seldom view it as the object of a sign, especially if the thing is not very important. Hardly
anyone will use the term sign in the following situations: A person seeing sunlight judges
that the sun is up in the sky; a person seeing a tree judges that it has roots underneath the
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earth; a person seeing a barking dog judges that it has a heart in its body. Some things are
hardly repeatable, such as individual physical objects and their sensations. For example,
holding an apple, orange, lemon, or banana in one’s hand, one could also sense its smell; but
few would regard its look as a sign of its smell. Similarly, few would use a sign for one of
the several fruits one ate, for a particular animal one saw on a trip, or a mass of cloud one
saw in the sky. Such sensations or individuals hardly recur, and are thus not important to the
subject. When the thing to be revealed is no more interesting than the thing that reveals, there
would be no revealing function. Poinsot refuses to see an image as a sign of another image,
one sheep as a sign of another sheep, because “each one is really principal” (1985: 218). As
Langer (1948: 46) puts it, for something to be a sign of another thing, the former must be
more easily available while the latter must be more interesting. Even if we grant the status of
sign to such cases, they hardly serve any ends, let alone the revealing function. Another
manifestation is that most sign phenomena are irreversible. For instance, we occasionally
view a photo as a sign of a person, but rarely or never will we see a person as a sign of a
photo. The reason is simple: We normally care more about the person than the photo. As for
the second group of cases, the former increases the cost of the revealing act, while the other
decreases the chances of reusing. As a result, for instance, more people would question the
status of sign of a drawing, a sculpture, a piece of music, or a film, than that of a calling, a
gesture, or a facial expression. In the case that the revealing act is purely unconscious or
instinctual, there would be no room for such thing as memory, knowledge, experience, habit,
or convention; in consequence, the subject would not be able to utilize the act later. Such an
act is more open to doubts as to its status of sign. Eco, for instance, holds that stimuli
“cannot” be seen as signs (1976: 19-20). The fourth group of cases comes up when a sign
relies on knowledge gained from other phenomena or from delusions. Normal signs build on
memory or knowledge of a preceding act involving the same two relata. Some signs,
however, are based on knowledge gleaned from relevant sign phenomena, or from pure
belief, true or false. Pure belief is characteristic of some divinatory and physiognomic signs.
Indirect knowledge gleaned from relevant sign phenomena is common with abstract
inferential signs, which often lack exactly corresponding knowledge to rely on. Knowledge
of a regularity or law sometimes plays a role in interrelated phenomena that make up a
system, such as symptoms, physiognomic signs, divinatory signs, and other recollective
signs. For such interrelated phenomena, it is highly likely that after observing some instances,
one comes to believe in a regularity or law, such as Aristotle’s belief that “an alteration of the
state of the soul produces an alteration in the form of the body” (1984: 2711), and form new
signs on that basis. For the entire fourth group of cases, the phenomenon involved is not, or
not necessarily, reliable, thus limiting their utility for revealing.
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4.3 Complex Sign Situations
The following three topics concern some complex sign situations, resulting from two
kinds of interrelations: between sign phenomena and non-sign phenomena; between sign
phenomena and sign phenomena. Such topics might relate to all sign phenomena listed in
Section 3.1.1, yet they are more marked, or make more sense, in the case of the sign in the
broader sense.
4.3.1 Sign Statement, Sign Phenomenon, and Pre-Sign Phenomenon
By sign statement is meant a statement that asserts a sign phenomenon briefly or in
detail. The instances of signs listed in Section 3.1.1 are, in the first place, sign statements
cited by philosophers or semioticians in the history. That section is meant originally for data
on sign phenomena; nevertheless, as sign phenomena are essentiallly mental acts
inaccessible to observation, sign statements are all that is available to us. A sign statement
might describe a sign phenomenon as it is, or only claims so. This means that there is a
possibility for divergence between a sign statement and a sign phenomenon. A sign statement
might assert a sign phenomenon when no corresponding mental act goes on within the mind
of a subject. The story of the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” is a good case in point. The sign
statement would say that a cry screaming “Wolf!” is a sign signaling an approaching wolf.
The mischievous boy, however, actually relates the cry to a prank. Besides, as shown in
Section 3.1.1, sign statements in the history of semiotics generally resort to a brief formula:
Something is a sign of something else. A sign phenomenon, in contrast, is a very complicated
phenomenon. As indicated in Section 4.1, the sign in the broader sense is a process
consisting of at least six elements. The brief formula sign statements employ tend to leave
out four elements: the subject, the act of recollecting or inferring, a piece of memory or
knowledge, and the function to reveal something important to the subject. This means that
sign statements do not tell the nature of sign phenomena. What sign statements offer are only
first clues to the nature and classification of signs.
There might also be a divergence between a sign phenomenon and a corresponding,
underlying pre-sign phenomenon in reality. This happens mainly with natural signs, as
instituted signs generally do not presuppose a pre-existing natural phenomenon. The
divergence results from problems in the process that leads to the formation of the sign
phenomenon. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, normal recollective signs or indicative signs
involve four phases: a connection between two relata established by nature; an act of
experiencing; an act of memorizing; an act of recollecting or recollecting-based inferring. All
these phases involve a connection between two relata. The act of experiencing converts a
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natural connection into a perceived connection; the act of memorizing converts a perceived
connection into a memorized connection; the act of recollecting or recollecting-based
inferring converts a memorized connection into an external-internal connection. Take the
example of dark clouds being a sign of a coming rain. Dark clouds and rain have a natural
connection. An experience of the connection forms in a subject a perception of the
connection. An act of memorizing causes in the subject a memory of the connection. During
the act of recollecting or recollecting-based inferring, when the subject sees clouds in the sky,
he or she draws on the memory, and thinks of or infers a coming rain. The three acts mainly
serve to convert one mode into another mode; they largely reproduce the connection
involved in the preceding phase. As a result, the natural connection in the first phase tends to
remain constant through the whole process, albeit in differing modes of existence in the four
phases. However, there are abnormal situations in which the latter three phases are not that
standard, resulting in a divergence between the connections in the four phases. The problem
often occurs, when the act in the latter three phases is not one of pure experiencing,
memorizing, or recollecting. When the second phase is not an act of perceiving, but an act of
fantasizing or an act of experiencing plus a false judgment, there might be no natural
connection at all. On perceiving two distinct things, people occasionally attribute to them a
connection, which turns out to be the case, or not the case. On this point, Ersu Ding (2016:
169) gives an interesting example: In ancient China, people believe that when an emperor
misconducts himself, the kingdom would suffer from natural disasters, like earthquakes,
floods, and droughts. Viewed from modern sciences, the connection between an emperor’s
misconducts and natural disasters is a mere fantasy. The attributed connection might also
result from an act of inferring from other false knowledge. In justification of the reign of
feudal dynasties, an emperor used to be glorified as the “son of Heaven”; the Heaven, in turn,
is believed by people in ancient China to determine the course a kingdom takes. For
believers of such a theory, the emperor is naturally connected with the Heaven on one side
and with the kingdom on the other; accordingly, when he misconducts himself, the Heaven
will punish the kingdom with natural disasters. The second phase might also be an act of
perceiving, but not a pure act of perceiving---something is added to it. For instance, it is
likely that some people in the past did perceive the coincidence between an emperor’s
misconducts and natural disasters, but mistaken the coincidence for a natural regularity or
law. In such a case, there is a natural connection between the two, but it is merely a
coincidence. In these cases, the second phase is not a pure act of experiencing, resulting in
divergence between the first two phases. When the third phase is problematic, it involves
more than an act of memorizing. A common problem is the generalizing tendency from sign
and the overgeneralizing tendency from sign mentioned in Section 3.1.2. That section raises
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the question of how something gained from an act could be applied to another act. The
answer lies in our proclivity to generalize from a case or cases. We derive from a
token-connection a type-connection, a regularity, or a law; and then apply the latter to later
token-connections. We commit the error of overgeneralizing from case when we claim a
connection between two unrelated things, or when we exalt an accidental phenomenon to the
position of a regularity, a probable law, or even a universal law. Our memory tends to forget
trivial details and retain schemas; thus playing a role in the generalization from
token-connection to type-connection. Yet the generalization or overgeneralization from a
coincidence to regularity to law takes more than memorizing; it requires at least memorizing
plus reasoning. This added act of reasoning is exactly what makes divinatory and
physiognomic signs “childish and fantastic” (Kant 2006: 85). For modern people, for
example, it sounds superstitious to see constellations of stars as a sign of an impending
human fate, or to take Americans’ forehead overgrown with hair on both sides to be a sign of
their innate feeble-mindedness. The fourth phase causes problems when it involves more
than an act of recollecting, or when the act of inferring is not grounded on recollecting.
Typically, it involves an act of recollecting plus an act of inferring, or an act of inferring not
grounded on recollecting. When the inferring is sound, this does not lead to divergence from
nature. Take Aristotle’s (1984: 1313) example of halo: Halo is a sign of rain; halo fading
away, of fine weather; halo broken up, of wind. Suppose one has known the first part,
through personal experience or acquisition from others, but has no knowledge of the second
and the third part. And suppose he or she now sees a halo fading away. He or she would still
be able to reach the conclusion that tomorrow is a fine day. He or she reaches the conclusion
because he or she not only has the memory or knowledge that halo means a coming rain, but
has the ability to reason like this: Since halo fades away, there will be no more rain, hence a
fine day. This conclusion turns out to be valid. When the inferring is not sound, however,
there emerges a disparity between sign acts and natural phenomena. For instance, it is fair to
say that sweating is a sign of a hot day, but it is not right to say that cold seating is a sign of a
cold day. In brief, a sign phenomenon consists of several phases; every phase involves a
connection between two relata. In normal sign phenomena, every connection largely copies
its preceding one; consequently, the connection in a sign act tends to tally with the
connection in nature if there is any. In abnormal situations, however, a sign phenomenon
consists of phases involving abnormal acts, resulting in disagreement between a sign-relation
and a natural connection. Let us call such sign phenomena pseudo-signs, in the sense that
they are like normal signs but fail to reflect reality.
In a word, a sign phenomenon is essentially about a connection between two relata, but
it is better to distinguish between three groups of connections. The first group includes only
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one connection: the natural connection, prior to or independent of any semiosic activity. Let
us call it simply the natural connection or pre-semiosic connection. The second group
consists of connections appearing in the constituent acts, which combine to make a semiosic
activity. These acts generally comprise one act in which the natural connection comes within
the consciousness of a subject for the first time, one act in which the connection turns into
memory or knowledge, and one act in which the memory or knowledge is utilized for a
specific sign situation. Let us call them semiosic connections. The third group includes only
one connection: the connection as asserted in a sign statement. Let us call it asserted
semiosic connection. The three groups of connections might coincide with one another. In
other cases, they diverge from one another.
To mention in passing, the reality may be even more complicated than stated above. For
instance, the second group of connections only applies to those subjects embracing the
sign-relation. There are other subjects who have never been involved in the semiosic activity,
and still others who are involved in the semiosic activity but embrace a different
sign-relation. For example, Cicero (2006: 130) makes a sign statement as follows: A crow
croaking on the left was considered a sign of good fortune. A believer of such an omen
would think exactly the same way. For a believer, who is so used to another omen---that a
raven croaking on the left is ill-omened (Cicero 2006: 130; Commentary)---what he or she
really thinks of might be bad fortune. For a scientifically minded subject, however, the
croaking is only a croaking that portends nothing. In reality, the croaking of a crow probably
has nothing to do with fortune, be it good or bad.
4.3.2 Sign-Inference, To-Sign Inference, and Inference from Sign
As mentioned earlier, the sign is essentially a mental act of recollecting or
recollecting-grounded inferring. In the case of recollecting, the act is more automatic; in the
case of inferring, the act calls for deliberate efforts on the part of the subject. Pure
recollecting is rare and extreme; most cases are adulterated by inferring.
In the case of inferring, it is better to distinguish between three types of inferences
relevant to sign phenomena. Let us label them, respectively, sign-inference, to-sign inference,
and inference from sign. The first refers to inference relevant to a sign-relation within a sign
act; the second, inference leading to a new sign-relation; the third, inference based on an
established sign-relation. During a sign act, the inferring unfolds from something perceptible
to something not perceptible at the time; or for instituted signs, also from something not
perceptible at the time to something perceptible. Take Aristotle’s (1984: 1313) example:
Halo is a sign of rain. On seeing a halo of the moon, one infers that it is going to rain. This is
a sign-inference. Then, what enables this inference? One natural answer is a piece of
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memory or knowledge of a preceding act of experiencing or of several such acts, in which
one notices the connection between halo and rain. In other words, the sign-inference is based
on some memory or knowledge derived from a preceding act of experiencing. This inference
from the preceding act(s) to a sign-relation is what we call to-sign inference. As mentioned
in Section 3.1.2, to-sign inference is by nature an inference from case(s), which often
displays a generalizing tendency that leads to belief in a piece of regularity or a law, or an
over-generalizing tendency that leads to error, as is often the case with divinatory signs and
physiognomic signs. Inference from sign happens after a sign-relation is established. One
typical example is offered by Hippocrates on symptoms: When bubbles form in the urine, it
is a sign that the kidneys are affected, and that the disease will be protracted (1931: 199). The
latter judgement that the disease will be protracted is inferred from a sign phenomenon, to
the effect that bubbles in the urine stands for a chronic kidney problem. As there is a chronic
problem with the kidney, it follows that the disease will be protracted. Inference from sign is
especially common with instituted signs, particularly linguistics signs. Suppose one says to
his or her partner at breakfast, “Heavy cloud today.” The speaker not only means a likely rain,
based on a sign-inference, but also advises his or her partner to take an umbrella when going
out, based on an inference from the sign. On hearing the words, the partner infers that it is
going to rain, based on a sign-inference, and that the speaker wants him or her to take an
umbrella, based on an inference from the sign. The partner may also stop at the raining
inference, failing to notice the umbrella suggestion or taking the speaker to be meaning
“Hurry!”. In this sense, philosopher J. Austin’s (1962) illocutionary act and perlocutionary
act are based on inference from sign. Another manifestation of inference from sign is sign
statements made on types of things, as shown below:


Cold sweating is a sign of serious illness. (Aristotle 1984: 3235)



Urine is the sign of health in animal. (Aquinas 1947: 93)

Such instances result from a combination of two inferences: a sign-inference from cold
sweating or urine to a particular disease, say, a cold or kidney problem; an inference from
sign, reasoning from a particular disease to a generic phenomenon, like illness or health.
Occasionally, both relata of the connection extend from a case to a generic type, as illustrated
below:


The body is a sign (sēma) of the soul. (Plato 1997: 118).



Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks
symbols of spoken sounds. (Aristotle 1984: 72)



Every effect is a sign of its cause. (Aquinas 1947: 3124)



Every image is a sign of the thing whose image it is. (Roger Bacon 2013: 123;
Appendix A)
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Features of the face, modulation of the voice, motion and attitude of the body are
natural signs for thoughts, purposes, and dispositions of the mind. (Reid 1823: 64)

4.3.3 Changing Conceptions of the Sign and Sign-Jumping
Examples of signs mentioned by scholars in the past display several shifts in the
conception of the sign. The foregoing sections already touch upon several manifestations of
such a shift or evolution. As mentioned in Section 3.1, signs in the broader sense display two
marked features as to the object they stand for. One feature is the bias toward something in
near future or at present against something in the past. What’s more, reference to the future
appears the earliest, with divinatory signs; reference to the present comes next, with
symptoms; whereas reference to the past occurs much later, with one early example offered
by Empiricus during the 2nd and the 3rd century. This order makes some sense. Divinatory
signs are a subtype of recollective signs, the latter of which are the only type of signs that
could stand for something in the future, at present, or in the past. Symptoms are a subtype of
indicative signs, the latter of which mainly stand for something within the body at present.
The remaining type of signs, namely, instituted signs, represents something mental or
something physical considered by the mind at the moment. Therefore, the above order
actually means a route from recollective signs, indicative signs, instituted signs, and finally
back to other subtypes of recollective signs. The other feature displayed among the signs in
the broader sense is a descending order of importance to the subject: signs of something vital
to the existence of a subject, signs of something important to the existence of a subject, signs
of something of influence on the immediately ensuing actions of a subject, to signs of
something serving non-practical purposes as memorizing, thinking, expressing, and
communicating. The two orders seem to point to the same shift in the conception of the signs.
The extension of the sign broadens, as the magnitude of its revealing function shrinks. This
sounds natural, in that the most marked or prototypical signs must have been the earliest to
come to the attention of semioticians or other scholars, whereas the later added phenomena
must be less prototypical.
Also mentioned earlier is the shift from standard signs to non-standard signs; that is,
from signs based on knowledge gained from direct experience to other signs, including those
based on knowledge of a regularity or law, on knowledge gained from other sign phenomena
or non-sign phenomena, and on knowledge gained through acquisition. This shift has two
consequences. For one thing, it leads to a greater chance of error. Knowledge of laws and
knowledge inferred from other phenomena both run the risk of improper application.
Knowledge by acquisition relies on its source for its validity. For another thing, they are all
useful, or necessary, to certain situations. Knowledge of laws saves the labor for repeated
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experiencing, and thus drastically increases efficiency. Knowledge inferred from other
phenomena is helpful and necessary, when no proper knowledge is available for an
interpretation. Knowledge by acquisition saves other people from the efforts for direct
experience, and helps strengthen the tie within a community or society. In spite of all these,
the shift reflects the loosening up of the defining constraints of the sign and the broadening
of its extension.
Still another shift touched upon earlier is the one from natural signs to instituted signs.
The shift results from the change in the origin of signs from a natural connection to an act of
instituting. This change leads to a set of further changes. Two major changes are these: from
being unidirectional to bi-directional, i.e., from interpreting to both interpreting and
expressing; from a revealing function to such added non-practical functions as memorizing,
thinking, expressing, and communicating. Other minor changes are as follows: Due to the
role of the will, the piece of memory or knowledge involved in instituted signs tends to be
more conscious, and more likely to be automatic; instituted signs might happen between two
subjects; instituted signs show a higher need and frequency for the phenomenon of sign by
acquisition. In addition, there are changes brought by the shift to representative signs, a
subtype of instituted signs: to a lesser degree of materiality for the sign vehicle, to a higher
capacity for the sign vehicle to substitute for its object, and to greater likelihood for sign
vehicles to combine with one another to form a text. In brief, this shift reflects not merely the
broadening extension of the sign; it also represents a radical change in the kernel topics of
semiotics.
The examples of signs mentioned by scholars in the past also display a development, or
even a jumping, in our awareness of the sign. One manifestation is the collapsing of one or
several complex phenomena into a single sign. For simplicity, let us call such a phenomenon
sign-jumping and sign-collapsing. Sign-jumping has two major forms. One form is to
collapse semiosic activities and non-semiosic activities into a single act, or to collapse
sign-inferences and inferences from sign into a single sign-inference. An example will make
this clear. We have discussed the phenomenon of inference from sign inherent in the
following example: When bubbles form in the urine, it is a sign that the kidneys are affected,
and that the disease will be protracted (Hippocrates 1931: 199). One point to add here is that
the latter judgment might later be incorporated into sign phenomena, thus collapsing the two
judgments into one sign phenomenon. The resultant sign would be this: When bubbles form
in the urine, it is a sign that the disease in the kidney will be protracted. A streamlined
version would be this: Bubbles in the urine is a sign of a protracted disease in the kidney.
Hippocrates already does something like this, as in this example: The following is a sign of
approaching elimination of bone in a case thus treated. A large amount of pus flows from the
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wound, which appears turgid (1928:161). There are several steps away from a turgid wound
discharging much pus to elimination of bone. Such a sign comes into being, only when
several steps are collapsed into one step. The other form of sign-jumping is to collapse one
or several indirect signs into a direct sign. Bolzano and Husserl both distinguish between
direct sign and indirect sign. According to Husserl, the indirect sign is something like this:
“Z is a sign of object G in virtue of the fact that Z is a sign for Z0 which is a sign for G; or in
virtue of the fact that Z is a sign for Z1, this a sign for Z2, this again perhaps a sign of a Z3,
and so on, until finally the sign Zn directly designates G” (1994: 23). On this interpretation,
Husserl claims that general names are all indirect signs (1994: 23). Bolzano offers the
following example: Letters of the word “God” is a sign of the sounds of the word, which is a
sign of the concept of God (2014 3: 47). He argues that an indirect sign can become a direct
sign with use (2014 3: 47). For instance, the picture of a scale is an indirect sign of the Libra
or an equinox, but a direct sign for experienced astronomers who do not think of the scale.
Russell raises an interesting assumption for the shift from indirect sign to direct sign:
Perhaps it may be assumed that the sign-relation is often transitive, i.e. that, if A is
a sign of B and B is a sign of C, then A is a sign of C. This will not be invariably
the case, but it will tend to happen if the sign-relations of A and B, B and C are
very firmly established in the animal’s organism. In that case, when the word
“smoke” is a sign of smoke, and smoke is a sign of fire, the word “smoke” will be,
derivatively, a sign of fire. If fire causes the word “fire”, the word “smoke” will
thus have become, derivatively, a cause of the word “fire”. (2009: 165)
Bolzano and Russell offer some clues to the condition of such a shift: “with use,”
“experienced,” and “tend to happen if the sign-relations of A and B, B and C are very firmly
established in the animal’s organism.” The key is for an organism to be well familiar with the
relation between A and C after sufficient experiences. Naturally, it would be even better if
the relation is so firmly established that it gets more or less automatized, be it a habit or
conditioned reflex. The function of sign-jumping is apparent: It saves efforts and increases
efficiency. For human beings, it accelerates the development of human wisdom and
drastically promotes its competence to cope with the complicated world.
4.4 Sign in the Broader Sense as an Object of Study
So how does the sign in the broader sense fare as an object of study? Given its
characteristics, as portrayed in Section 4.1, the sign in the broader sense includes a broad
range of phenomena: recollective signs, indicative signs, and instituted signs. It has certain
prototypical members: those with a great revealing function, whose revealed thing is
important to a subject and whose revealing act is striking and valid, such as meteorological
signs, medical symptoms, and instituted signals. It also includes less prototypical members
varying in the revealing function, thus displaying a gradient of prototypicality. It also
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possesses a relatively clear borderline staked out by the three ingredients of the sign in the
broader sense, thus excluding such phenomena as sense signs, sensational signs, perceptual
signs, conceptual signs, abstract inferential signs, and thought-signs. In these senses, the sign
in the broader sense qualifies as a category. However, as an object of study, it has two patent
deficiencies. First, it has so broad a scope that it does not display any deep-lying regularity,
rule, or law worthy of scientific efforts. The sign in the broader sense includes nearly all
relations in nature---concerning the body or concerning the mind. On the other hand, its
nature is too apparent for much attention. As pointed out in Section 4.1, the sign in the
broader sense consists in a process in which somebody recollects, or infers on the basis of a
recollection, with the aid of some memory or knowledge, from something perceptible
something not perceptible at the time that is important to his or her existence, his or her
immediately ensuing actions, or his or her interpretation of other subjects. This looks
complicated. In essence, however, it merely refers to (a) an experience-based process, (b) a
process happening between something perceptible and something not perceptible at the time,
and (c) a process that reveals something important to a subject. None of these three processes
is complex enough for a discipline, nor is their combination. The above defining statement is
almost all one can say about the sign in the broader sense. Hardly can one find any
deep-lying, systematic regularity, rule, or law for it. This explains, to a great degree, why the
history of semiotics offers abundant examples of signs yet little theorization. The second
deficiency of the sign in the broader sense is the clear cleavage between natural signs and
instituted signs. Both sides share the features attributed to the sign in the broader sense.
Nevertheless, as mentioned in Section 3.1.2, instituted signs originate from an act of
instituting, unfold in two possible directions of recollecting, often involve other subjects, and
rely heavily on knowledge gained through acquisition. As will be analyzed in the next
chapter, instituted signs are different in more ways. They are far more complicated, and are
thus worthy of greater scientific efforts. Such a clear cleft between natural signs and
instituted signs undercuts the appropriateness for the sign in the broad sense to be the object
of study of semiotics. In the next chapter, we will focus on the other candidate, namely,
instituted signs.
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Chapter 5 Toward a Theory of the Instituted Sign
5.1 Name and Nature of the Instituted Sign
In contradistinction to natural signs, such as recollective signs and indicative signs,
there exists another type of signs. We have termed it instituted sign. Historically, this term
has many near-synonyms. They include Aristotle’s symbol; Augustine’s signa data; Poinsot’s
stipulated sign; Reid’s artificial sign; Condillac’s instituted signs; Kant’s voluntary sign;
Degérando’s instituted sign or arbitrary sign; Bolzano’s arbitrary sign; Peirce’s symbol;
Saussure’s sign; Husserl’s conventional sign or expression; Cassirer’s, Morris’, Langer’s,
Benveniste’s, or Sebeok’s symbol, etc. Underlying such names are the varied ways of
characterization of the contra-natural sign phenomena. As suggested in Section 3.2.2, the
history of semiotics has characterized this kind of phenomena in four major ways. On the
first account, their nature arises from desire, intent, intention, or will; or from an act of
conscious and intentional associating, choosing, conferring, instituting, imposing, or
stipulating (e.g., Augustine 1958: 34-35; Peter of Spain 2014: 103; Roger Bacon 2013: 39;
Poinsot 1985: 136; Locke 1824 bk. III, ch. II, sec. 2; Peirce 1899-1900: 4-6; Husserl 2001
[1970]: 192). On the second account, they acquire their character from usage, habit,
acceptation, agreement, contract, compact, custom, tradition, or convention (e.g., Plato 1997:
103; Aristotle 1984: 72-73; Francis Bacon 1605: 139; Poinsot 1985: 136; Reid 1823: 53;
Peirce 1903: 88; Eco 1976: 16). On the third account, they are arbitrary, at the will of a
subject, or of one’s own pleasure (e.g., Roger Bacon 2013: 40; Hobbes 1839: 14; Arnauld
and Nicole 1996: 36-37; Locke 1824: bk. III, ch. II, sec. 8; Condillac 2003: 36; Whitney
2013 [1875]:19; Saussure 1959: 69). On the fourth account, they are evolutionally more
advanced, belonging to the human world of meaning (Cassirer 1944: 51), or that they are
substitutive (Morris 1946: 25-27), or that they serve non-practical functions like thinking,
referring, expressing, and talking about (Langer 1948: 20-52).
The first account tells about the origin of a non-natural sign, rather than all of its
characteristics. The features listed in the first account need a proviso: when its sign-relation
comes into being for the first time for some subject. In establishing a sign-relation for the
first time, the subject concerned implements the desire, intent, intention, or will to choose,
confer, or impose something for/on something else, to intentionally associate something with
something else, or to institute or stipulate a connection between something and something
else. However, these features are much less marked with acts following the above act. As
analyzed in Section 3.1.2, normal instituted signs include three basic phases: an act in which
a subject establishes a sign-relation for its first time; an act of memorizing; an act of
recollecting or recollecting-grounded inferring. In the latter two acts, the subject merely
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utilizes the piece of memory or knowledge gained from the first act, and applies it to an act
of recollecting or inferring. Alternatively, other subjects acquire the sign-relation, and then
apply the piece of knowledge to an act of recollecting or inferring. Such acts are not as
conscious, intentional, or voluntary as the first act. In fact, the piece of memory or
knowledge might become engraved in the mind, so that the later acts get to be as automatic
as reflexes. Put simply, it is more proper to say that non-natural signs originate from desire,
intent, intention, or will; or more accurately, from an act of conscious and intentional
associating, choosing, conferring, instituting, imposing, or stipulating. As will be shown
below, this origin is the defining feature of non-natural signs.
The second account relies on something involved in the later acts, but neglects the first
act that brings a sign-relation into being for its first time. It is only after a sign-relation is
established that its use becomes possible. It is only after frequent uses that a habit comes into
being. It is only when a sign-relation is available that expressing becomes possible. It is only
when expressing is possible that communication, as a subtype of expressing targeted at
another subject, could be conducted. It is only after communication could be conducted that
acceptation, agreement, contract, compact, custom, tradition, or convention is likely to come
into existence. The features listed in the second account are characteristic of the majority of
non-natural sign phenomena, but they are merely likely rather than necessary. They are
derivative features that, in themselves, await further explanations presupposing sign
phenomena. In this respect, it is incorrect to characterize the sign as communicational or
conventional. In particular, the popular term conventional sign is starkly inadequate for the
category of non-natural signs. As pointed in Section 3.2.1, it is unduly restrictive in
excluding signs for uses between a couple of people, such as cloaks and ciphers (see Nöth
1990: 207, 289-290), and for personal uses, such as for counting, recording, memorizing,
thinking, and self-expressing. Likewise, Augustine’s signa data unduly confines non-natural
signs to communication, excluding those phenomena for personal uses.
The third account fails to capture the essence of the first act, and neglects the restraining
effects stemming from agreements on, or history of, the use of a particular sign. Arbitrariness
is a feature derived from the first act, in which a subject voluntarily establishes a connection
between two relata. The subject who establishes the connection has a full say on the selection
of the vehicle. In this sense and only in this sense is the non-natural sign arbitrary. In real
situations, however, a subject performs an act for some benefit, in relation to the cost
incurred and to other interests pursued. Accordingly, the subject tends to make a rational
selection on the vehicle, based on a set of considerations: demands from the circumstances of
the intended use of the vehicle; habits or traditions relevant to the connection; less effort;
greater efficiency, etc.. In consequence, most non-natural signs are carefully chosen:
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appropriate to the task, following preceding models set by oneself or by others, and
connected in some way to the object represented. Besides, the third account totally neglects
the acts following the first act. In these later acts, the subject who launches the connection
normally makes use of it by drawing upon its memory or knowledge. Other subjects first
learn the connection from the initiating subject, and then make use of it by drawing upon its
memory or knowledge. In such acts, the sign-relation is not at the will or pleasure of the
subject. In this sense, arbitrary sign is not a good term for non-natural signs.
The fourth account lists some potential distinguishing features of non-natural signs, but
does not reveal their nature. The features characterize non-natural signs from the perspective
of evolution or function. There are good reasons to say that non-natural signs are more
evolutionally advanced. Non-natural signs have more to do with the human world. Some of
them could be substitutive, such as representative signs with a low degree of materiality.
They serve non-practical functions, which are probably more varied than Langer claims,
including recording, memorizing, communicating, and telecommunicating. Nevertheless, the
account does not show how non-natural signs come to possess such features. What makes
non-natural signs more privileged by the humankind? How do non-natural signs fulfil
non-practical functions? Answers to such questions presuppose close examination of how a
single non-natural sign unfolds. In this regard, the former three accounts are more specific
and basic.
In sum, the four accounts are all partial with relation to the whole picture of non-natural
signs. Comparatively, the second to the fourth account all concern derivative features,
offering useful distinguishing features here, and biased, non-necessary features there. What
defines non-natural signs is the basic fact that their sign-relation is established by some
subject when it comes into being for its first time. In this sense, Poinsot’s stipulated sign,
Reid’s artificial sign, Condillac’s and Degérando’s instituted sign, and Kant’s voluntary sign
are more appropriate for the name of non-natural signs. Among these terms, artificial sign is
problematic, in the sense that non-natural signs might employ natural objects as vehicles, as
is the case in which a stone set in the ground is used to mean the bound of a field (Hobbes
1839: 14). Voluntary sign applies better to the first act than the later acts, namely, the act of
memorizing and that of recollecting or recollecting-grounded inferring; it easily leads to the
delusion that non-natural signs are voluntary, which is often not the case. By comparison,
stipulated sign and instituted sign are much better, in that, with the suffix “-ed,” they imply a
lead to a preceding act. Stipulated sign, however, is not satisfactory, in that the word stipulate
has two unneeded components of meaning nowadays: to require; with other subject(s).
Overall, instituted sign is probably the best term for non-natural sign phenomena. To digress
a bit, another popular term symbol is not satisfactory, either. The word is ambiguous, and is
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loaded with traditional usages that are still wildly in current within and outside semiotics.
The term is “ubiquitous” and “one of the most overburdened terms” in many fields of
research (Nöth 1990: 115); semioticians differ widely as to its exact meaning (see Nöth
1990:115-120). As surveyed by Nöth (1990: 115-120), the word has at least four major
usages: symbol as a synonym of sign, symbol as a conventional sign, symbol as a kind of
iconic sign, and symbol as a connotational sign. This is understandable, because the term,
consisting of a single noun, is open to varied interpretations, though subject to constraints
from its tradition. Besides, being made up of a single noun, it also loses the one advantage
enjoyed by terms like instituted sign---namely, to hint at the defining feature of non-natural
signs.
By way of conclusion, instituted sign seems to be a better term for those sign
phenomena opposed to natural signs. Natural signs are those sign phenomena involving a
connection given by nature. Instituted signs are those sign phenomena involving a
connection established by a subject when it comes into being for its first time.
5.2 Genesis of the Instituted Sign
How do instituted signs emerge? How do natural signs evolve into instituted signs?
How do instituted signs evolve between their subtypes? Such genetic accounts would shed
more light on the essence of instituted signs, and on the characteristics of various subtypes of
instituted signs. Below is a closer examination at the evolution from recollective signs,
indicative signs, to instituted signs on the one hand, and the evolution among various
subtypes of instituted signs on the other hand.
5.2.1 Some Theories in the History of Semiotics8
In discussing the origin of language, Reid distinguishes between natural signs and
artificial signs, the former being those having “a meaning which every man understands by
the principles of his nature” and the latter being those that “have no meaning, but what is
affixed to them by compact or agreement among those who use them” (1823: 53-54). Reid
argues for a necessary route leading from natural language to artificial language: An artificial
language is composed of artificial signs; artificial signs presuppose compacts or agreements;
compacts or agreements presuppose natural signs. Even the brutes, like a chick, a dog, or a
horse, boast of natural signs to express and understand thoughts, affections, and desires; yet,
only the humankind can make a promise or plight a faith. The natural language of mankind

8

Discourse on evolution of signs abound in biosemiotics. Pressed for space, this aspect is to
be put off until further studies.
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consists of three types of natural signs: modulations of the voice, gestures, and features.
These means enable two savages to converse in some tolerable manner. Artificial signs are
later added to supply the deficiency of natural signs; after coming into being, artificial signs
multiply with the arts of life and the improvements of knowledge. Artificial signs are useful
to overcome the defects of natural signs, but it is better not to root out natural signs, because
natural signs have the advantage of being much more expressive than artificial signs, which
signify but do not express (Reid 1823: 55-57).
To study the human mind, Condillac (2001: 5) seeks to lay bare its operations in all
their advances and the origin and genesis of ideas, under one and the single principle. To this
end, Condillac (2001: 52) argues for a sequence of operations of the soul as follows:
perception, consciousness, attention, reminiscence, imagination, contemplation, memory,
reflection, distinguishing, comparing, composing, decomposing, analyzing, affirming,
denying, judging, reasoning, and conceiving. He also distinguishes between three kinds of
signs: accidental signs, i.e., objects linked with an idea by some particular circumstances;
natural signs, i.e., cries established by nature for sentiments like joy, fear, and pain; instituted
signs, i.e., those chosen by ourselves and with only an arbitrary relation to ideas (2001: 36).
On Condillac’s (2001: 36-41) account, the operations that precede reminiscence do not need
any sign. Accidental signs and natural signs offer chances to exercise the faculty of
reminiscence and imagination, but these processes are not at one’s command. Instituted signs
cause memory, i.e., the power to recall the circumstances, an abstract idea, or the name
accompanying a perception. Memory enables one to gain mastery of his or her own
imagination. This mastery allows one to govern his or her attention. Seeing the advantages of
signs, one will invent more signs, which will further increase the exercise of imagination,
memory, and reflection. Condillac (2001: 114-116) later gives a more detailed account of the
transition from accidental signs and natural signs to instituted signs. On this account, when
people live alone, the operations of the soul are limited to perception, consciousness,
attention, reminiscence, and a limited amount of imagination. Living together offers
occasions for greater exercise of these operations. Frequent repetitions of such occasions
habituate them to the connection between, on one side, cries and accompanying motions of
the body and, on the other side, sentiments. This familiarity enables them to recall the
connection at will. This new ability enables them not only to recognize sentiments by signs,
such as cries and motions, but also to communicate sentiments with signs that imitate the
cries and motions. Using natural signs as models, the two communicators come to use
arbitrary signs for sentiments, at first by articulating new sounds accompanied by gestures
pointing to the object of attention. With the language of articulated sounds becoming richer,
the vocal organ gets more flexible, until finally the language of articulated sounds prevail
109

over that of action.
Degérando (1800 1: 6) first supposes an individual without any commerce with other
fellow men. Operations of the mind arising from the first simple sensation include sensation,
attention, perception, judgment of fact, consciousness, and reflection. When a sensation
affects the individual once again, there comes the phenomenon of reminiscence. When two
sensations affect the individual simultaneously, there comes a perception of a whole or of
two independent perceptions, which the individual might compare or analyze. An individual
at this stage would not have, or need, any sign, defined as “means which serves to supply
immediate perceptions to the mind, in procuring us with the idea of what we no longer
perceive” (Degérando 1800 1: 29). On the other path, sensation causes images; images are
invoked by the faculty of imagination; reminiscence applied to imagination forms memory;
from memory comes judgment of belief; a series of judgments constitute reasoning
(Degérando 1800 1: 52-78). Once the faculty of imagination is in place, when a sensation
affects the individual, it might trigger an idea whose original sensation bears a relation of
simultaneity, succession, or analogy with the former (Degérando 1800 1: 61). In this case,
the sensation is a sign of the idea. For this reason, the individual at this stage has signs, but
only those signs that he or she cannot control at will (Degérando 1800 1: 74). These signs are
restricted to those of sensible ideas, mainly simple and occasionally complex to a degree
(Degérando 1800 1: 73). Degérando then seeks to examine the birth of language, by
supposing two individuals deprived of all communication until this hour (1800 1: 108).
Finding an exterior form similar to his or her own, each of the two individuals would
imagine his or her own self and then others’ self by lending his or her own self to others.
Observing actions similar to his or her own, he or she thinks of the needs that inspire his or
her own actions, and thereby guesses the other’s thought; in this way, the two individuals
might be able to understand each other mutually. Noticing that he or she can be understood
by a similar being in certain encounters, he or she feels the need to make him or herself
understood, for help in work, for relief of pains, or for support in danger. The first and
simplest means he or she thinks of is to reproduce actions that had made him or her
understood. Such actions constitute the first language called the language of nature
consisting of signs offered by nature (Degérando 1800 1: 113). The language of nature soon
proves to be inadequate, especially under situations where there is no sign yet, where the
sign is hard to reproduce, or where the sign is equivocal in being relevant to many ideas or to
different ideas between the two individuals. The two individuals need an easier, safer, and
more fruitful language. One candidate is the language of analogy (Degérando 1800 1: 121).
The language of analogy falls into three kinds: indicator, imitator, and figurative sign
(Degérando 1800 1: 117-121). Indicators serve to excite the attention of the companion and
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direct it to an object that is currently affecting the senses of the two individuals, often with a
shout, a wand, or a finger. These signs constitute the first kind of instituted signs. The second
kind of instituted signs are imitators, used for an object that is sensible but out of sight for
the moment, be it in another place, in the past, or in the future. Imitators function by
imitating an object, such as by imitating the attitude, movements, or cries of an animal one
saw earlier in a neighboring forest. Figurative signs are used for an object that can never be
sensed, such as interior modifications like desires, regrets, pleasures, pains, judgments, and
doubts. Figurative signs function by giving such interior modifications a momentary material
form and showing it to the companion. For example, one might manifest a movement and
fixation of attention of the mind with a movement and fixation of the eye, a judgement
balancing two thoughts with the movements of two hands weighing two bodies, a lively
passion with a flame, a turbulent mind with a storm, and a calm mind with a serene sky.
Overall, the language of analogy adopts three kinds of materials: gesture, speech, and
symbolic writing. Signs of analogy has its efficacy founded on analogy, but soon acquires a
new force, namely, habit; after repeated use, they become signs of habit, in which case we
may be “satisfied with a slight analogy” (Degérando 1800 1: 123). Finally, we will have
entirely arbitrary signs, which come into being through two ways: “first by the successive
degeneration of language, then by express conventions” (Degérando 1800 1: 123). In the
second volume, Degérando (1800 2: 330) remarks on the way arbitrary signs have originated.
Most arbitrary signs do not result from an express agreement, but are due to “the corruption
of certain primitive analogies” (Degérando 1800 2: 330). When an analogous sign receives
general recognition between people, the common habit renders less necessary the analogy
between the sign and the idea. The analogy is at first altered imperceptibly by usage; but the
change accelerates drastically, when the sign becomes strikingly less complete or when the
original motive for the analogy is almost forgotten. Occasionally, the sign might get utterly
disfigured or destroyed, without losing its value as a sign for the idea. Anyway, after analogy
decreases while uses increase, the signs retain their strength “only because they agreed to
give them the same meaning”; as a result, the simplest way to express new ideas would be to
“agree to choose a name for them” (Degérando 1800 1: 124). This convention is “first
formed between those who most commonly needed to design this idea, then became
common to others” (Degérando 1800 1: 124). Degérando adds that the way a child learns to
speak could be said to be an abridged version of the institution of signs in human societies.
The process also undergoes three stages: natural signs, namely, the first cries of a child;
analogous signs, mainly indicators, like the first motions a child executes with limbs and
gestures; arbitrary signs, which a child learns from adults (Degérando 1800 1: 127-128).
Husserl (1994: 24-25) holds that conventional signs share the same underlying natural
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laws with natural signs, but involve a novel aspect, i.e., the influence of the will.
Conventional signs presuppose some psychological conditions: “the capacity for
understanding the function of signs, and the power of will over the underlying psychical
dynamics” (Husserl 1994: 25). More specifically, the emergence of conventional signs from
natural signs takes five steps (Husserl 1994: 25). First, a sensible expression presents itself as
a natural sign for an individual. Second, the sensible expression serves as a mediator of
understanding for another individual. Third, with this knowledge, an individual sometimes
purposefully uses the natural sign as a means of understanding. Fourth, when such use
happens frequently and mutually, the sign turns into one with a fixed, conventional
signification. Fifth, in the same way originate conventional surrogates. Here, conventional
surrogate means “a special class of conventional signs” that are “invented to take the place
of authentic representations and judgments” (Husserl 1994: 44).
Much later, Robert Brandon and Norbert Hornstein (1986) offer an account of the
evolution “from presign behavior to prelinguistic iconic communication systems and from
these, in turn, to the symbolic ones characteristic of human natural language.” The two
scholars have an uncommon conception of signs, and do not detail the two transitions. They
only mention the transition from behavior to sign, and from iconic communication to
symbolic human language due to the selective pressure of phenotypical transmission.
Nevertheless, they offer an interesting account of the second stage by invoking the biological
notion of ritualization. On this account, ritualization in the biology of communication falls
into three stages. At the first stage, one organism observes in another organism an action or
some part thereof, usually an initial part, and infers from it some subsequent behavior. For
example, on observing such movements of another bird as crouching, raising tails, and
slightly spreading wings, a bird would infer that the former bird is to fly. In such a case, the
movements become a sign of flight to the watching bird. At the second stage, the sender
exaggerates, stylizes, and articulates certain features of the preceding behavior, so that the
receiver would not miss or misunderstand the sign. The third stage involves a process of
transference, in which the old sign is transferred to a new referent that bears no perceptual
iconicity with the sign. For instance, a male grey heron develops a courting ritual with
movements for fishing. At this stage, the sign is diachronically iconic but synchronically
arbitrary.
Keller (1998) builds on Brandon and Hornstein’s account, and gives a much more
elaborate version. Keller (1998: 99-100) distinguishes between three kinds of signs, namely,
symptom, icon, and symbol; and redefine them, respectively, in terms of three basic
techniques of interpretation, namely, causally based, similarity based, and rule based. Keller
(1998: 143-155) advances that symbols emerge, step by step, from symptoms to icons
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through iconification, and then from icons to symbols through symbolification. To be more
specific, iconification happens like the second stage of ritualization mentioned above. An
iconified symptom consists of two aspects: one aspect making it symptomatic of something;
the other aspect making it a deliberately produced sign of the symptom, through
modifications on the original symptom. For instance, to indicate to my companion that the
lecture is boring, I could turn to him or her and make a somewhat exaggerated yawn. The
yawn makes him or her know that I feel bored, and the exaggeration lets him or her know I
want him or her to know the act is a simulation of a yawn. Symbolification of icons happens
through demotivation of the icon. Keller cites the following fictive example:
During a walk through the forest, I want to make my companion aware of a
wood pigeon sitting on a branch, but without scaring her away (the pigeon, that
it). I could do this by pointing towards the pigeon and imitating its cooing sound.
[…] the situation comes up again the next day. […] By the fifth time, at the latest,
I will not even bother with trying to produce the pigeon's coo with any degree of
authenticity. Just the start of an approximate coo will suffice to let my
companion know that I want to point out a pigeon. She will no longer need to
employ her associative abilities. The basis of her inference will be her
knowledge. (Keller 1998: 150)
The linchpin is that repetitive use renders iconicity no longer necessary. The motivatedness
of the sign loses the function to act as an associative catalyst. Sign users no longer have the
reason to expend energy on the authenticity of the sign, and thereby the sign turns gradually
into a symbol. Keller (1998: 148-150) also raises a third transition: from symptoms to
symbols through staging. Overall, Keller (1998: 153) proposes three processes of sign
metamorphosis: Symptoms can become icons or symbols, by means of exploitive use---that
is, by simulating for icons and by staging for symbols (1998: 150); icons can become
symbols, by means of frequent use.
Ersu Ding (2014, 2016) gives a more accurate and cogent evolutionary account of signs
than Keller. Ding proposes an evolution order, illustrated with rich and interesting examples,
from indexical signs to iconic signs to symbols. This makes two major differences. First, the
account dethrones Peirce’s priority accorded to icon before index, awakening us to the
legitimate right to doubt the validity of Peirce’s philosophical architectonics built on firstness,
secondness, and thirdness. Second, it improves on Keller’s narrow confines of the first
evolutionary stage of the sign, namely, symptom. Keller uses a term for a species, namely,
symptom, to represent a genus. Symptoms are but a subtype of indexical signs. More
importantly, Keller construes the first stage of signs to be causally based. In contrast, Ding
explicitly points out the deficiency of this view and broaden it to “the relationship between
things and events in his/her external environment or internal state of mind” (2016: 172). The
indexical sign is grounded in the “the intellectual ability to deduce B from A” (Ding 2016:
169). The indexical sign turns into an iconic sign when someone utilizes the ability for
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communicative purposes, say, by “produc[ing] something similar to a part of the intended
object or state of things either in sound, or in shape, or in color so that his/her listener could
make a proper deduction thereupon” (Ding 2016: 170). The iconic sign turns into a symbol
when the former “loses its ability to evoke a similar image over time” as repeated use
renders the sign-relation “automatic” (Ding 2016: 173).
5.2.2 Evolution of Semiosic Competence and of Signs
An evolutionary account of signs needs to tell about the evolutionary sequence of
various types of signs, and the mechanisms for the shifts in every stage as well. To form a
new subtype of signs, three things are required: competence necessary to form it; tools
necessary to form it; pressure for its formation. Correspondingly, underlying the evolution of
signs are three chains of shifts: shifts in types of competence necessary to form various types
of signs; shifts in types of tools necessary to form various types of signs; shifts in types of
pressure for the formation of various types of signs. These three chains provide clues to a
coherent evolutionary account. It is reasonable to hypothesize, for instance, that the
competence necessary to form a type of sign (to be called semiosic competence hereinafter)
must have developed from more basic mental faculties to more advanced mental faculties,
and that, accordingly, sign types requiring more advanced mental faculties tend to be
evolutionarily later. It is also reasonable to hypothesize that the needed types of tools and
pressure display their own order of development, and that the evolutionary sequence of signs
must have respected such orders. Combining the three chains of shifts in semiosic
competence, tools, and pressure, we might envisage a more thorough genetic account of
signs as below.
i. Birth of recollective signs
Among the previously evolutionary accounts of signs, Degérando goes into some detail
as to the transition from pre-sign phenomena to natural signs. According to Degérando (1800
1: 6-61), some of the first mental operations do not need any sign; the first sign comes with
the advent of the faculty of imagination; through imagination, a sensation calls up an idea
whose original sensation bears a relation of simultaneity, succession, or analogy with the
former. Degérando, like Condillac, gives a coherent story of the evolution of mental faculties
and of the genesis of signs. On the other hand, his account is not free from problems. One of
the problems concerns the validity of his evolutionary sequence of mental operations,
especially seen from our modern perspective. For example, reminiscence and memory, as
defined by both Condillac and Degérando, belong to the now more generic term memory,
which involves retrieving in two modes, namely, recognition and recall (see Eysenck &
Keane 2015: 242). Besides, memory in the contemporary sense is much more fundamental
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than Condillac and Degérando conceive. According to some modern systems theory of
memory, even information passing through the senses involve a kind of memory, sensory
store, such as visual store or iconic memory for seeing and acoustic store or echoic memory
for hearing (see Eysenck & Keane 2015: 192-193). More importantly, the faculty of
imagination, in order to invoke an image, presupposes the existence of the image in the mind,
which, in turn, requires memory, i.e., the storing and retrieving of the image. This is even
more the case in associating, in which one sensation excites a relevant image.
The birth of the first signs takes more mental faculties than Degérando claims.
Degérando defines the sign as “any sensations which excite in us an idea, by virtue of the
connection which reigns between them” (1800 1: 63). Degérando offers three examples at
this point: the smell of a rose as a sign of the ideas of its color and form; the sight of
lightning as a sign of the idea of thunder; the sight of a house as a sign of the idea of those
who live in it and of the enjoyments I have perhaps tasted under its roof. Of the three
examples, the first seems to be more basic than the second, and the second more basic than
the third. In terms of the three principles of association, namely, simultaneity, succession,
and analogy, the first example arises from simultaneity, and the second from immediate
succession. The third possibly arises from the combination of two connections: one largely
of simultaneity between, on the one hand, people who live in the house or the enjoyments I
have tasted in it and, on the other, the look of the inside of the house; the other between the
look of the house viewed from the inside and that viewed from the outside. Degérando
attributes the sign-relation solely to imagination, which he defines as the faculty that
reproduces an image (1800 1: 32) while Condillac defines as the faculty to recall a
perception on sensing an object (2001: 27). For Degérando, an image is reproduced through
a process of association triggered by an act of sensation. This explanation, however, is an
oversimplified version of a three-stage phenomenon: sensing something; forming an image;
associating the image with another image. This still does not exhaust the explanation,
because it does not explain how the act of associating is possible and how the two images
emerge and exist. The act of associating entails a preceding act of perceiving or judging of
the connection between two things. All the acts involved in this process are founded on
memory: storing and retrieving of an image. Let us put in more briefly. The three examples
Degérando cites all belong to the recollective sign, and as analyzed in Section 3.1.2, a
recollective sign entails four phases: a connection between two perceptible things established
by nature; an act of perceiving of the natural connection; an act of memorizing of the
perception; an act of recollecting of one of the two things on sensing the other perceptible
thing. Overall, the first signs require at least three faculties of the mind: perception, memory,
and imagination. In more complicated sign phenomena, more faculties are necessary, such as
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reasoning. In terms of the demands on mental faculties, a phenomenon grounded on a
connection by simultaneity is simpler than that of a connection by succession; a phenomenon
grounded on a connection by immediate succession is simpler than that of a connection by
markedly separated succession, or than that of a connection by analogy. Connection by
simultaneity might take only one act of perceiving in which two things are perceived as a
whole. On seeing a tree, one might perceive, at one single sight, a whole picture of the trunk,
branches, and leaves. Presented with a rose, one captures at once its smell, its form, and its
color. Connection by immediate succession, such as lightning followed by thunder, takes two
acts of perceptions and a judgment of the connection. It is only that when the two things
occur immediately after each other, the judgement is somewhat pressed onto one’s mind.
Connection by markedly separated succession also takes two perceptions and a judgment of
the connection, but the judgement comes into being only when one repeatedly notices the
two things and make deliberate efforts to link them up. Take for example the halo as a sign of
rain. The two phenomena are separated by one night, and thus one might experience them for
many times without making a connection between them. Connection by analogy is like the
case of connection by markedly separated succession, in that it also takes two perceptions
and a judgement that needs deliberate efforts. It is only that the efforts taken in the former
case are usually slighter in comparison with the latter case, because the judgment in the
former case has the aid from analogy. In more complicated cases, such as the third example
cited by Degérando, the judgement of the connection might take a chain of judgments, i.e.,
reasoning. Besides, for all of the above cases, the fourth phase, namely, the act of
recollecting, might be spontaneous, when the memory is engraved, or deliberate, when the
memory is not engraved. What’s more, in some cases, this phase takes more than an act of
recollecting; it occasionally takes an act of inferring. This is probably the case with the
following example cited by Peirce (CP 2.304): A piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it is an
index of a shot. In a word, the first signs that appeared in the world are probably recollective
signs, which emerge only after the equipment of such mental faculties as perception, memory,
imagination, and even reasoning.
If the evolutionary order of signs, as we hypothesized, tends to respect that of semiosic
competence, recollective signs would also display an evolutionary order between its
subtypes. In accordance with their demands on mental faculties, recollective signs founded
on a connection by simultaneity probably come before those by immediate succession, and
those by immediate succession probably come before those by markedly separated
succession and those by analogy. Of those recollective signs founded on a connection by
succession, those of something in the future probably come before those of something in the
past, because the latter needs an added step, namely, to infer from an observed sequence to
116

its reverse sequence. For instance, after observing heavy clouds followed by raining, it
would be easy to infer an impending rain from heavy clouds one sees on a later day. By
comparison, to infer from a raining that there were heavy clouds earlier requires an added act
of inferring that reverses the sequence between heavy clouds and raining. There is need to
add that the evolutionary order of recollective signs does not equal the order of signs
reflected in sign statements made by philosophers or semioticians in the past. The latter order
is determined by the prototypicality of various subtypes of recollective signs and, more
directly, their prominence in the eyes of semioticians. It probably begins with those with a
strikingly high revealing function and those familiar and common. Consequently, the two are
likely to differ. For instance, as for the various subtypes of recollective signs, the
evolutionary order is probably like this: signs by simultaneity, signs by immediate succession,
signs by markedly separated succession or by analogy. In contrast, as pointed out in Section
3.3.3, the order implied in sign statements is like this: signs of something in the future (as
early as Mesopotamia), signs of something in the past (by Empiricus between the 2nd and the
3rd century), signs by something similar (by Roger Bacon in the 13th century), and signs of
something at present (by Langer in the 20th century). The latter order is such, probably for
the following reason. Signs of something in the future are common, and tend to have the
greatest revealing function. They often reveal something vital or fairly important to a subject,
such as things related to weather, danger, disaster, war, and human fate. Signs of something
at present are extremely rare, among which some reveal something not very significant for a
subject. One of the rare examples, cited by Langer (1948: 46), says that a patter on the roof is
a sign of raining. An approximate example is the one cited above by Degérando, saying that
the smell of a rose is a sign of the ideas of its color and form. Both examples reveal
something not very dramatic; the latter, in particular, hardly influences the subject’s
existence or ensuing actions. Signs of something in the past are, theoretically speaking, as
common as those of the future, as they are merely the reverse of each other; however, they
have the least revealing function, because something in the past are only indirectly useful to
a subject’s existence or ensuing actions. Signs by analogy tend to have a greater revealing
function than those of something in the past, in that the former directly reveals something not
present. However, they are much less common---we could enumerate their examples with
one hand, such as mirror, photo, and painting---though perhaps still more common than those
of something in the present.
ii. From recollective signs to indicative signs
The transition from the recollective sign to the indicative sign is only a natural step. As
discussed in Section 3.1.2, much like the recollective signs, indicative signs also entail four
major phases: a connection between a perceptible thing and an imperceptible thing
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established by nature; an act of experiencing of the natural connection; an act of memorizing
of the experience; an act of recollecting of the imperceptible thing from the perceptible thing.
The major difference lies with the second phase. Unlike recollective signs, indicative signs
link up a perceptible thing and an imperceptible thing. This is no easy task, and entails
several stages. The perceptible thing is easy to experience. When it happens to oneself, the
subject could observe it indirectly, and feel the physiological reactions while externalizing it;
when it happens not to oneself, the subject could observe it directly. The imperceptible thing
is a headache. It cannot be directly perceived, nor could it be felt wholly. The imperceptible
thing might exist within the body of a subject of a sign phenomenon, or within the body of
an organism under observation by the subject. In some cases, it could take much effort and
many a step to experience it; in other cases, it could be experienced, partly, with less effort.
For the imperceptible thing to be experienced, something mediatory is necessary: Either it
triggers some internal physiological reactions that can be felt by the subject; or it triggers
some observable, external behavior by an organism under observation. As cited in Section
3.1.2, the former is well exemplified by a cold, which is likely to trigger a set of
physiological reactions, such as fever, fatigue, headache, stuffy nose, sore throat, chest
discomfort, and muscle aches; the latter could be exemplified by a shame, which is likely to
trigger a set of external bodily manifestations---head lowered, eyebrows arching outward,
eyes looking down, mouth dropping, face or neck flushing, voice lowered or slowed,
stuttering or speechless, etc.. Both means are not adequate to attain to the imperceptible thing.
In the former case, having felt the set of physiological reactions, the subject still needs to
take another step: to realize that there is something more than these reactions, and that all
these reactions combine to form a whole, internal state of affairs. The latter case takes even
more steps. What the latter means achieves is merely a set of overt behavior. To attain to an
imperceptible thing, one needs to know that they are triggered by an imperceptible thing.
Nevertheless, there is no way to know such a triggering process since it happens within the
body of other people, except with the aid of modern technology. Without such aid, the
simplest way may be the one suggested by Degérando. Degérando (1800 1: 111) suggests the
following path to the first mutual understandings between organisms: Observing actions
similar to one’s own, a person thinks of the needs that inspire his or her own actions, and
thereby guesses the thought of the other organism. The above route could be extended to the
topic under discussion: Observing a set of overt behavior of another person, we think of
similar behavior of our own as well as the internal states of our body triggering such
behavior, and thereby guess the other’s internal state. After seeing a set of bodily
manifestations of shame in an organism, for instance, the subject thinks of similar situations
he or she experiences, and forms the belief that the bodily manifestations result from an
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internal state within the organism. The above route is feasible when the imperceptible thing
triggers both apparent bodily manifestations and physiological reactions. As listed in Section
3.1.1, the imperceptible thing in indicative signs falls into three major groups: internal
conditions of the body, characters and dispositions, emotions and feelings. The above
requirement is well met by most phenomena of the third group, but not so well by some of
the first two groups. The situation gets more complicated when the imperceptible thing does
not trigger marked physiological reactions within the body. Characters and dispositions, for
instance, unlike emotions and feelings, are long-term phenomena. In such cases, no
sympathy comes to the subject’s aid. After seeing some bodily manifestations, the subject
has to rely on knowledge gleaned indirectly from other experiences. For another instance, it
takes quite a few steps to attain to such an imperceptible thing as a wound in the lung. After
cognizing a perceptible thing and an imperceptible thing involved in an indicative sign, the
next step to do is to link them up. As analyzed above, the two things enter into connection
through a mediatory stage, which unfolds on two possible paths. On one path, a subject feels
some physiological reactions (Y’) relevant to the perceptible thing; he or she feels a set of
physiological reactions (X’) relevant to the imperceptible thing; he or she then forms a belief
in the connection between Y’ and X’, on the basis of the contiguity of the two feelings. On
the other path, a subject observes the perceptible thing (Y); he or she observes a set of overt
behavior (X’’) relevant to the imperceptible thing; he or she then forms a belief in the
connection between Y and X’’, on the basis of the contiguity between the two observations.
On the first path, the subject then extends Y’ to Y, by sensing the externalized Y, such as
hearing the sound of coughing one makes; he or she also infers X from X’, by feeling or
judging that the set of physiological reactions (X’) constitute part of a more complete internal
state (X); finally, he or she links up Y and X through the connection between Y’ and X’. On
the second path, the subject then infers from the set of external behavior (X’’) a
corresponding set of internal physiological reactions (X’), by virtue of sympathy or some
indirect knowledge; he or she also infers X from X’, by feeling or judging that the set of
physiological reactions (X’) constitute part of a more complete internal state (X); finally, he
or she links up Y and X through the connection between Y and X’’. Thus forms the second of
the four phases that make up an indicative sign, and phase that differentiates indicative signs
from recollective signs.
Indicative signs are probably evolutionarily later than recollective signs. First of all,
indicative signs take more steps and more mental faculties than recollective signs. Apart
from mental faculties required by other three phases, such as perception, memory, and
imagination, the second phase of indicative signs often requires internal perception and
sympathy. Complicated indicative signs often need abstract and complex knowledge for
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complicated reasoning, as is the case with most symptomatic signs. While a great part of
signs of emotions or feelings are relatively easy to form, most of other indicative signs, such
as physiognomic signs and symptoms, are hard to realize. In terms of the mental faculties
and cognitive effort need, indicative signs are much more demanding than recollective signs,
and thus are probably evolutionarily more advanced. Second, when realized, recollective
signs offer surer knowledge than indicative signs. Due to its elusive imperceptible relatum,
indicative signs are largely based on a vague feeling and on guesswork, involving not
“judgments of evidence,” but “beliefs” that could go awry---in the terms of Degérando (1800
1: 41). Third, compared with recollective signs, indicative signs represent a step toward the
first quest for underlying causes. There is a step away from seeing something as a
recollective sign and seeing something as an indicative sign. Suppose a roaming lion comes
to another lion’s territory and sees the latter lowering its eyebrows, bulging its eyes, pressing
its lips, and baring its teeth. There is a difference between seeing these manifestations as a
recollective sign of a possible attack and seeing them as an indicative sign of anger or threat.
The former only takes perception and memory, whereas the latter takes much more. In the
former case, the animal’s behavior is much like successive changes occurring in nature,
whereas in the latter case it is interpreted as reactions by a real “living being.” In this sense,
it is likely that animals could only attain a vague intuition of indicative signs. Fourth, the
evolution from recollective signs to indicative signs is natural in still another sense.
Recollective signs emerge from the need to know about the physical world we live in, to
know how its affect our existence or ensuing actions. Indicative signs emerge from the need
to know about our own body or other organisms, to know how our body or other organisms
would impinge upon our existence and ensuing actions. As Degérando puts it, “the man
begins by studying all that surrounds him, before thinking of studying himself” (1800 2: 250).
We first turn our eyes to the physical world, then to our own body, and then to other living
beings. In the first stage, even living beings are construed as physical things; in the third
stage, living beings are treated as living beings. In brief, indicative signs represent an
evolutionary step forward to more advanced and more complicated signs, to more uncertain
signs; they enable the first understandings of living beings; they represent our continued
quest for knowledge of things that affect our existence and future practice.
iii. Birth of first instituted signs
The birth of instituted signs has been best portrayed by Degérando, though others’
accounts complement his to a great extent. A more critical and fuller account may be as
follows.
From understanding to communicating. The transition from natural signs proper to
instituted signs entails two linchpins: transition from the intent to understand to the intent to
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communicate; transition from utilizing a natural connection to instituting a connection.
On the first transition, Degérando (1800 1: 111-115) offers a reasonable account. This
account portrays a three-step route: to be able to understand another person’s thoughts; to
notice oneself understood; to intend to make oneself known. Seeing certain actions of a
companion, one thinks of his or her own similar actions, from which he or she thinks of the
state the companion is in, including the time, needs, or motives that have caused the actions
of the companion. He or she attributes the state to the companion, hence an understanding of
the actions of the latter. This process also applies to the companion, enabling the companion
to understand his or her actions. Having understood one another, they will follow one
another’s activities. For instance, on seeing the companion running away, one construes the
act as resulting from a ferocious beast, and flees too. The other day, when one sees a beast
and flees quickly, and notices the companion running like him or her, he or she comes to
know that he or she has been understood by the companion. On the discovery that he or she
could be understood by the companion, he and she would seek to be understood, i.e., to
communicate something. This urge gets stronger for people who feel weak, because they
would hope to procure help in work, relief in pains, or support in dangers.
From utilizing a natural connection to instituting a connection. The first and simplest
means to communicate is to show by doing. In On the Teacher, Augustine raises the question
of whether it is possible to communicate without signs, and discusses the case of showing by
doing (see Cary 2008: 93-94). One example Augustine cites is this: A birdcatcher might
teach us what birdcatching is by silently but deliberately practicing his or her craft in front of
our eyes. Another example is for one to demonstrate what walking is by starting to walk, or
by walking faster if he or she is already walking. Degérando raises a similar version, i.e., to
reproduce “those actions by which he had had the happiness to be understood” (1800 1: 115).
The two scholars differ on three points. Augustine means to talk about the possibility to
communicate without signs; he counts the means out of signs; in diction, he uses such words
as “show,” “demonstrate,” and “do.” In contrast, Degérando is concerned with the evolution
of various kinds of signs; he regards those simulating actions as signs that constitute the
language of nature; in diction, he uses such words as “repeating” and “reproducing.” It is
reasonable to treat the means or the actions as a kind of sign; yet Degérando’s account is still
oversimplified. Let us have a closer look at how this phenomenon emerges. As mentioned
above by Degérando, by observing each other’s actions, and then recalling the external and
internal states accompanying one’s own similar actions, two people would be able to
understand each other, and become aware of this understanding. Realizing that they can
understand each other and that both of them know this, they come to form the intent to
communicate with each other. The first means available to them at the time is the very
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actions that made them understand each other earlier. Utilization of such a means may fall
into three steps or situations. In the first step, one attaches to an action another intent, i.e., to
show the action to others. In this case, the action performs double functions: praxis and
communication. In the second step, one develops the capacity and habit to perform an action,
when needs arise, for the sole purpose of showing the action to others. In this step, the agent
actually “reproduces” the action, as Degérando puts it. In the first two steps, the agent does
not manifest the intent to communicate, and the receiver is likely to fail to discern the intent.
We may dub the acts in these two steps covert teaching by doing. In such acts, we have a
case of covert communicating. The second step would probably transit immediately to the
third step, on three realizations on the part of the agent. First, he or she realizes that it is
enough to reproduce only part of the action. Second, switching from praxis to
communicating, he or she realizes that it is necessary to preface the action with a signal to
draw the attention of the intended receiver. Third, he or she realizes that he or she had better
make the simulated action differ from the original action, by abbreviating it, exaggerating it,
changing its speed, etc.. Hence, the third step. In the third step, one shows an action to others
by reproducing part of it and, occasionally, by modifying it a bit, typically after emitting a
signal to arouse the receiver’s attention. We may dub such an act overt teaching by doing. In
such an act, we have a case of overt communicating. It must be added here that the third step
has already had recourse to certain types of instituted signs to be discussed below. Since the
three steps mentioned above all use an action, complete or abbreviated, to show an action, let
us call the former action a sign of action, to avert possible ambiguities surrounding
Degérando’s term language of nature. The means to communicate via showing by doing,
however, soon proves to be insufficient. This means applies only to situations where one
seeks to let another know what a certain action is like. It does not apply to situations where
the thing to communicate is not an action, but a living being, a thing, a quality, a relation, a
scenario, etc.. Even when the thing to communicate is an action, the means does not work
well if the action is hard to reproduce. Worst of all, this means is gravely equivocal or
ambiguous (Degérando 1800 1: 116). Augustine already notices the ambiguity inherent in
this means: One would wonder whether the demonstration by walking means “walking,”
“starting to walking,” or “walking faster” (see Cary 2008: 93).
When the above means does not work well, there is no direct experience available for
communicating. In such a case, we have to use something new to manifest the thing to
communicate, by instituting a relation between them, hence the birth of an instituted sign.
The first means to communicate via instituted signs can be attributed to Degérando’s (1800 1:
117-118) indicator. This means serves to communicate something that is at once present and
sensible for both parties of a communication. Degérando remarks that one can communicate
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such a thing, by exciting another one’s attention with a shout and then directing the attention
to the thing with a finger or a wand. On closer examination, however, there is a simpler
situation than Degérando conceives: The two fellows have each other in vision. Under such a
circumstance, the prefacing shout is not necessary. All that is needed is a sign to direct one’s
attention, by pointing with a finger or a wand, by moving eyes or the mouth, by tilting head,
etc.. So to speak, the kernel of an indicator in Degérando’s sense is the pointing gesture; the
shouting is supplementary. In indicators, the cry and the gestures do not result from the
present and sensible thing, nor are they contiguous with the latter in space or time. The two
relata have no natural connection between them. The connection is instituted. The shout and
the gestures in such events are probably the simplest and the most basic form of instituted
sign. Before closing this paragraph, let us add some remarks about the name and nature of
the indicator. Indicator sounds similar to indication (e.g., Husserl 2001[1970]: 183), another
term for a kind of sign, but they are actually different. The indicators, unlike Husserl’s (2001
[1970]: 184) indications, do not motivate a belief in the reality of the thing pointed at. On the
other hand, pointing gestures designated by indicator are subsumed under index by Peirce
(CP 2.286; W 5:379), for the reason that they are “dynamically connected with” the thing
pointed at (CP 2.305), and that the two relata have “a real relation” (W 5:379). However,
Peirce’s index is a melting pot comprising natural signs, physical symptoms, pointing
gestures, and linguistic signs including deictic words and proper names. The dynamic
connection or real relation in Peirce’s eyes cannot possibly equal a naturally established
connection. No matter whether Peirce’s theory of index is reliable or not, his account of
pointing gestures does not prove that they are by nature natural. Instead, a pointing gesture is
produced, and it is produced not because the thing pointed at causes it. The connection
between the two relata are instituted, when it comes into being for the first time, hence its
nature as an instituted sign. Degérando also makes an odd statement on indicators, treating
them as one of the three subtypes of the language of analogy. Pointing gestures, including
their prefacing shouts, however, bears little analogy to the thing pointed at.
A more complicated situation is to communicate something sensible but not present for
the receiver. One can communicate such a thing by imitating it---its cries or motions if it is a
living being (Condillac 2001: 115; Degérando 1800 1: 119), or its sound or shape or color if
it is an object or a state of thing (Ding 2006: 170). Degérando (1800 1: 119) calls these tools
imitators. Degérando predicates their effectiveness on two points: One is “that they
reproduce a part of the sensations which the object itself would excite if it were present, and
that by that they awaken the image of all the others”; the other is “that it is taken only for a
game and not for a reality” (1800 1: 119). These two points remind us of the third stage of
showing by doing. As mentioned there, an act of overt teaching by doing tends to involve
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three characteristics: reproducing part of an action, making modifications on the original
action, and prefacing with a signal for attention. Of these three characteristics, the third
needs an indicator whereas the first needs an imitator. It is only that, at that point, what is
imitated is restricted to actions. Brandon and Hornstein (1986) as well as Keller (1998:
144-145) also confine themselves to actions. They also stress the need to make the imitating
action distinguishable from the imitated action. Brandon and Hornstein (1986) emphasize the
need for the sender to exaggerate, stylize, and articulate certain features of the preceding
behavior to avert misunderstanding on the part of the receiver. Keller (1998: 144-145) makes
a point of the necessity for the imitating action to differ from the real symptomatic action.
All these conditions serve to let the receiver know that it is a “game” instead of a “reality.”
These scholars, however, overplay this point, and neglect the phenomena of pretend actions
by animals and humans. Pretend actions are common in nature and in the human world:
small animals feigning death before predators (Ding 2016: 172); a person bending down to
the ground pretending to pick up a stone, or raising one’s hand to pretend a strike (Keller
1998: 113-114). Such actions apparently, are not meant to be different from the imitated
actions or states. Instead, they are meant to be as close as possible to the imitated thing. In
the example offered by Ding, the small animal would expend every effort needed to make
the imitating look real. In the two examples cited by Keller, the person would make the
initial part of the action look as real as possible, and, when it is adequate to produce the
intended effort, omit the remaining parts of the action. In summary, imitators serve to
communicate something sensible but not present for the receiver. The thing to communicate
could be an action, a state of affair, a living being, a static object, a scenario, etc.. In some
cases, the imitation closely resembles its target, for the purpose of certain covert
communication; in other cases, the imitation is made deliberately different from the target,
for the purpose of certain overt communication and of less effort.
A still more complicated situation, as noted by Degérando (1800 1: 117-121), is to
communicate something that escapes the senses of the receiver, such as desires, regrets,
pleasures, pains, judgments, and doubts. Since such a thing is not before the eyes of both
parties, indicators are helpless; since it is not sensible, there are no sensible qualities to
imitate, hence the uselessness of imitators. The only way out is to employ some sensible
means to approximate certain prominent features of the imperceptible thing. For example,
we may manifest the shift of attention with the looking and stopping of the eye, manifest a
judgment balancing two thoughts with the act of weighing two bodies with two hands, and
manifest lively passions, fights, or contentment of the mind with a picture of a flame, a storm,
or a serene sky. Degérando (1800 1: 121) calls such means figurative signs. At this point,
Degérando’s account is not exhaustive. He neglects those phenomena related to indicative
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signs mentioned earlier, such as internal bodily conditions, emotions, feelings, dispositions,
and characters. These things are not sensible for the receiver, but partly sensible for the
sender; more importantly, they naturally display themselves via visible bodily reactions. To
communicate these things, the sender also resorts to imitation. Unlike imitators, however,
these phenomena are only indirectly sensible; the sender does not imitate the phenomena
directly, but imitate the bodily reactions caused by them. Thus, it is better to classify things
escaping the senses of the receiver into two groups: one group not sensible to the sender as
well as the receiver; the other group partly sensible to the sender and causing sensible bodily
reactions. Both groups need the means of imitation for communication, and both lack a
sensible template for direct imitation. The only difference is that the latter group could
imitate the bodily reactions caused by them, whereas the former group has to use some
physical phenomena to approximate some of their features. Degérando (1800 1: 121) also
notes the role indicators play in the function of figurative signs: An indicator helps make
clear that the figurative sign describes something mental instead of an external object.
Compared with the preceding means to communicate, figurative signs are make-do means,
and are much less adequate or efficient. Their efficacy decreases drastically with the
increment of the complexity and abstractness of the mental entities, hence the necessity for
other kinds of signs. Indicators, imitators, and figurative signs combine to constitute what
Degérando calls the language of analogy, the second language to communicate something.
Let us give an overview of this section. This section deals with the birth of
communicating, by means of signs of action, and the birth of instituted signs. The first
instituted signs include indicators, imitators, part of which are signs of actions, and figurative
signs. These first instituted signs have several features. First, they appear to be more like
natural signs, though they are actually instituted signs. These signs are instituted, in the sense
that their sign-relation is instituted when it comes into being for the first time. Pointing
gestures, imitative acts, and figurative acts are nowhere to find in nature when they first
show up. On the other hand, they are so produced as to point to or imitate something in
nature. Once produced, they become connected with the object by contiguity or resemblance.
On receiving these signs, a receiver could understand the connection without pre-learning.
So to speak, the three kinds of signs are instituted signs produced on the basis of natural
connections. Having been produced and instituted, indicators are spatially contiguous with
the thing pointed at; imitators and figurative signs are analogous with the object. They are
signs that are covertly instituted and apparently natural. Let us call them covertly instituted
signs. Below we will come across covertly instituted signs that are more fully-grown and
those that are reduced, overtly instituted signs that are partly motivated and those that are not
motivated. From the first kind to the last, the receiver needs an increasing amount of training
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to discern the connection involved. Second, these instituted signs largely resort to means
stemming from part of the body of an organism. Indicators are generally gestures made by
the fingers, the eyes, the mouth, or the head, prefaced occasionally by a sound made by the
voice. Imitators and figurative signs are mainly gestures made by hands, or sounds made by
the voice. These instituted signs mainly rely on two means produced by the body: vocal
sound and bodily motions. In Jakobson’s (1971: 661) parlance, these signs all involve the
“bodily production of signs” rather than “instrumental production of signs.” In a word, they
are bodily signs. Third, these signs are mainly signs of simple and concrete things or actions
rather than complex and abstract concepts. Indicators and imitators both apply to sensible
things, animals, actions, etc.. Figurative signs apply to imperceptible things with features that
could be approximated by some sound or bodily motion. The more abstract or complex, the
harder it will be to spot such a feature. A great proportion of complex and abstract concepts
is beyond figurative signs, and has to wait for a later comer---arbitrary signs. However, the
three kinds of signs are sufficient for daily communication, especially for ancients armed
with few complex and abstract concepts. Fourth, the efficacy of these signs is restricted in
several senses. The first communicators tend to rest content to foreground and make known
an object to their nearby companions, and only for the nonce. As a result, they do not have a
stable form; the sender tends to utter a sound or make a gesture all anew; the sound or
gesture produced tends to vary with organisms and with situations, tends to be fuzzy and
ambiguous, and tends to be poor at describing the object and distinguishing between like
objects. Besides, resorting to bodily devices, these signs function only when the sender and
the receiver are together in the same situation and only when they are within each other’s
sight or hearing.
The evolutionary order of the above kinds of signs is such for three reasons. The signs
of action, as the first means to communicate, emerge prior to instituted signs, because the
latter takes more steps, the crucial one being to institute a brand-new connection that cannot
be observed in nature. As the first three means for instituted signs, indicators, imitators, and
figurative signs come one after another, first because they take increasingly more steps to
experience the object to communicate. Something sensible and present is obviously easy to
perceive than something sensible yet absent, and they are obviously easier to experience than
something imperceptible. The chasm between the first two and the third, i.e., between
something perceptible and something imperceptible, is exactly the same as that between
recollective signs and indicative signs mentioned earlier. As Degérando puts it, “the first
conversations by which man tries to communicate with his fellow man, also relate only to
external objects […] But soon […]. It is no longer enough to make an object known, it is
necessary to announce how it relates to our well-being” (1800 2: 251). Another reason is that
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indicators obviously take fewer steps to accomplish than imitators, and so are imitators in
relation to figurative signs. A third reason is that the latter two both need the aid of an
indicator: To communicate something sensible but not present with an imitator requires a
pointing gesture toward the place of the absent thing; to communicate something
imperceptible with a figurative sign requires a pointing gesture toward the brain or part of
the body.
iv. From first instituted signs to more fully-grown analogous signs
Apart from the means to show by doing, indicators, imitators and figurative signs offer
the basic means to communicate. As mentioned above, they are covertly instituted,
apparently natural, bodily means to communicate something for the nonce, with no stable or
agreed form serving repeated future use. The first indicators, imitators, and figurative signs
emerge between two organisms that are together at the same spot. The two are only supposed
to foreground and make known the object to the companion for the nonce. What they care
about is “the momentary efficacy of the signs,” that is, “the fidelity with which their fellows
responded to their intentions, and the prompt and certain execution of the actions”
(Degérando 1800 1: 213). In addition, imitative sounds or motions are by nature something
continuous and full of details. They function well, as long as they include enough details for
the recognition of the similarity between the means and the object. In Degérando’s (1800 1:
215) words, analogous signs often dispense with details that correspond to those of the idea
to convey. Moreover, the first users of these signs must have lived in a shared circumstance,
which was simple and varied little; thus, they could “get along half-heatedly” (Degérando
1800 1: 214), and a simple clue would be sufficient for a successful communication. As a
result, the produced sound or motion is prone to resemble some feature of the object but not
necessarily the most unique one, to crudely approximate the chosen feature rather than
faithfully reproduce it, and to have a markedly personal tint and improvisatory flavor.
Changes occur with three novel developments in communication. The first development
lies in the expansion of the scope of things to communicate. With the development of
transportation and of society, a greater number of things come into people’s life and require
communicating. This raises an increasingly high demand on the capacity for each sign to
discriminate between objects, including like objects. Imitative means are poor at
discriminating between things. Objects, particularly similar objects, are likely to share
features; accordingly, an imitation targeted at one object might apply as well to other objects.
This is compounded by those first inventors and users of imitative sounds or motions, who
tend to resort to elliptical, fuzzy, variable, and personalized forms. To meet the need to
discriminate more and more objects, each imitative sound or motion must be more than
adequate for successful communication; it must resemble its object fairly closely. As
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Degérando (1800 1: 216) remarks, the more the resemblance is complete, the less likely
objects will be confused under the same sign. In a word, with the increasing need to
communicate more objects, each and every sign must be in itself more complete and exact.
The second development in communication lies in the expansion of the scope of
participants: from the original two participants to other people, or to more people. Along
with this change, the relations uniting two individuals become more loose, and the
circumstances of their lives less analogous; thus, they have to add something to the signs in
order to better determine their meaning (Degérando 1800 1: 215). In other words, to
compensate for the loss in shared living surroundings and ideas, they have to make the signs
closer to the object to communicate. Ellipsis, fuzziness, and personal tint now give way to
the guaranteed success of communication. The sender has to imitate the object more
completely and more closely, and choose the most distinguishing feature that most people
prefer; alternatively, they would make more imitations on various aspects of the object. This
does not mean, of course, that the sender needs to reproduce the targeted object fully, as he
or she would still seek to save effort on the condition that the success of communication is
ensured. What this means is that the first instituted signs underwent a shift from an initially
extremely elliptical, fuzzy, variable, and personalized form to a much more complete, exact,
stable, and standardized form.
The third development in communication lies in the need to communicate something
between people separated in space or/and time. As mentioned above, the first instituted signs
resort mainly to bodily means, and apply to situations where the sender and the receiver are
together at the same spot and within each other’s sight or hearing. Such restricted
communication soon lags behind the development of society which requires communication
between people separated in space or/and time. Separated in space or/and time, the
participants have less in common; instead, they are more varied. Communication between
such people requires that the sign be sufficiently close to the object to ensure success in
communication. Like the second development in communication, this one raises a greater
need for the shift from the first instituted signs that are elliptical, fuzzy, variable, and
personalized to more complete, exact, stable, and standardized instituted signs.
Interestingly, this third development itself brings about novel means some of which
meet the requirements the development raises. This novel means is non-bodily signs. Bodily
signs, elliptical or more fully-grown, rely on sounds made by the voice or motions made by
the body. As regards space, they are effective only within the range of sight or hearing. As
regards time, both sounds and bodily motions are transient and thus do not last long. Bodily
signs are inadequate for communication between people separated by space or/and time,
hence the need for non-bodily signs. Bodily signs are produced directly by part of the body
128

of an organism. Let us call all other instituted signs non-bodily signs. To be more exact, by
non-bodily signs, we mean those instituted signs that use something physical, natural or
artificial, as a sign vehicle, or those that use such a physical thing to produce a sound or a
flash of light that acts as a sign vehicle. Like bodily signs, non-bodily signs also involve
work done by part of the body of an organism. Unlike bodily signs, the work done by the
body does not give direct rise to a sign vehicle, but a physical object that acts as a sign
vehicle or a physical object that produces something that acts as a sign vehicle. So
non-bodily signs appear to be directly related to a physical object, than to the body of an
organism, though it implicitly involves the latter. For instance, we may use as a sign vehicle
a natural object, such as a stone, a tree, a leaf, and a pottered-flower; we may also produce
something physical, such as a smoke, fire, flare, painting, picture, and character, and use it as
a sign vehicle. Alternatively, we may use something natural, such as a leaf or a horn, or
something produced, such as a drum, siren, whistle, beacon, lamp, or a torch, to make a
sound or a flash of light that acts as a sign vehicle. In the former group of examples, we
ultimately have a physical object that acts as a sign vehicle; in the latter group, we have a
physical instrument that produces a sign vehicle. Compared with bodily signs that are
transient and reach a short distance, the former group offers a sign vehicle that lasts long and
can be transported elsewhere, so that a receiver later in time or at a distance could still
perceive the vehicle. The second group, like bodily signs, tends to make transient messages;
however, with the intermediary of the physical instrument, they enjoy one special advantage:
The physical instrument tends to be so deliberately chosen as to be able to make a sound or a
flash of light that travels farther than those made by bodily signs, thus enabling
telecommunication. In a word, non-bodily signs enable communication between people
separated by space or/and time.
Of the non-bodily signs, the most contiguous with the first instituted signs must be
carving and drawing. Most examples of non-bodily signs mentioned above are apparently
instituted, and come with the advent of arbitrary consciousness. Carving and drawing, in
contrast, are highly motivated, and are probably the earliest batch of non-bodily signs. Like
imitators and figurative signs, carvings and drawings communicate things through imitation.
Early carvings and drawings are effective within a short distance, because they are generally
adhered to something immobile, such as the ground, a wall, or a tree. Later, when they are
applied to a transportable vehicle, such a piece of stone, shell, bark, parchment, etc., they are
able to communicate things across a long distance. There is only one minor step away from
imitators and figurative signs to carvings and drawings: from bodily means to non-bodily
means. Yet this minor step does make a difference. The first is the above-mentioned
advantage of non-bodily signs. Though not travelling far, carvings and drawings last long,
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and thus can be received by many a people separated by time; that is to say, the maker and
the receiver do not need to be co-present. As Degérando notes, “Speech and gesture lasted
only an instant, and they ceased with thought; but the drawing survived it; it survived the
man himself, and through its means a century could converse with a century that follows”
(1800 2: 382-383). The second advantage is that carving and drawing offer the most
complete and exact means to imitate an object. As Degérando puts it, “The analogies of the
language of action and speech were sometimes insufficient, especially when it came to
describing new or very complicated objects; but the drawing, much richer in its means,
completed the description which those had only sketched” (1800 2: 383). Drawing, as
Degérando says, has “the advantage of being able to imitate, in a much more complete and
more exact manner, dimensions and forms” (1800 2: 389). Moreover, as something physical,
drawings have a greater potential than the earlier signs to become stable and standardized.
Drawing represents a mediatory stage. On the one hand, it inherits the first instituted signs in
communicating by imitating, and reaches the apex in the potential to offer a more complete,
exact, stable, and standardized means to imitate something. With this potential, it conduces
to the three novel developments in communication: to communication of more things, in that
it is best at discriminating between objects; to communication between other people or more
people, in that they are the most self-sufficient and the least context- or subject-dependent; to
communication separated by space or/and time, in that they possess materiality that lasts
long. On the other hand, it also represents a stride forward, ushering in the non-bodily signs.
Thus concludes the transition from the first instituted signs to more fully-grown analogous
signs.
v. From more fully-grown analogous signs to reduced analogous signs
After ensuring success in communication of various requirements---such as face-to-face
communication, communication of more and more things, communication between more and
more people, and communication across space or/and time---the participants begin to quest
for more. Degérando lists “four motives that direct men in their choice and use of signs”:
convenience, promptness, security of communication, and the disposition of the user (1800 2:
448). Apart from the quest for successful communication, the most important motive is to
save effort. This quest is fundamental to a rational animal. A rational animal expends its
effort for a purpose. It pursues a goal for its potential gain as against its necessary cost. It
seeks to obtain an end with little effort. The quest to save effort is actually at work all the
time. It is the very reason why the first instituted signs tend to be extremely elliptical and
fuzzy. It is also the very reason why the more fully-grown analogous signs would not go as
far as to reproduce the object fully. Instead, they increase the degree of analogy, only to the
extent that they are adequate for the three novel developments in communication.
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So what is the influence of the quest to save effort on the more fully-grown analogous
signs after they come into being? It causes the reduction of analogy between a sign vehicle
and its object. The trigger of the reduction is a fourth development in communication, i.e.,
recurring communication of the same object. Unlike the previous three developments in
communication, recurring communication does not raise more requirements to secure the
success of communication. Rather, it has more to do with the quest for convenience and
promptness. To put it briefly, recurring communication demands that a sign vehicle be simple
and easy to reproduce. This requirement only affects the more fully-grown analogous signs,
which tend to be more complete, exact, stable, and standardized. To meet the requirement to
be simple and easy to produce, it is necessary to make the sign vehicle less complete yet
more exact, stable, and standardized. Less complete sign vehicles are naturally simpler and
easier to produce. So are more exact and stable sign vehicles, because such sign vehicles are
easy to become a piece of memory or knowledge that can be applied to future use. If they are
sufficiently exact and stable, they become ready-made tools for future use. If the piece of
memory or knowledge is sufficiently internalized, the future use could become nearly
automatic and thus effortless. Interestingly, recurring communication not only requires sign
vehicles to be more exact and stable. It also makes them more exact and stable, in that
repetition in an act fosters the motor memory. When one performs an act, say, uttering a
sound or making a gesture, for the first time or only occasionally, the act is relatively
unconstrained. When the acts repeat themselves, however, the agent would form motor
memory in the muscles needed to perform the act. The muscle memory constrains later
motions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, enables the agent to repeat the motions with
great accuracy, hence the more stable and exact acts. In this way, the sound or gesture is
increasingly crystalized, and becomes a much more stable and exact sign vehicle.
Standardized sign vehicles also help to save effort. Without standardized sign vehicles, the
members of a community would have to strive for mutual understanding by inferring from
communicative processes, whenever they meet with a new member. Standardized sign
vehicles offer the community a ready-made tool for communication, thus saving the
community members all the troubles to start communication processes afresh.
The remaining question is this: How does the sign vehicle become less imitative?
Several scholars (e.g. Degérando 1800; Ding 2016; Husserl 1994; Keller 1998) have made
keen observations on such a shift, to the effect that repetitive communication renders
unnecessary the original analogy between a sign vehicle and its object. How does this
happen? Degérando attributes the impetus to “a new force” (1800 1: 123), believing that
repeated use brings about “general recognition between people” whose “common habit
renders less necessary the analogy between the signs and the idea” (1800 2: 330). Keller
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ascribes it to “knowledge.” Gleaned from his words scattered in different sentences, his
account could be constructed into a relatively coherent whole as follows. Repetitive
communication renders an associative link “an object of common knowledge,” giving rise to
“a rule of use”; with this rule, the motivatedness of the sign no longer functions as “an
associative catalyst,” and thus the sign user “no longer has reason to spend much energy on
authenticity” (Keller 1998: 150-151).
Then, how is it possible that decrease in analogy does not jeopardize the success of
communication? After all, earlier, sign vehicles even underwent a shift from elliptical forms
to more complete forms to ensure the success of communication. The answer to the above
question is the birth of a new aid in communication, brought about by recurring
communication, which compensates for the loss incurred by the decreasing of analogy.
Degérando takes it to be “habit” whereas Keller points to “knowledge.” Both are a bit
oversimplified. The first instituted signs and the more fully-grown ones ensure successful
communication in two ways: for indicators, by pointing to something sensible and present;
for analogous signs, such as imitators, figurative signs, and drawings, by way of analogy
between a sign vehicle and its object. Indicators cannot be simplified anymore, so are
imitators and figurative signs at their early stage. Only more fully-grown analogous signs,
such as imitators, figurative signs, and drawings, are subject to the influence of recurring
communication. Such analogous devices are adequate for the first four forms of
communication: face-to-face communication, communication of more and more objects,
communication between more and more participants, and communication between
participants separated by space or/and time. Recurring communication brings something new.
Take for example the following analogous devices: a “coo-coo” sound imitating a cuckoo’s
cry, a bodily motion imitating the look of an elephant, and a drawing portraying a woman.
When one communicates the latter object with the former device for the first time, the
receiver understands the sender through the analogy between them. Meanwhile, the receiver
also forms a piece of memory of the sender’s expressive act. When such a communication
process recurs, the receiver not only forms memory of each expressing act, but also forms a
piece of knowledge, according to which he or she believes that all these will recur in future.
More specifically, the receiver forms two pieces of knowledge: one of the connection
between a sign vehicle and its object, the other of the constituent elements of the sign vehicle.
With such knowledge, the receiver can understand the sender, even if the sender gives off
only the initial part, a distinguishing component, or the sketch of the analogous device---such
as the first half of the “coo-coo” sound, a bodily motion imitating the long nose of an
elephant, and a figure of a woman with long hair and bulgy breasts. The receiver manages to
do this in two steps: to recollect the whole analogous device from part of it, on the basis of
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the second piece of knowledge; to infer the sender’s intention from the analogous device, on
the basis of the first piece of knowledge. The first step operates in the same way as
recollcetive signs do. The sender offers only part of the imitation in two possible ways:
accidentally or deliberately. It might be that the sender has barely given the initial part, when
he or she notices some responses from the receiver, indicating that the message has got
across. Alternatively, it might be that the sender comes to know that a sketch or part of the
analogous device is sufficient for communicating the object and discriminating it from
similar objects, and thus offers only this much for the sake of less effort. In any case, the
receiver gets the message, and the sender notices this. From then on, the sender, driven by
the urge to save effort, offers only part of the analogous device; the receiver, on the other
side, recognizes and accepts this practice. They form a tacit agreement on the connection
between the less analogous sign vehicle and the object. When they get sufficiently familiar
with the agreement, the agreement becomes the primary means for the communication, while
the remaining analogy between the sign vehicle and the object lapses into a subsidiary role.
Through more of such processes, the agreement gets about, forming a convention shared by
a community, which comes to rely more on agreements than on analogy. In brief, repetitive
communication triggers a series of reactions that enable reduction in the degree of analogy
between the sign vehicle and the object without destroying the communication. To
recapitulate, analogous signs enable communication for the first time; repetitive
communicative acts form in the receiver a piece of knowledge; the knowledge enables the
reciever to guess the sender’s communicative intent, even if the sender gives only part of the
original analogous device; the sender’s awareness of this leads to more frequent use of the
reductive analogous device; the receiver’s ensuing acceptation gives birth to a tacit
agreement between them on the employment of the reductive form as a new sign vehicle for
the object. What happens next? The above phenomenon lets participants form several
realizations, inclusive of the following points.


Through the above process, they can form a piece of mutual knowledge of one
another; with this knowledge, they can communicate an object with something only
partially, or even slightly, analogous with the object.



Through the above process, they can reach a tacit agreement to use a partially or
slightly analogous device to communicate an object; when such an agreement is
available, the original, analogy between the sign vehicle and the object comes to
play a subsidiary role in communication.



Other than indicators and analogous signs, there is a third means to communicate,
i.e., by means of agreement.

With these realizations, they would not hesitate to turn to less or slightly analogous sign
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vehicles and to the means of agreement, for two potential benefits. The first benefit is to save
effort. As mentioned above, a rational animal has a basic urge to save effort. Analogy, in
contrast, takes effort. Drawing, for instance, takes time, effort, talent, and tools to execute in
a proper manner. Reducing analogy saves part of the time and effort needed to produce the
sign vehicle. Of course, this benefit incurs some cost: It takes a complex process to enable
the benefit. The reduced analogy is no longer adequate in itself for successful
communication. The success of the communication relies on the memory, knowledge, or
agreement formed in the complex process. The memory, knowledge, and agreement thus
formed, on the other hand, bring about the second benefit: a ready-made sign vehicle that is
exact, stable, and standardized. Such a sign vehicle drastically reduces the labor needed by
every later communicative process. Thus, on the one side are two benefits brought by
recurring communication: first, less labor to produce the sign vehicle; second, a ready-made,
exact, stable, standardized sign vehicle, making later processes to communicate the object
easy, efficient, and accurate. On the other side are two pieces of cost: the labor to go through
the process leading to an agreement; the labor to retain the process and the agreement in
memory. The benefits are enjoyed by countless later processes of the immensely vast public,
whereas the cost is scattered among individuals and restricted to one process plus later
memory. The former outweighs the latter, hence the phenomenon of reduced analogy caused
by repetitive communication argued by the four scholars (Degérando 1800; Ding 2016;
Husserl 1994; Keller 1998).
Overall, the transition from more fully-grown analogous signs to reduced analogous
signs is not formed at one stroke. Rather, it takes some time and a long process. The
transition is motivated by the quest to save effort, and triggered and driven by recurring
communication. Recurring communication puts pressure on the sign vehicle to become
simple and easy to reproduce, or more concretely, to be less complete yet more exact, stable,
and standardized. At first, the shift must be slight and slow, and then it becomes dramatic and
rapid. As Degérando (1800 2: 330) notes, the analogy decreases with usage imperceptibly at
first, and then accelerates drastically when the analogy becomes so slight. Thus, we can
divide the transition into two stages. In the first stage, only slight modifications occur, whose
resultant sign vehicle is still adequate in itself for one to communicate or understand its
object. Examples include the transition from imitation in sound to the early forms of
onomatopoeia, the transition from realistic drawing to abstract drawing to sketching, the
transition from drawing to early Egyptian hieroglyph to later Egyptian hieroglyph, and the
transition from drawing to early Chinese pictograph. Here is a case in point: An imitative cry
in pain with marked change in tone and rich emotions turns into the more streamlined sound
“ou.” In the second stage, there is drastic reduction in analogy whose resultant sign vehicle is
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inadequate in itself for one to communicate or understand its object. The later changes of
onomatopoeia, such as the shift from the sound “ou” to the sound “ouch,” belong partly to
the second stage and partly to later phonetic standardization. Likewise, the transition from
early Chinese pictographs to ideographs belongs partly to the second stage and partly to later
orthographic standardization. Also belonging to the second stage are the examples cited
earlier: half of the “coo-coo” sound, a bodily motion imitating the long nose of an elephant,
and a figure of a woman with long hair and bulgy breasts. At the beginning of the second
stage, the change must also be slow, because sign vehicles at this point enjoy both
advantages. On the one hand, reduction in analogy not only saves effort to produce the sign
vehicle, but also makes it easier for the sign vehicle to become more exact, stable, and
standardized. On the other hand, the remaining analogy functions as aid in linking the
vehicle with its object. In a sense, they are the most perfect signs. Many of such partly
analogous instituted signs do not continue to decrease in analogy; in fact, they are still
prevalent today and represent a great part of most existing sign systems. Some of them,
however, keep decreasing in analogy. When the analogy becomes so obscure, the change
begins to accelerate, and they soon turn into the next kind of signs, namely, arbitrarily
instituted signs.
vi. Birth of signs with an arbitrary tint and of largely arbitrary signs
The quest to save effort gradually grows out of the above stage. The benefits brought by
the decreasing of analogy through the formation of mutual knowledge or agreement are
sweet; yet the long process leading to them is time- and effort-consuming. People wish to
obtain the former without the latter. Getting used to using a partially or slightly analogous
device to communicate an object, people seek to invent or use even simpler sign vehicles,
voluntarily and directly. Seeing the advantage of an agreement, people seek to skip the long
process that leads to it. They seek to form an agreement, voluntarily, directly, and explicitly.
Here begins a stage when people no longer closely follow the path nature has prepared for
them. Instead, they try to make signs without modelling them on nature: to overtly choose or
invent a sign vehicle; to actively reach a new agreement between a sign vehicle and an object.
In a term not very accurate, they begin to form the consciousness of “arbitrary sign.” At
preceding stages, people institute a sign by making a sign vehicle that points to or imitates an
object, and then communicates the object by virtue of the contiguity or similarity between
the sign vehicle and the object. The receivers, on the other side, could understand the sign
vehicle directly, by virtue of the very contiguity or similarity. At the present stage, people
institute a sign by choosing or inventing a sign vehicle as they like, link it with an object by
way of decision, and communicate the object by means of agreement. The receivers have to
learn the agreement first, before understanding the sign vehicle; after acquiring the
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agreement, they could understand the sign vehicle directly, by virtue of the agreement. The
preceding stages utilize an existing connection between a sign vehicle and an object; the
present stage utilizes the disjuncture between a sign vehicle and an object, which is later
bridged by a newly-born agreement. This does not mean that the sign vehicle at this stage is
made at random, or that the sign vehicle cannot be analogous with the object. People foster
the awareness to utilize the power of agreements, and thus enjoy the freedom to choose or
invent sign vehicles as they like. Nevertheless, as rational animals, they like to pursue
multiple ends at once, and thus choose or invent sign vehicles with specific features catering
to various considerations.
The first signs with an arbitrary tint are probably analogous forms modified in some
way. It is easy for people busy imitating things with sounds or bodily motions to find the
disjuncture between them. While imitating things, people easily find that some sounds or
motions are not indispensable or replaceable, that they could add or omit a sound or motion,
and that they could combine sounds or bodily motions much at their pleasure. Such
phenomena are common in drawing and writing. In drawing and writing, we can find some
operations tinted with arbitrariness, such as adjusting, adding, or omitting part of a drawing,
combining two drawings, adding something non-analogous to a drawing, and modifications
of the like made to early Egyptian hieroglyphs or Chinese pictograms. For instance, in early
Egyptian hieroglyph,

‘seated god’ is different from

‘seated king’ only in two details:

The latter has a straight beard and wears a coif with uraeus on the brow, whereas the former
has a slightly curved beard and wears a straight wig (see Gardiner 2001[1957]: 446). Ancient
Egyptians express the god of sun with

, a drawing made up of a figure of the seated “god

with sun and uraeus on head,” and express the goddess of sun with

, a drawing made up a

figure of the seated “goddess with sun and horns” (see Gardiner 2001 [1957]: 448-449). In
ancient Chinese drawings, as forerunners of characters, the god of sun looks like a drawing
of a radiating sun with human face, a radiating sun on top of a human being, a human being
embedded within a radiating sun, or a human being carrying a radiating sun (see Huang and
Meng 2001: 75-80); some tribal totems are made of a human body below an animal, such as
a dog or a bird (see Huang and Meng 2001: 99). In early Chinese ideograms, 射 ‘to shoot
with a bow’ is expressed by a drawing of a deer aimed at by a bow with an arrow (see Tang
2005: 73); 明 ‘brightness’ by the sun together with the crescent moon (see Ding 2014: 124);

休 ‘to rest’ by a man leaning against a tree (see Ding 2016: 173); 旦 ‘dawn’ by a sun above
the horizon, and 暮 ‘dusk’ by a sun sinking into grasses (see Wu 1994: 34). In early simple
Chinese ideograms, 刃 ‘blade’ is expressed by a drawing of a knife plus a dot put near the
middle of the thin side; 本 ‘root/base’ by a tree plus a dot or line added to the root (see
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Chen 2001: 66). In these instances, something arbitrary is added. The Egyptians and the
Chinese did not have any existing image to follow, when they invented the hieroglyph for the
seated god or the drawing for the god of sun. Instead, the sign vehicles come into being
through the somewhat arbitrary modification---the former probably made to the existing
hieroglyph of seated king, the latter through the somewhat arbitrary combination of two
existing drawings, one being the sun and the other being a human being or part of a human
being. The Chinese compound ideograms listed above give life to the corresponding five
abstract notions; however, the choice of deer, sun, moon, tree, horizon, and grass is
somewhat arbitrary. In simple Chinese ideograms, the dot added to the knife or tree is more
like an arbitrary mark to direct our attention to a part of the thing drawn. It is non-analogous,
and is like a pointing gesture applied to a drawing. These phenomena display several features.
The first is that the sign vehicles all possess an element that has no necessary connection
with their object, though the element has some connection with the cultural history of the
community or society. The second is that they result from operations made to a pre-existing
analogous form. The third is that such modified analogous forms could express things that
are hard or impossible to express only through imitation. Most of the illustrated examples are
impossible to express through pure imitation, including the imaginary “gods,” as well as the
partly perceptible yet partly abstract “brightness,” “dawn,” “dusk,” and “base.” “Blade,” as
part of a physical object, is easy to be confused with the whole knife, if presented solely
through a realistic drawing. Of the two activities, namely, “to rest” and “to shoot with a bow,”
the first is hard to present through imitation of the act; the second could be conveyed with
two drawings, one with an arrow in the bow and the other with the arrow flying, but is hard
to imitate with one single drawing. The third feature of modified analogous forms become
more striking, when compared with earlier-mentioned figurative signs and purely imitative
drawings. The figurative sign applies better to those imperceptible things that cause
perceptible bodily reactions, and those imperceptible things whose key feature bears
resemblance with something physical that can be imitated through vocal sounds or bodily
motions. A drawing breaks through the limitations of bodily means, and conveys more
accurately; nevertheless, a purely imitative drawing is still confined to those imperceptible
things that cause perceptible bodily reactions, and those imperceptible things whose key
feature bears resemblance with something physical. The modified analogous sign breaks
through the limitations of purely imitative drawings, and applies to those imperceptible
things whose key feature cannot be captured by a single imitative drawing. The means to add
something non-analogous, in particular, enjoys an added advantage of being much more
accurate than figurative signs and purely imitative drawings. Overall, modified analogous
signs, unlike earlier analogous signs, do not imitate something in nature or mind directly;
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instead, they first resort to imitation, and then to operations upon the product of the imitation,
resulting in something both analogous and arbitrary.
Another form of early arbitrary signs is tally-keeping devices. Such devices include
counting stones, notched tally sticks, quipus of the Incas, and wampum belts of the Iroquois
(see Nöth 1990: 252); Chinese knotted strings, Eight Trigram (pa kua) markings, and pottery
marks (see Huang and Meng 2001: 80-97); Egyptian hieroglyphic numerals (see Gardiner
2001 [1957]: 191) and ancient Chinese characters for numerals (see Tang 2005: 48-49).
These devices, unlike modified analogous forms, are not quite analogous; nevertheless, they
might have some connection with the object. In some cases, the number of physical things,
such as stones, beads, and knots, are used to represent corresponding numerals. In other
cases, more immaterial devices are used, such as notch, carving, and drawing. For instance,
in Egyptian hieroglyphics, one vertical line means “one,” two vertical lines mean “two,” and
nine vertical lines mean “nine”; in ancient Chinese characters, one to four horizontal lines
mean numbers from “one” to “four.” The figures for other numerals is much more arbitrary
in Egyptian hieroglyphics, such as
for “ten thousand,” and

for “ten,”

for “hundred,”

for “thousand,”

for “hundred thousand”; though they are repeated for as many

times as the number of units needed when used for a bigger number, such as
for “152,123” (see Gardiner 2001 [1957]: 191). Similarly, oracle shell inscriptions for
numbers in ancient China are quite arbitrary for numbers from five to ten and for hundred,
thousand, and ten thousand---

and ; though they are repeated for as many times

as the number of units needed when used for a bigger number, such as

for “twenty,”

“thirty,” and “forty.” These tally-keeping devices could be regarded as an extreme extension
of figurative signs: to express something imperceptible with the least degree of analogy.
Numbers are imperceptible in themselves, and we try to express them with a stone, bead,
knot, notch, or a stroke of drawing, hence the link between the abstract notion of “oneness”
and one physical thing. Compared with modified analogous signs, tally-keeping devices for
the most basic numbers have a much lower degree of analogy yet a higher degree of
arbitrariness. They resort either to a physical thing with little amount of materiality or to an
almost immaterial mark. On the other hand, they are rather arbitrary in the choice of the very
physical thing, be it a stone, bead, or knot, of the means to make a mark, be it through
carving or drawing, and of the form of the mark, be it vertical or horizontal. Some ideograms
with little degree of materiality probably descend from such devices. For instance, the
Chinese oracle shell inscriptions

respectively mean “up,” “down,” “left,” and

“right.” The abstract spatial relations between two objects are expressed by the spatial
relevance between the two strokes.
Among later partly arbitrary signs, some remain to be at least partly analogous. These
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include some bodily signs called “polite formulas” by Saussure (1959: 16) or “ritual and
ceremonial gestures” by Nöth (1990: 398-399). For example, greeting gestures---such as
heading down, Wai in Thailand, bowing in Japan, Mano in the Philippines, kowtow in
pre-modern China, and long kowtow in Tibet of China---are probably ritualized imitation of
gestures to show subordination among animals. Like figurative signs expressing emotions
and feelings, they are bodily motions that are imitative; differing from the former, they have
an apparently arbitrary tint, in the sense that they at once add and subtract parts of the
subordinating gestures in the animal kingdom, exaggerate some of their elements, and stylize
some of their elements. Even less analogous signs are some non-bodily signs, such as totems,
heraldic devices, and the common symbol using doves for peace. The dove is believed to be
gentle, innocent, and tranquil; hence its partial analogy with peace. Totems and heraldic
devices use icons of animals or plants to represent qualities treasured by a nation, tribe, or
family: lion for strength and valor, eagle for fortitude, stag for readiness to fight, fox for
intelligence, bee for industry, antelope for peace and harmony, lily for purity, and ivy for
eternal life. These animals or plants bear certain analogy to the cherished qualities, but the
analogy is indirect and partial; overall, the connection between qualities of an animal or plant
and an abstract notion or national quality is not necessary. This arbitrariness is obvious in
such example where a totem employs an imaginary animal, such as dragon, phoenix, and
unicorn.
More arbitrary are some non-bodily signs with a non-analogous connection with their
object. For example, a barrel-loop has an apparent connection with a barrel, and a barrel with
wine within it, hence its appropriateness to be the sign of wine-selling when put before or
within a shop. A national symbol is prone to be an animal that can be found within the
country and that are revered for certain qualities. Examples include American bison and bald
eagle in U.S.A., kangaroo and emu in Australia, green pheasant and carp in Japan, kiwi in
New Zealand, gyrfalcon in Iceland, oryx in Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates, tiger in
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Vietnam, and lion in quite a few other
countries. Signs that are even more arbitrary are some non-bodily signals intended for
communication at a distance or for telecommunication. Such signs include various types of
instituted signals mentioned in Section 3.1.1, such as bells, drums, gongs, sirens, whistles,
horn beeps, smoke signals, watch-fires, flares, beacons, traffic lights, and red flags. These
non-bodily sign vehicles are neither analogous nor contiguous with the object to
communicate. They are very much arbitrary in relation to the object, but are so chosen as to
make sound or light travel at a great distance.
Even more arbitrary are those representative signs that also serve to distinguish a person
or thing from others, or to distinguish between like people or things. They are typically
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carried or worn by, placed on, or attached to a person or a thing. A theater ticket, for instance,
serves to distinguish people with it from those without it. A sign of disgrace, such as a
branding on the face or the forehead of a criminal, serves to distinguish criminals from other
people. A crown serves to distinguish a ruler from the other people. In some countries, it also
serves to distinguish a ruler from other officials who also wears a hat that differs from a
crown. Other examples include uniforms and liveries, banners and military standards, coats
of arms, badges and medals, trademarks, logos, stamps, signatures, watermarks, etc.. Such
sign vehicles are neither analogous nor contiguous with their object. On the other hand, these
vehicles are not chosen at random; instead, they are so chosen or made to possess certain
peculiar features. The crown is often made of precious metal, decorated with jewels, and has
a unique design; all these make it look elegant, splendid, singular, treasurable, hence its
appropriateness to be a symbol for royalty. Uniforms differ markedly from other clothes;
they also differ from one another in design, as is the case with uniforms in blue for navy and
in white for air force in some countries. Badges and medals tend to be made of precious
metal and have a unique design, as is the gold, silver, and copper medal for sports games.
Trademarks, logos, watermarks, and signatures tend to be peculiar in design, so that they not
only serve to distinguish, but also to prevent counterfeiting. Overall, such sign vehicles are
highly arbitrary, though chosen or made deliberately.
Representative signs with a low degree of materiality are apparently arbitrary, due to
their reduction in materiality, be it in the form of simple sounds, marks, or sketchy pictures.
Nevertheless, they tend to vary in the degree of analogy with the object from one subtype to
another, and from one stage to another of the same subtype. Some types of them are highly
analogous, such as hieroglyphics, pictograms, zodiac signs, and geometric shapes, though
the first two come to be less analogous at later stages. Other types tend to be more abstract,
but are still partly analogous, such as astronomic signs, cabalistic signs, magical signs,
chemistry symbols, and some physics symbols. Still other types ground their efficacy upon
differences in strokes or shapes from other members of the same system, and are thus largely
arbitrary, such as musical signs, stenographic signs, arithmetic marks, algebraic marks,
numeric signs, phonetic signs, punctuation marks, alphabetic signs, other scientific and
technical signs, and linguistic signs. Some of these examples still bear some analogy with the
object, such as >, <, ⊂, ∈, →, ⊥, and ∥ in mathematics. However, most of them are nearly
utterly arbitrary, though not chosen or made at random due to the inherent rationality of
human beings.
5.2.3 Implications for the Instituted Sign
The genesis of instituted signs presents several implications for our understanding of
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the instituted sign and of semiotics in general. The first implication is the divergence
between the types of instituted signs mentioned in the history of semiotics, as listed in
Section 3.1.1, and the types of instituted signs mentioned in the above genetic account. The
former brings up instituted signals, representative signs, and representative signs with little
materiality, most of which belong to the last stage of the latter. The latter includes three more
stages, namely, first instituted signs, more fully-grown analogous signs, and reduced
analogous signs; it encompasses some important subtypes not mentioned by the former, such
as indicators, imitators, figurative signs, non-bodily signs like drawing and tally-keeping
devices, etc.. This divergence is natural, as what the history of semiotics mentions tends to
be prototypical sign phenomena noticed by scholars, that is, those sign phenomena that are
familiar, frequent, and striking. The former account is necessarily selective and crude, in
comparison with the genetic account. This is exactly why a genetic account is useful: It
delves into the nature of a phenomenon, and offers a systematic, chronological narration.
The second implication is that the genetic account calls our attention to some aspects of
instituted signs that elude daily attention of semioticians. For one thing, the instituted sign
arises out of the realization of the possibility and need to transit from understanding to
communicating, and from the utilizing of an existing connection to the instituting of a new
connection. For another thing, the evolution of instituted signs is propelled by the
ever-developing needs of human beings. Some of such needs have been mentioned in the
above genetic account: to communicate face to face, to communicate more things and new
things, to communicate between more people and other people, to communicate across space
and time, and to communicate something repeatedly; to save effort; to increase efficiency,
etc.. Other needs also exist, such as those raised by the development of mental faculties, as
will be discussed in studies following this dissertation. New needs are always in formation.
For a third, driven by such motivations, the instituted sign undergoes a shift in its vehicle
from bodily signs to non-bodily signs. The former includes sounds made by the voice and
motions made by the body, be they facial expressions or motions of other parts of the body;
whereas the latter includes those things like ordinary physical objects and those with little
amount of materiality. For a fourth, instituted signs establish their sign-relation by linking a
bodily or non-bodily means with its object in three ways. One is by pointing, as is the case
with indicators. Another is by imitating, as is the case with imitators and figurative signs in
their first form, in their more fully-grown form, and in their reduced form. The third is by
mental associating without following any prior model, as is the case with signs with a varied
degree of arbitrariness. Of signs with an arbitrary tint, partly arbitrary signs resort to both the
means of imitating and the means of modeless mental associating. Purely arbitrary signs
resort only to the means of active mental associating, though they might choose or invent
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sign vehicles with certain features in accordance with certain considerations. For a fifth, the
genesis of instituted signs, as described in the above section, results from the evolution of
semiosic competence, formed to cater to the ever-developing needs of human beings, with
the aid of the developments in tools. For instance, in terms of the competence needed in the
evolution of signs, internal perception and sympathy are essential for the transition from
recollective signs to indicative signs; the intent to communicate plays a key role in the
transition from natural signs to instituted signs; pointing and imitating enable first real
communication; modeless mental associating is the prerequisite for the advent of arbitrary
signs. In terms of the tools needed for the emergence of various subtypes of signs, for
instance, drawing requires the discovery of pigment; carving needs the help of something
sharp and hard; other non-bodily signs, such as drums, gongs, flares, and traffic lights, all
need a variety of tools and materials to make.
The third implication is that there are grave problems with current semiotics. For
instance, according to the above genetic account, Saussure’s “arbitrary signs” are merely a
small part of instituted signs, and belong in the last stage of their evolution. They are a result
of modeless mental associating. Modeless mental associating is merely one of the three
means to form instituted signs. Many instituted signs employ the means of modeless mental
associating together with the means of imitating. What is more, even instituted signs formed
purely by modeless mental associating are never really “arbitrary.” Instead, all instituted
signs result from a rational act; their vehicles are always chosen or made out of certain
considerations. For the same reasons, Peirce’s trichotomy between icon, index, and symbol
does not hold ground. The first classification of signs is between natural signs, based on a
natural connection, and instituted signs, based on a voluntarily instituted sign-relation. An
icon could be either a natural sign, as is often the case with an image reflected in a mirror or
a photograph, or an instituted sign, as is the case with a rocking painting describing a past
event. The icon does not qualify as a category side by side with the index and the symbol. An
index---encompassing both natural signs consisting in a relation of cause or contiguity, a
pointing finger, and linguistic signs such as deictic words, pronouns, and proper names
(Peirce CP 2.283-2.305)---is a hybrid, resulting from clashing criteria and trivial standards,
and overlaps with the icon and the symbol. Peirce’s symbol is overstretched in including
concepts, sentences, and books (W 1:257-258). It is also unduly restrictive: like Saussure’s
arbitrary sign, Peirce’s symbol---such as watch-fire, standard or ensign, watchword, badge,
church creed, theatre ticket, check, expressions of sentiment (W 1:257)---belongs in the last
stage of the evolution of instituted signs. Instituted signs, with its three possible means--pointing, imitating, and modeless mental associating---encompass both icons and symbols in
Peirce’s parlance. On the whole, Peirce’s trichotomy is misconceived. As Ding puts it
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shrewdly, “nothing is an index, icon, or symbol unless it is interpreted as such” (2016: 174).
The crux is not the kinds of relation between the sign vehicle and its object, but the relevance
of such relations to a subject.
5.3 Makeup of the Instituted Sign
The genetic account of instituted signs points out a variety of subtypes of instituted
signs: indicators, analogous signs, partly analogous and partly arbitrary signs, and purely
arbitrary signs; bodily signs and non-bodily signs; signs with a natural vehicle and signs with
an artificial vehicle; signs with a vehicle of full materiality and signs with a vehicle of less
materiality, etc.. An ensuing question is this: How do these subtypes of instituted signs come
into being? A more general question is this: How are instituted signs formed? Briefly put,
instituted signs result from the interaction between various types of sign acts. Variations in
sign acts result in various subtypes of instituted signs. Instituted signs as a whole consist of
three kinds of phenomena, each of which comprises a set of sign act types: essential
phenomena, supplementary phenomena, and epiphenomena. Roughly speaking, nature
brings about the essential phenomena; the essential phenomena bring about the
supplementary phenomena and the epiphenomena.
5.3.1 Essential Phenomena
The uppermost feature of the instituted sign is naturally its defining feature, namely that
the sign-relation is established by a subject when it comes into being for its first time. Then,
why should the subject establish a sign-relation? This question splits into two minor ones:
Why would the subject need a sign-relation? Why should the subject establish such a
relation? Section 4.1 suggests that prototypical natural signs fulfil a function: to reveal
something important to the subject, with respect to his or her existence or immediately
ensuing actions. Instituted signs are similar to natural signs on this point, with a slight
variation: to reveal something important to the subject, with respect to his or her
interpretation of other subjects. The historical account of signs begins with recollective
signs---to be more specific, divinatory signs---that are meant to reveal something in nature
not perceptible at the time. It proceeds to indicative signs that are meant to reveal something
hidden beneath the body of a subject, such as health conditions, characters or personalities,
emotions or feelings. It finally arrives at instituted signs that are meant to reveal something
going on in the mind of another subject. Recollective signs enable the subject to know
something hidden in nature; indicative signs, something hidden within the body; instituted
signs, something hidden in the mind. Knowledge of nature is requisite for dealing with
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nature; knowledge of the body, for dealing with one’s own body, or for dealing with other
living beings; knowledge of the mind, only for dealing with other living beings. In brief, the
sign-relation of instituted signs is necessary, because its knowledge is useful to reveal things
going on in the mind of other living beings, because knowledge of the other minds is useful
for dealing with the other living beings, and because the other living beings, like one’s own
body and nature, are part of the world a subject needs and longs to deal with. What is special
about instituted signs is this. Most things hidden in nature or within the body can be known
through something perceptible linked with them, whereas things going on in the mind are not
intrinsically related to anything perceptible. On a couple of occasions, a thought could be
guessed through its concomitant perceptible reactions, such as facial expressions or bodily
movements. This guess is seldom accurate, even if it happens to be right. On the majority of
occasions, there are no concomitant perceptible reactions, in which case even a guess is
impossible. With the increasing need to reveal others’ thoughts accurately, comes the need to
couple a fixed perceptible thing with a particular idea borne in the mind. In summary, the
sign-relation of instituted signs is established because, on the one hand, there emerges an
increasing need to accurately reveal the thing going on in the mind of other living beings and,
on the other hand, there is nothing readily available to meet the need.
How could the sign-relation of an instituted sign be established? The sign-relation of an
instituted sign consists essentially in a relation between something perceptible and something
mental. Since nothing is readily available to reveal the mental thing, one has to make
something perceptible, either by choosing something existing or by making a new thing. As
pointed out by Yiheng Zhao (2011:28), this perceptible thing might be a natural thing, an
artificial thing made originally for praxis, or an artificial thing made originally for
signification. After the perceptible thing is chosen or made, one can set about establishing a
relation between it and the mental thing. One can establish the relation by, say, mentally
granting or pledging the connection. For instance, one can mentally decide that he or she
would observe the connection whenever any one of the two relata comes up. For clarity, let
us use the act of vehicle-making to name the move to choose or make a vehicle, and the act
of instituting or signizing9 to label the move to establish the relation between a vehicle and
the thing to be revealed. After the act of instituting, the subject concerned would be able to
use the vehicle to represent the thing going on in his or her mind. Let us name this move act
of using. One and the most typical form of this act is to use the vehicle to externalize the
subject’s thought. This act is what is generally called expressing. One and the most typical

9

The term signize or signizing is first proposed in Jin & Cao (2019), referring to “a process
in which a Y (sign-other) is intentionally related to a certain X (sign-vehicle) for the first time in
the history of Y” (2019: 355).
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form of expressing is to externalize the thought and send it to another living being. This act
is what is generally called communicating. On receiving the vehicle given off by the act of
expressing or communicating, the receiver would normally try to make something out of it.
This act is what is generally called interpreting or understanding. At this moment, the
receiver still has difficulty getting to know the thing in the mind of the sender, because he or
she still has no idea of the relation between it and the vehicle. Under this condition, he or she
might hazard a guess on the basis of the circumstances, but the chances of success is low. For
an accurate interpretation, another act is necessary, in which the receiver gets to know the
relation between the vehicle and the thought. Let us call this move the act of acquiring. Only
after such an act, and only when the two subjects share the piece of knowledge of the very
relation, can there be perfect communication. To sum up, to fulfil the function to reveal
something in the mind of another living being, the instituted sign entails at least an act of
vehicle-making, an act of instituting, an act of expressing, and an act of interpreting. The act
of communicating and of acquiring are not logically necessary, because any act of expressing
produces something external for the act of interpreting, and because the circumstances
occasionally provide enough clues for a correct guess. Nevertheless, the act of
communicating is the most common form of expressing, and the act of acquiring is the most
common means for later accurate and efficient interpretation. In this sense, both are in
demand. Let us call all of the above acts the essential acts of the instituted sign. Among them,
two acts are the most important, namely, the act of interpreting and the act of expressing. The
other acts are all secondary to them. Let us call these two acts the core acts of the instituted
sign.
Along with the essential acts of the instituted signs come their essential functions. The
first and foremost function of instituted signs is probably the one that relates instituted signs
to natural signs, namely that they serve to reveal something mental of another living being.
This function is realized in the act of interpreting. The act of interpreting presupposes at least
an act of expressing, an act of instituting, and an act of vehicle-making; in most cases, it also
entails an act of acquiring and of communicating. Of these acts, the act of vehicle-making
prepares for the act of instituting. The act of instituting prepares for the act of expressing,
which often takes the form of communicating. The act of expressing externalizes something
mental for oneself or for others, the latter of which constitutes an act of communicating. The
act of acquiring prepares for later acts of expressing or interpreting by the subject who
acquires the piece of knowledge. The act of interpreting seeks to understand the mental thing
behind the emitted vehicle. Altogether, the essential functions of instituted signs are threefold:
to reveal something mental of another living being; to communicate something mental to
others, or to express something mental for oneself.
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5.3.2 Supplementary Phenomena
The essential phenomena of the instituted sign, including essential acts and essential
functions, bring about supplementary acts of the instituted sign, meant to serve the essential
acts. The supplementary acts comprise two major types. One type involves phenomena
serving the act of communicating. They typically function through operations on the vehicle:
converting it into another kind, attaching it to another vehicle, enlarging its size, amplifying
its volume, posing it on a higher place, etc.. Let us call them the act of vehicle-adapting. The
primary goal of the act of vehicle-adapting is to increase the range of communicating. Nöth’s
(1990: 287-292) survey of language substitutes concerns this function. Language substitutes
have several potential functions, such as secrecy, the extension of the medium, and the
replacement of a defective channel (Nöth’s 1990: 292). Most instances of language
substitutes serve to extend the range of communication, such as drum and whistle languages,
the Morse code, naval semaphore, and the binary code of the alphabet in the information
industry. Here, it is possible to distinguish between those sign phenomena meeting the
requirements of special audiences, circumstances, or purposes on one side, and those sign
phenomena serving to increase the range of communicating on the other side. On such a
distinction, the Braille code, tactile alphabets, drum and whistle languages, naval semaphore,
cloaks and ciphers, etc. belong to the former group. They are independent sign types catering
to special needs. They serve communication of special requirements. For instance, drum,
whistle, and naval semaphore serve telecommunication in noisy surroundings; cloaks and
ciphers serve secret communication; the Braille code serves communication between blind
people via the sense of touch. In contrast, there are some phenomena that are meant to
operate upon other sign phenomena, for the purpose of extending the range of
communication, such as the Morse code and the binary code of the alphabet in the
information industry. Such phenomena do not stand by themselves; rather, they are
dependent upon and serve other sign phenomena. This subtype of vehicle-adapting mainly
functions through “code substitution” (Nöth’s 1990: 290) or, as we prefer, vehicle converting,
such as transforming sound into electrical currents in the case of telephone and transforming
words into electromagnetic waves in the case of radio. One important form of vehicle
converting is recording, such as sound or video recording in the case of tapes or compact
discs. Recording helps to lengthen the time the original vehicle, such as sound, could last,
and makes it easier to duplicate or transport, thus serving the act of communicating in
several ways. Another means of vehicle-adapting is to attach a vehicle to another vehicle,
usually to make it easier to place on a higher place or to make it more durable. Examples of
the latter vehicle include the stick for national ensigns, the wood or metal board for traffic
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signs, as well as the high post for national flags, traffic signs, and traffic lights. On other
occasions, the act of vehicle-adapting might also resort to simple skills to extend the range of
communication, such as using a sound-amplifying device, enlarging the words on an
advertisement board along the high way, and flying an ensign high on a ship.
The other type of supplementary acts serves the act of acquiring. Any act of expressing
or communicating offers a chance for the receiver to acquire a sign-relation. Yet there are
acts launched specially to impart to others a piece of knowledge regarding a sign-relation.
Let us call them the act of imparting. The act of imparting falls into two major types. The
most common way to impart a sign-relation is an act of communicating aided by tools to
externalize, partly or wholly, the mental thing. Take a modified example from Russell’s
(2009: 61) account of ostensive definition. Suppose an English mariner, knowing no French,
is shipwrecked on the coast of Normandy and makes his way into the house of a farmer. The
mariner sees a piece of bread on the table and points to it with an inquiring gesture. The
French farmer says, “Pain.” The mariner concludes that the French word means bread in
English. In this case, the farmer’s act of communicating, aided by the mariner’s pointing
gesture, fulfils the function to impart the sign relation between the French word pain and the
food. Of course, the communicating tool is more commonly provided by the sender. A parent
teaches a kid, by pointing to a table and uttering the word table. A teacher teaches a word to
students, by pointing to a sample object, by illustrating it with a picture or a photo, or by
paraphrasing it with other words. Another type of the act of imparting takes a hypostatized
form, either by juxtaposing a sign vehicle with its object, or by juxtaposing two different
modes of vehicles of the same object. The former case happens mostly by attaching a tag to
an object such as a tree in a park, an animal in a zoo, and a historical artifact on an exhibition.
The tag on the object lets visitors link the object with the name or description contained in
the tag. Let us call the act implied in such phenomena the act of labelling. The latter case
happens by juxtaposing a vehicle with another vehicle, such as a picture of dinosaur under
the word dinosaur in a textbook for kids, or an English word apple after a French entry
pomme in a French-English dictionary. In such cases, the former vehicle serves to point out
the object the latter vehicle is meant to represent, thus enabling readers to acquire the
corresponding sign-relation. Since the two vehicles seem to paraphrase each other, let us call
the act implied in such phenomena the act of paraphrasing. To mention in passing, the act of
labelling and the act of paraphrasing lead to a hypostatized form of sign phenomenon: an
object in juxtaposition with a sign vehicle, or a sign vehicle in juxtaposition with another
vehicle pointing to the former one’s object. Such hypostatized sign phenomena are so
common, especially with linguistic signs, that they are easily mistaken to be the
representatives of sign phenomena. This leads to a delusion common among people: It
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seduces us into believing that sign phenomena are static entities instead of dynamic
activities.
The supplementary acts of instituted signs serve the essential acts. In this sense, they do
not serve functions parallel in position with the essential functions. Instead, such
supplementary sign phenomena merely serve subsidiary functions in relation to essential sign
phenomena.
5.3.3 Epiphenomena
Along with the act of expressing emerge some epiphenomena. They do not serve the
original function to reveal something mental of another living being, but come as
epiphenomena along the path to fulfil this original function. The original function
presupposes an externalized sign vehicle, which is provided by the act of expressing. In such
cases, the act of expressing typically takes the form of communicating, that is, to express
something for interpersonal uses, or put in another way, to communicate something to others.
Occasionally, it happens that the sign vehicle is externalized by an act of expressing meant
for oneself, but is perceived by others. Gradually, the act of expressing for personal use
develops into an autonomous phenomenon. This autonomous sign phenomenon falls into two
forms: externalized, for personal use; not externalized, for pure mental use. To avoid
confusion, let us employ the act of using as the generic term; the act of expressing, for
externalized use, including the act of communicating and the act of expressing for personal
use; and the act of mental using, for purely mental use. The act of expressing for personal
use includes such phenomena as thinking aloud, thinking while writing, taking notes, and
writing a diary. Thinking aloud and thinking while writing not only slow down the pace of
thinking, thus allocating more attention to every chunk of thought. They also give each
chunk of thought double vehicles, one in the form of mental entities and the other in the form
of sound or written marks, thus offering people two chances to think about each chunk of
thought. In consequence, these two forms fulfil a striking function to facilitate thinking. Note
taking and diary writing accord materiality to something mental. Thanks to such materiality,
people could revisit their ideas at will repeatedly, and extend the life of the ideas as long as
written marks endure. These two forms have an evident advantage to aid memory and
thinking. The act of mental using happens when we link a mental entity with an image of
sign vehicle, particularly of a linguistic sign. This act scaffolds the formation of higher-order
mental entities and mental operations, resulting in the human ability to “think with signs.” It
is necessary for the formation, for instance, of “complex ideas of the second order” and
abstract ideas; it is also necessary for the formation of such higher-order mental operations
like abstract judgment and abstract reasoning (Degérando 1800 2: 548). Overall, both the act
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of expressing for personal use and the act of mental use are irrelevant to the essential
functions of instituted signs. Rather, they serve cognitive functions---to aid cognition or to
scaffold cognition. In this sense, they are epiphenomena with unique functions. To mention
in passing, these two acts are mainly restricted to artificial signs, to representative signs with
little materiality, and to linguistic signs. This is because such signs could be so produced as
to be materially simple, because abundant materiality is instrumental for communication yet
cumbersome for cognition. This is also because such signs use vehicles that are more
combinable and could be produced easily and cheaply (Jin and Cao 2019). The relation of
these types of signs to the two kinds of acts is probably not merely a coincidence---the signs
types are evolutionarily later comers while the two kinds of acts are by nature
epiphenomena.
5.4 Instituted Sign as an Object of Study
Summarizing the conclusions of the preceding three sections, we can say that the
instituted sign consists in a process in which somebody recollects or infers on the basis of a
recollection, with the aid of certain memory or knowledge originating from an act of
instituting, from something perceptible something in the mind of another person, for the sake
of understanding the mental thing; or something perceptible from something in one’s own
mind, for the sake of expressing or communicating the mental thing. Such a process implies
at least six elements: (a) a subject; (b) something perceptible; (c) an act of recollecting or
recollecting-grounded inferring; (d) a piece of memory or knowledge, as the basis of the act;
(e) something not perceptible at the time, being the result of the act; (f) a function to reveal,
express, or communicate something mental, being the effect of the act. The above process
entails a set of acts, which constitute the essential phenomena of instituted signs. The
essential acts need the aid of some supplementary acts on one hand and, on the other hand,
lead to some unintended acts. The former constitutes the supplementary phenomena of
instituted signs; the latter, the epiphenomena of instituted signs.
Based on the preceding three sections, instituted signs are characteristic of the following
six features.
First, in continuation from natural signs, they also involve a relation between something
perceptible and something not perceptible at the moment, entails an act of memory-based
recollecting or knowledge-based inferring, and originate in a function to reveal something
hidden, i.e., something going on in the mind of another subject.
Second, diverging from natural signs, they involve a connection voluntarily instituted
by some subject when it comes into being for the first time.
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Third, instituted signs emerge from natural signs and evolve a long way ahead, resulting
in a great variety of subtypes: indicators, analogous signs, partly analogous and partly
arbitrary signs, and purely arbitrary signs; bodily signs and non-bodily signs; signs like
ordinary physical objects and signs with less materiality.
Fourth, with the advent of instituted signs and of their subtypes emerge new functions
of signs: to express or to communicate; to aid or scaffold cognition.
Fifth, to fulfil its original function, an instituted sign entails a set of essential sign acts,
which bring about the essential functions of instituted signs; the essential sign acts trigger
supplementary sign acts; from essential sign acts emerge epiphenomenal sign acts, together
with their unique functions.
Sixth, on the level of sign acts, instituted signs involve such topics as intention, memory,
knowledge, etc.; on the level of instituted signs, they are indispensable for an array of topics,
such as sign system, text, complex sign activities, convention, society, culture, etc..
Overall, the first three features define the border of the instituted sign. The fourth
feature points to the qualifications for its prototypical members, namely, those best at
fulfilling its basic functions, and the qualifications for its perfect forms, namely, those best at
fulfilling all of its functions. The fifth feature concerns its underlying mechanisms. The sixth
feature tells about its relevance to adjacent topics. As a category, the instituted sign has a
relatively clear borderline enclosing a broad and great variety of phenomena, has marked
distinguishing features to form its own prototypical members, involves complicated
underlying mechanisms demanding huge scientific efforts, and has great relevance for an
array of topics crucial for adjacent disciplines. In brief, the instituted sign is unique, complex,
and valuable enough to be a good object of study.
5.5 Sketch of the Theory of the Instituted Sign
A fully-blown theory of the instituted sign exceeds the space allowed here, but an
outline is possible and salutary. A general theory of the instituted sign is to address the
following major topics:
1. How do instituted signs originate from natural signs? How do they evolve?
2. How are instituted signs classified? What are the characteristics of each type of
them?
3. How do instituted signs emerge from sign acts? How do sign acts form various types
of instituted signs? How do sign acts work?
4. What functions do instituted signs perform? What peculiar functions do various types
of instituted signs perform? How do they perform their functions?
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5. How is an instituted sign conventionalized and socialized? What are the effects of
such conventionalization and socialization?
6. How does an instituted sign change? What are the effects of such changes?
7. How do instituted signs multiply to form sign systems? What are the characteristics
of various sign systems, particularly language?
8. How do instituted signs cooperate to make a text?
9. How do instituted signs participate in complex human activities?
For each topic, we need to determine on the proper concepts, try to form singular statements
or empirical laws based on observation of the phenomenon world, and finally form
theoretical laws adequate to explain the topic. The first two topics have already been dealt
with, with the result of a genetic account of instituted signs and a crude typology. A more
refined typology of instituted signs requires conclusions reached on other topics. The third
and the fourth topic have been briefly sketched. The third topic reveals the mechanism
underlying the formation of an instituted sign; the fourth topic presents an account of the
functions of instituted signs. If properly addressed, the fifth and the sixth topic would show
how instituted signs stabilize and how they change; the seventh to the ninth topics would
offer an account of how instituted signs interact with other instituted signs or non-signs. All
of these achievements would interlace with one another to form a general theory of instituted
signs. Such a theory grounds itself upon an object of study determined through descriptive,
comparative, and evaluative studies of sign phenomena. The initial answers to the first four
topics listed above all sprout from such studies. These four topics make up the core of the
general theory, which offers a framework for the explanation of basic topics of the instituted
sign, such as its origin and genesis, its classification and typology, its formative mechanism,
and its functions. Only when such a framework is in place is it reasonable to deal with such
complex phenomena relative to an individual sign, such as conventionalization and mutation,
covered by the fifth and sixth point respectively. Only after the topics relevant to an
individual instituted sign are examined is it proper to deal with the relation of an instituted
sign to members of the same system, the cooperation between instituted signs, and the role of
instituted signs in other human activities. Such a theory, hopefully, would not only provide
explanations for instituted signs, but coordinates with other theories of adjacent sign
phenomena or non-sign phenomena, contributing to the increment of overall human
knowledge. Such a theory also throws light on some deficiencies inherent in many existing
semiotic theories: not starting from or based on sign phenomena; ignoring the genesis and
evolution of signs; neglecting the functions of signs; disregarding the role of sign acts and
their interactions; conflating three layers of analysis, namely, sign acts, individual signs or
sign types, and phenomena involving signs. Instead of starting from and basing themselves
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on sign phenomena, some existing semiotic theories begin with their peculiar metaphysical
beliefs or vested interest, resulting in highly speculative or biased discourse on signs.
Ignoring the genesis and evolution of signs, some theories lose sight of the whole picture of
sign phenomena, and make selective or biased discourse on signs. Neglecting the functions
of signs, some theories turn pan-semiotic, whereas other theories subject their conception of
the sign to the phenomena they focus on, leading to problems in internal consistence or
external coherence. Disregarding the role of sign acts and their interactions, most current
semiotic theories are not explanatory at all, largely confined to talks of the definition and
classification of signs; worse still, they lack the right apparatus to coordinate with other
disciplines, contenting themselves with fuzzy semiotic discourse. Conflating the three layers
of analysis, some semiotic theories are bogged down in vicious circles, unable to address the
genesis questions, leading to chaos in the scenario of human knowledge.
5.6 Minimalist Approach to Semiotics
According to this dissertation, there exists a cline of reasonability for the object of study
of semiotics. The object of study becomes less reasonable, when the scope of sign expands
from instituted signs, to indicative signs and recollective signs, and to abstract inferential
signs, thought-signs, conceptual signs, perceptual signs, sensational signs, sense signs, and
bio-signs. Instituted signs turn out to be the best candidate for the object of semiotics, if
semiotics aspires to be an ideal discipline conducive to the increment of overall human
knowledge. This, of course, does not deny the possibility or right to adopt other alternatives.
After all, an object of study, like a category, is finally determined by our will. It is always
possible to select whatever group of phenomena and call them sign if one likes. For instance,
one is entitled to take a pan-semiotic view, believing that semiosis is coextensive with life
(Umiker-Sebeok and Sebeok 1980: 1), or believing in “physiosemiosis,” i.e., semiosis
operative in the dyadic interactions of brute force (Deely 1990: 94). An umbrella word is
always conveniently useful. A generic term has the advantage to calling our attention to the
link between diverse phenomena. However, expansion in scope necessarily leads to
reduction in shared regularity, rule, or law, resulting in loss of explanatory sufficiency for its
members and making it less worthy of scientific efforts of a discipline. In consequence, the
losses might well overweigh the gains. In contrast, a reasonable object of study covers a
moderate range of phenomena, but reveals much about its members; what is more, it
encourages division of labor among disciplines, lets each discipline fully play its role, and
allows disciplines to coordinate with one another. In consequence, its gains might well
overweigh its losses. Ultimately, the proper radius of an object of study hinges upon how
152

much it contributes to overall human knowledge.
What this dissertation advocates here is a minimalist approach to academic researches,
including semiotic studies. Such an approach aims for maximization of overall human
knowledge. To be more specific, it quests for a theory that meets two criteria: adequate
explanation of its member phenomena; good coordination with other disciplines. Adequate
explanation of its member phenomena involves two requirements: First, it could explain to
an extent all of its members; second, it prioritizes the prototypical members in its
explanatory efficacy, in the sense that it is better to be incapable of thorough explanation of
non-prototypical members than prototypical members. Good coordination with other
disciplines also raises two requirements: First, the theory explicitly specifies its interface
with other disciplines; second, when adjacent disciplines clash with one another, let the one
with greater explanatory power play its role. All these requirements presuppose a proper
object of study. To fulfil such a role, the object of study must itself satisfy two requirements:
First, it is internally coherent, i.e., it boasts of certain family resemblance to hold their
members together; second, it covers a moderate scope of phenomena, so that it complements
rather than encroaching on other objects of study.
The minimalist approach to semiotics treats semiotics as a discipline, and expects it to
develop into an ideal discipline. It studies sign phenomena for a specific purpose: to describe
and explain its member phenomena adequately, in such a way as to coordinate with other
disciplines to add to overall human knowledge. Therefore, it is prescriptive to an extent; it
rejects the purely descriptive or explanatory attitude toward semiotics. It believes in
differences between proper objects of study and improper objects of study, between good
theories and bad theories, and between immature disciplines and ideal disciplines. On the
other hand, this approach also takes a descriptive and explanatory attitude toward semiotics.
It stresses the necessity to describe sign phenomena in detail before arriving at an
explanatory framework. It disapproves of those semiotic theories deduced from metaphysical
assumptions, and those constructed on the basis of one type of sign phenomena. The former
is characteristic of Peirce’s triadic view whereas the second happens with certain specific
semiotics or applied semiotics, such as biosemiotics and social semiotics. They fail to study
semiotics in accordance with the requirements of an ideal discipline. Overall, the minimalist
approach takes a descriptive, explanatory, evaluative, and prescriptive attitude toward
semiotic studies.
The minimalist approach to semiotics also presupposes a proper object of study. This
dissertation nominates the instituted sign. It is believed that recollective signs could be well
explained by scientific inference involved in physical sciences; that indicative signs could be
well explained by scientific inference involved in physiology and psychology; that abstract
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inferential signs, thought-signs, conceptual signs, perceptual signs, sensational signs, and
sense signs are well covered by psychology; and that bio-signs could be sufficiently
explained by biology, though the current biology needs further development. An object of
study with a moderate scope promises more thorough explanation of its member phenomena;
in addition, through coordination with neighboring disciplines, it could also serve to point
out the link between diverse phenomena---the only advantage enjoyed by an object of study
of broad extension. In contrast, an object of study of broad extension necessarily leaves
topics veiled in mystery. For instance, when Eco subsumes intended meaning, inferences
from evidences, and pictorial representation under the term sign, and ascribes the sign to
“semiosic process of interpretation” (1984: 1), his theory cannot really explain why instituted
signs could be put into use in acts of expressing or communicating, as expressing and
communicating are not a kind of interpretation. The pan-semiotic view, endorsed by Sebeok,
Deely, and other biosemioticians, ignores even more topics, making semiotics a discipline of
a large expanse with many uncharted areas. Such an approach to semiotics leads to
disciplinary hegemony without making genuine contribution to the increment of overall
human knowledge.
Having decided on its proper object of study, the minimalist approach to semiotics
requires express statements on the relationship between the object of study and other
phenomena. It needs to make clear how non-sign phenomena cause sign phenomena and
how sign phenomena lead to other non-sign phenomena. It needs to point out the interface
between semiotics and other disciplines. One of the problems with extant semiotic theories is
their tendency to define the sign with terms incommensurable with terms of other disciplines,
or to talk about sign phenomena with purely semiotic terms. Peirce (CP 8.343) defines the
sign with sign (or representamen), object, and interpretant; yet he equivocates about the
meaning of object and interpretant, hesitates to declare their equivalents in other disciplines,
and does not give any real account of the corresponding phenomena. Saussure (1959: 66)
defines the sign with signifier and signified, i.e., sound image and concept, but seldom
characterizes signs with sound image and concept, nor does he give an account of the
relation between sign and image or concept. Such practices not only defy the good scientific
tradition to explain new phenomena with known phenomena, but also shut semiotics from
other disciplines. The minimalist approach to semiotics does otherwise. This dissertation, for
example, boils down the sign to a peculiar kind of activity made up of interrelated sign acts,
and seeks to analyze sign acts with ordinary non-semiotic terms.
In addition, the minimalist approach to semiotics follows a progressive route. First, it
stresses the distinction between a sign phenomenon and a phenomenon involving signs,
between a semiosic act and an activity involving a semiosic act, and between sign-inference
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and inference from sign. It insists on, for instance, studying how signs participate in the
formation of a sculpture, a drawing, or a piece of music, rather than identifying the work of
art with a sign phenomenon. In other words, the works of art are phenomena involving signs
instead of sign phenomena proper. For another instance, several of the ten examples cited by
Sebeok (2001: 25-26) as instances of semiosis are, strictly speaking, activities involving
signs rather than semiosic acts proper. Take the following two examples (Sebeok 2001: 25):
A meteorologist notes a rise in barometric pressure and delivers the next day's forecast taking
that change into account; a compromising fingerprint is introduced as evidence in a trial; the
defendant is convicted on that evidence. In these two examples, the act of forecast delivering,
the act of introducing, and the act of convicting are all non-semiosic acts building on
semiosic acts. These non-semiosic acts are backed by inference from sign. Inference from
sign, as discussed in Section 4.3, often appears hand in hand with sign-inference. This is
natural, as semiosic acts are not launched for their own sake, but for future practice. The
minimalist approach makes a point of separating the two, unless they have already been
collapsed into a new sign-inference by way of sign-jumping. In this spirit, the three kinds of
interpretant distinguished by Peirce do not necessarily fall within the boundary of a semiosis,
any more than Austin’s illocutionary act and perlocutionary act really fall within the compass
a speech act proper.
Second, the minimalist approach to semiotics emphasizes the need to study basic signs
before such extended sign phenomena as sign system and text. In Sebeok and Danesi’s (2000:
2-5) parlance, it is necessary to distinguish “singularized form” from “cohesive form” and
“composite form.” The theory of basic signs constitutes the core and backbone of semiotics;
studies on sign system and text are an extension and application of the theory. It is believed
that systematicity and compositionality are common in nature and the human world, instead
of being the distinguishing features of sign phenomena. Therefore, it is advisable to study the
sign first, before going on to study sign system and text.
Third, the minimalist approach to semiotics underscores the line of demarcation
between sign-relation and relation between signs---that is, between intra-sign relation and
inter-sign relation, in Jin and Cao’s (2006) parlance. Pierce is prone to blend the two
phenomena together. He defines the sign as “anything which determines something else (its
interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in the same way, the
interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum” (CP 2.303; italics original). He
thus defines a sign as “something which generates a sign which generates a sign, etc.”
(Morris 1946: 290; Appendix). Peirce commits the fallacy he himself labels “circulus in
definiendo” (CP 3.464). As Morris comments on it, “Signs, at least at the human level, do
frequently generate a series of sign-processes, but I see no reason why this fact about signs
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should be incorporated into the definition of ‘sign’ itself” (1946: 290; Appendix). Piece’s
unique proclivity, i.e., to identify an individual sign with a sign chain, also explains why he
proposes thought-sign, i.e., a thought being a sign of an ensuing thought, and why he
proceeds to such statements as “All association is by signs” (W 2:237-238; CP 5.307-309)
and “Man is a sign” (CP 5.314). This proclivity also explains why Peirce regards
“combinations of words” as symbols, maintaining that “a proposition, an argument, even a
whole book may be, and should be, a single symbol” (W 1:468; italics added).
Fourth, when it comes to sign types, the minimalist approach recommends studying
their simpler forms before complicated forms, evolutionarily earlier phenomena before later
phenomena, and essential phenomena before peripheral phenomena. For instance, of
instituted signs, it is advisable to study imitative signs, such as an imitative gesture, before
studying partly analogous and partly arbitrary signs, such as a ceremonial gesture. In
studying a Chinese character, it advisable to go from its pictogram to its early ideogram, and
then to its modern form. In studying linguistic signs, it is advisable to study its
communicative function before its cognitive function. Reversing the orders might lead to
delusions. For instance, on examining instituted signs, semioticians, fascinated by the
splendor of language, tend to begin with linguistic signs, rather than first instituted signs. In
consequence, they tend to accentuate the features of linguistic signs or linguistic sign system,
and graft them to other instituted signs. Thus, Saussure takes arbitrariness to be the first
principle of signs (1959: 67). Sebeok and Danesi (2001: 12-13) attribute to “forms of
meaning” the following “structural properties”: paradigmaticity, syntagmaticity, analogy,
sychronicity, diachonicity, and signification.
Fifth, in terms of the underlying mechanism of an individual sign phenomenon, the
minimalist approach calls for progression from signification to communication, from
communication to agreement, and from agreement to convention or law. As argued
persuasively by Eco (1976: 8-9), communication presupposes signification, whereas
signification could exist independently of communication. Among signs in the broader sense,
recollective signs and indicative signs only involve an act of interpreting; as for instituted
signs, representative signs with little materiality could serve personal uses, like counting,
recording, memorizing, thinking, and self-expressing. None of them entails communication.
Thus, it is better to begin with signification before moving on to communication. Similarly,
agreement presupposes communication, and convention presupposes agreement; whereas
communication does not entail agreement, and agreement does not entail convention. Of
instituted signs, indicators and analogous signs do not depend on agreement for
communication. When an agreement is needed, it might be one between two or several
people, as is the case with ciphers and cloaks; in such cases, there exists no convention,
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which generally concerns a community or society. Reversing the orders leads to the fallacy
of wrong direction, rendering semiotics unable to offer a genetic account. This is exactly the
problem with some semiotic accounts. Such semiotic accounts include those ascribing
non-natural signs to communication, community, contract, compact, or convention, such as
Augustine’s signa data, Francis Bacon’s note ad placitum, Poinsot’ stipulated sign, Arnauld
and Nicole’s non-natural signs, and Husserl’s conventional sign; they also include those
semiotic accounts taking signs to be based on social convention, such as Eco’s.
In summary, following the minimalist approach to semiotics, this dissertation proposes
to confine the object of semiotics first to instituted signs instead of other neighboring
phenomena; to sign phenomena, semiosic acts, or sign-inference, instead of phenomena
involving signs, activities involving semiosic acts, or inference from sign; to basic signs
instead of extended sign phenomena, such as sign system and text; to sign-relation instead of
relation between signs; and to essential sign phenomena instead of peripheral sign
phenomena. The proper object of study of semiotics is the instituted sign. The instituted sign
is by nature a special kind of activity---semiosis or semiosic activity. A semiosic activity is
made up of a set of interrelated sign acts. A sign act is launched by a subject under a certain
context for a certain aim, between something perceptible (Y) and something not perceptible
at the moment (X). The relation between Y and X within a sign act makes the so-called
sign-relation. Inference from Y to X or from X to Y within a sign act constitutes the so-called
sign-inference. Mixing together these phenomena poses obstacles to in-depth explanation of
sign phenomena, and results in loss in overall human knowledge. For various reasons,
current semiotics suffers badly from this problem. It fails to appreciate the appeal of simple,
basic sign phenomena themselves. For instituted signs at least, the sole meeting of Y and X
already makes a rich, complicated phenomenon, with enormous effects on the human world
comparable to that of the bang of the universe to the physical world. Semiotics is fascinating
enough to focus itself on the “bang of sign.”
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
This dissertation begins with the identity crisis of semiotics. It is found that semiotics
has no grounds to refuse to be a discipline; instead, it is disappointing just because it has not
yet developed into an ideal discipline. An ideal discipline demands a proper object of study
and a good theory. A proper object of study must be a fully developed, collectively shared,
common category covering a relatively wide range of instances that involve deep-lying
systematic regularities, rules, or laws, which knowledge is useful for guiding extensive
future public practice. A proper object of study lives up to two criteria: it well describes and
explains the range of phenomenon staked out, particularly its typical members; it
complements objects of study of other disciplines and thus contributes to the increment of
overall human knowledge. Such an object of study is normally formed like this: Initial
observations of the world lead to a crude category encompassing a range of phenomena;
descriptive studies and feature analyses of these phenomena reveal their unique features;
comparative studies of these features show the similarities and differences between these
phenomena; evaluative studies of the category according to the two criteria mentioned above
determine whether it qualifies as a proper object of study or needs adjustments regarding its
unifying feature and border; in the latter case, adjustments are then made, followed by
further descriptive, comparative, and evaluative studies, until the phenomena staked out
qualify as a proper object of study. In this spirit, the dissertation embarks on the task of
revamping semiotics by giving a description of the instances and types of signs mentioned
by scholars in the past. Ensuing feature analyses, comparative studies, and evaluative
analyses point to two candidates for the object of study of semiotics: one in its broader sense
and the other in its narrower sense. The sign in the broader sense requires three core
constituents: an act of recollecting or inferring, a relation between something perceptible and
something not perceptible at the moment, and a revealing function. Those signs with a
strikingly marked revealing function represent its prototypical members. Overall, the sign in
the broader sense does not meet the requirements of a proper object of study, as it does not
display any deep-lying regularity, rule, or law worthy of scientific efforts. By comparison,
the sign in the narrower sense, particularly instituted signs, makes a better object of study.
Instituted signs are those sign phenomena that involve a connection established by a subject
when it comes into being for its first time. They originate from recollective signs and
indicative signs, and undergo long evolution between its various subtypes. Instituted signs
are made up of three groups of sign acts: essential phenomena, supplementary phenomena,
and epiphenomena. They perform three main functions: to reveal something mental; to
express or communicate something mental; and to aid or scaffold cognition. All in all,
instituted signs prove to be sufficiently unique, complex, and important to be the proper
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object of study of semiotics, based on which a good theory of semiotics is likely to be
constructed. A discipline with such an object of study and theory meets the requirements of
the minimalist approach to academic researches aimed at the increment of overall human
knowledge.
Further studies could be conducted to flesh out the sketched theory of instituted signs.
First of all, more work needs to be done on the origin and evolution of instituted signs,
including the connection of the topic with biosemiotics, evolutionary linguistics,
evolutionary biology, and brain studies. It is believed that a fully-developed genetic account
of instituted signs will offer us a panoramic yet minute view of the instituted signs. Another
urgent topic for further studies is the function of signs. There has already been much talk on
the topic, but more is needed on how the sign-relation influences other phenomena and what
these influences are. Further studies are also necessary on the makeup of instituted signs. For
instance, what types of sign acts are needed to make up various types of instituted signs?
How do various types of sign acts combine to make an individual sign phenomenon? What is
the mechanism underlying each type of sign act, such as the act of vehicle-making,
expressing, and communicating? What is the general theory of action or activity like that
unifies various types of sign acts? A fourth topic for further studies addresses how an
individual sign phenomenon goes interpersonal and social. This topic concerns an array of
basic topics of the sciences of man. It points to the influence of signs upon the world due to
its communicative function. Another three topics worthy of real efforts are to make clear
how instituted signs combine to make various sign systems, particularly language; how they
cohere into a text; and how they partake in complex human activities. With all of these topics
addressed, a fully-fledged theory of semiotics will be in place.
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